An analysis of the impact of the admission of hearsay evidence on the accused's right to a fair trial by Mhlanga, Pete Vusi
1 | P a g e  
 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE ADMISSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE  
                         ON THE ACCUSED’S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL        
 
                                                  by  
     
 
                                           PETE VUSI MHLANGA 
 
 
                           submitted in accordance with the requirements 
                                                  for the degree of 
 
     MASTER OF LAWS WITH SPECIALISATION IN CRIMINAL AND PROCEDURAL LAW 
 
                                                  at the 
 
                                      UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
                                  SUPERVISOR:  PROF MJ MATHENJWA 
 
 
                                                   OCTOBER 2016 
 
 
2 | P a g e  
 
 
                                ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Mbuzeni Mathenjwa. Your genuine 
commitment and insightful guidance throughout the years have made writing this 
work possible. I am grateful for all your guidance and encouragement. I would also 
like to thank Professor Richard D. Friedman of the University of Michigan Law 
School, whose contributions to the right of confrontation and the rule against hearsay 
remain immeasurable and have inspired my inquisitiveness to explore and embark 
on this work.  
To my friends and family, thank you for your inspiration and encouragement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 | P a g e  
 
                                                   
                                                                         Student number: 8350779 
 
                                    DECLARATION                       
I declare that AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE ADMISSION OF 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE ON THE ACCUSED’S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL is my own 
work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and 
acknowledged by means of complete references. 
 
 
 
…………………….                                        ………………………. 
SIGNATURE                                                 DATE 
(Mr PV Mhlanga) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Pete Vusi Mhlanga
26 October 2016
4 | P a g e  
 
 
                                        CONTENTS 
Title page …………………………………………………………………………1 
Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………...2 
Declaration ……………………………………………………………………….3 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………7-8 
1.2 The problem statement ……………………………………………………8-10 
1.3 The point of departure …………………………………………………….10-11 
1.4 The research methodology ……………………………………………….11 
1.5 The aims of the study ……………………………………………………..11 
1.6 The projected time scale ………………………………………………….11 
1.7 The outline of the chapters ……………………………………………….11-12 
CHAPTER 2 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN 
ENGLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA  
2.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………...13-14 
2.2 Early history and development of the hearsay rule in England ………14 
2.2.1 The religious era ………………………………………………………..14-17 
2.2.2 The formal era …………………………………………………………..17-19 
2.2.3 The rational era …….........................................................................19-21 
2.3 Further development of hearsay evidence in England ……………….21-28 
2.4 Historical development of hearsay evidence in South Africa ………...28-34 
2.5 Conclusion............................................................................................34-35 
CHAPTER 3 EXAMINING THE USE OF EVIDENCE CONSIDERED ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER THE REFORMS INTRODUCED BY THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
AMENDMENT ACT 45 OF 1988 
3.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………..36-38 
3.2 The purpose of section 3 of the 1988 Act ………………………………38-39 
3.2.1 The definition of hearsay evidence …………………………………...39-42 
3.2.2 Does section 3 create discretion or a rule?  ………………………….43-46 
5 | P a g e  
 
3.2.3 Admissible by agreement – section 3(1)(a) …………………………………47 
3.2.4 Admissible where the declarant testifies –section 3(1)(b) …………...........47-49 
3.3 Admissible in the interests of justice – section 3(1)(c) ……………………….47-53 
3.3.1 The nature of the proceedings – section 3(1)(i) …………………….............53-54 
3.3.2 The nature of the evidence – section 3(1)(ii) ………………………………..54-55 
3.3.3 The purpose for which the evidence is tendered – section 3(1)(c)(iii) ……56-57 
3.3.4 The probative value of the evidence – section 3(1)(c)(iv) ………………….57-58 
3.3.5 The reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility 
the probative value of such evidence depends – section 3(1)(c)(v) …………….58-60 
3.3.6 Any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail – 
section 3(1)(c)(vi) ……………………………………………………………………..60-62 
3.3.7 Any other factor which should, in the opinion of the court be taken into account 
– section 3(1)(c)(vii) ………………………………………………………………….62-66 
3.4 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………...66-67 
CHAPTER 4 THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: MEANING AND INTENTION OF THE 
RIGHT TO CHALLENGE EVIDENCE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
4.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….68-69 
4.2 The principle of orality …………………………………………………………...69-72 
4.3 The origin of cross-examination ………………………………………………..73-75 
4.4 The role of cross-examination as an essential evidentiary testing device …75-79 
4.5 The meaning and intention of the right to challenge evidence ……………..80-84 
4.6 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………..84-85 
CHAPTER 5 THE HEARSAY RULE AND THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IN 
OTHER COMMON-LAW JURISDICTIONS AND IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
5.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….86                                                                                                     
5.2 Unites States ……………………………………………………………………...87-93 
5.3 United Kingdom ………………………………………………………………….94-105 
5.4 Canada ……………………………………………………………………….....105-109 
6 | P a g e  
 
5.5 Australia ………………………………………………………………………..109-112 
5.6 New Zealand …………………………………………………………………..112-114 
5.7 Hong Kong …………………………………………………………………….115-117 
5.8 Ireland ………………………………………………………………………….117-118 
5.9 European Court of Human Rights …………………………………………..119-124 
5.10 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………124-125 
CHAPTER 6 THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF SECTION 3 OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE AMENDMENT ACT 45 OF 1988 
6.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………..126 
6.2 Section A: The constitutionality of section 3 of the 1988 Act – a South African 
overview …………………………………………………………………………….126-131 
6.3 Section B: The constitutionality of the interests of justice and the reliability of 
hearsay evidence statutory tests – a comparative analysis……………...........132-142 
6.4 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………..142 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………143-146 
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………147-158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 | P a g e  
 
 
CHAPTER 1         INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
Amongst the major achievements of English common law are the trial by jury system 
and the hearsay rule, a rule which was formed as a tool to handle the admission of 
evidence and was subsequently called the hearsay rule. At the centre of this rule is 
the notion that “evidence so labelled should be excluded uncompromisingly if it could 
not be accommodated within an existing, recognised exceptions, whether statutory 
or at common law.”1 Wigmore described the hearsay rule as, “the most characteristic 
rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence – a rule which may be esteemed, next to 
jury trial, the greatest contribution of that eminently practical legal system to the 
world’s methods of procedure”.2 Furthermore, Thayer, when describing the influence 
of the hearsay rule in the English law of evidence, states that the “greatest and most 
remarkable offshoot of the jury was the body of excluding rules which chiefly 
constitute the English law of evidence.”3 
Of equal importance is that Zeffertt and Paizes also note that the hearsay rule 
applied in South Africa was received from England and was subsequently 
incorporated into South African law through statutorily enactments.4 On the other 
hand, this rule has also seen “some reforms in the United Kingdom recently which 
were considered to be in line with human rights and the right to a fair trial.”5 
Moreover, prior to the legislated definition of hearsay evidence, the South African 
courts have defined hearsay evidence as “evidence of statements made by persons 
not called as witnesses which is tendered for the purpose of proving the truth of what 
is contained in the statement.”6 When commenting on the fundamental attributes of 
the hearsay rule and the rationale for excluding hearsay evidence, Paizes argued 
that this evidence is considered inadmissible because “it contains intrinsic dangers 
and weaknesses that are not normally present in original testimony.”7 
Furthermore, owing to criticism levelled against the common law hearsay rule, 
parliament adopted the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 in order to 
prescribe for the circumstances in which hearsay evidence may be admissible. On 
                                                          
1
 D T Zeffertt and AP Paizes The South African Law of Evidence (formerly Hoffmann and Zeffertt) 
(2009) at 385. 
2
 John H. Wigmore  A Treatise on the Anglo-American Systems of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
(1940) at para.1364. 
3
 B. Thayer A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) at 180. 
4
 Ibid at 385. 
5
 Horncastle and others v R, [2009] UKSC 14 at para. 55. 
6
 Estate De Wet v De Wet 1924 CPD 341 at 343. 
7
 AP Paizes “The Concept of Hearsay with Particular Emphasis on Implied Hearsay Assertions” a 
thesis submitted in 1983 at the Witwatersrand University, at 20. 
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the other hand, the 1996 Constitution8 guarantees an accused’s right to a fair trial 
which includes the right to challenge evidence. 
1.2 The problem statement 
Section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 maintains the primary 
common law principle that hearsay evidence is inadmissible, but it also adds 
circumstances in which such evidence may be admissible. The Act provides as 
follows: 
“(1) Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be admitted as evidence at 
criminal or civil proceedings, unless – 
(a) each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the admission thereof as 
evidence at such proceedings; 
(b) the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, himself 
testifies at such proceedings; or 
(c) the court, having regard to – 
(i) the nature of the proceedings; 
(ii) the nature of the evidence; 
(iii) the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; 
(iv) the probative value of the evidence; 
(v) the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the 
probative value of such evidence depends; 
(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail; and  
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account, 
is of the opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice. 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not render admissible any evidence which is inadmissible on 
any ground other than that such evidence is hearsay evidence. 
(3) Hearsay evidence may be provisionally admitted in terms of subsection (1)(b) if the court is 
informed that the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, will 
himself testify in such proceedings.: Provided that if such person does not later testify in such 
proceedings, the hearsay evidence shall be left out of account unless the hearsay evidence is 
admitted in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) or is admitted by the court in terms of paragraph 
(c) of that subsection. 
(4) For purposes of this section –  
“hearsay evidence” means evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends 
upon the credibility of any person other than the person giving such evidence; 
“party” means the accused or party against whom hearsay evidence is to be adduced, including the 
prosecution.” 
On the other hand, the Constitution provides that, “Every accused person has a right 
to a fair trial, which includes the right to adduce and challenge evidence.”9 In 
addition, South African courts are not unanimous with regard to the meaning and 
                                                          
8
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996. 
9
 Section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. 
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intention of the right to challenge evidence and whether it includes the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses. 
In 2002, in S v Ndlovu and others,10 the court had to determine whether the “use of 
hearsay evidence by the state violated the accused’s right to challenge evidence by 
cross-examination”? It was held that, because the right to challenge evidence does 
not include the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, the admission of hearsay 
evidence did not, therefore, violate the accused’s right to a fair trial. However, in 
2009, in S v Msimango and others,11the court once again considered whether the 
right to challenge evidence includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses 
even in circumstances where hearsay evidence could be admissible, and it was held 
that the right to challenge evidence includes the right to cross-examine witnesses. 
Furthermore, the decision in Ndlovu was also criticised in the 2007 judgement of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Balkwell and another,12 where the provisions of 
section 3 of the 1988 Act and the accused’s right to a fair trial were also at issue. 
Ponnan JA identified the numerous problems created by the decision in Ndlovu and 
stated that “what is envisaged in Ndlovu it seems, in the case of an accused 
implicated by the extra-curial statement (hearsay statement) of another, is that he 
should go into legal battle without the sword of cross-examination or the shield of the 
cautionary rules of evidence. That can hardly conduce to a fair trial.” 
In addition, the decision in Ndlovu was recently rejected with regard to another 
aspect by the Constitutional Court in S v Mhlongo; S v Nkosi,13 where the court 
examined the approach adopted in the admission of hearsay evidence in Ndlovu and 
held that approach to be unconstitutional because “it violates section 9(1) of the 
Constitution, which provides that everyone is equal before the law and entitled to 
equal protection and benefit of the law.” While in Mhlongo, the constitutionality of the 
approach in Ndlovu was not questioned on the basis of the right to challenge 
evidence, it was, however, criticised on the use of hearsay statements against an 
accused where such evidence has not be subjected to cross-examination and its 
effect on the right to challenge evidence. 
Moreover, Wigmore, when commenting on cross-examination as a fundamental 
common law principle and the right of confrontation, argues that, “if there has been 
cross-examination, there has been a confrontation. The satisfaction of the right of 
cross-examination disposes of any objection based on the so-called right of 
confrontation in the American Constitution.”14 
Furthermore, the issue of whether the admission of hearsay evidence violates the 
right of the accused to a fair trial is well covered in other jurisdictions. In 1895, the 
                                                          
10
 2002 (2) SACR 325 (SCA) at para. 24. 
11
 2010 (1) SACR 544 (GSJ) at paras. 4 and 27. 
12
 [2007] 3 All SA 465 (SCA) at para. 35. 
13
 2015 (2) SACR 323 (CC) at paras. 27-33. 
14
 Wigmore supra 1396 at 127. 
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United States Supreme Court, in Mattox v United States,15 when examining the 
admission of hearsay evidence and the accused’s right to be confronted with 
witnesses against him, had stated that:  
“the primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte 
affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a 
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, 
not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to 
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanour upon 
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.” 
Cross-examination seems to have been a core feature of the constitutional right to 
be confronted with adverse witnesses provided by the United States Constitution for 
centuries. 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in Coy v Iowa,16 when considering 
hearsay evidence and the right of confrontation held that: 
 “the confrontation clause by its words provides a criminal defendant the right to confront face-to-face 
the witnesses against him. The core guarantee serves the general perception that confrontation is 
essential to fairness, and helps to ensure the integrity of the fact-finding process by making it more 
difficult for witnesses to lie.” 
The right to confrontation between an accused and his accuser also safeguards the 
fairness of the criminal procedure system. In addition, in Maryland v Craig,17the 
United States Supreme Court also held that the right to be confronted with adverse 
witnesses is also discharged and completed by numerous factors, amongst which, 
cross-examination is the main factor. 
The questions for this study are, therefore: 
1. Does the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to challenge evidence, 
include the right to cross-examine a witness? 
2. Does the admission of hearsay evidence under section 3 of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988 violate the right of the accused to a fair trial? 
 
1.3 Point of departure, assumptions, and hypothesis 
An accused has a right to a fair trial which includes a right to challenge evidence in 
terms of section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. The Constitution is, however, 
incomprehensible and unclear on whether the right to challenge evidence includes a 
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. An analysis of the relevant case law and 
literature review in South Africa reveals that the case law is not precise about 
whether the right to challenge evidence includes the right to cross-examine the 
original maker of a statement. Furthermore, an analysis of other international 
                                                          
15
 [1895] USSC 34, at 242-243. 
16
 [1988] USSC 154, at 1015-1020. 
17
 [1990] USSC 130, at 836. 
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jurisdictions on the admission of hearsay evidence is essential in interpreting the 
phrase in the Constitution “right to challenge evidence.” Accordingly, the admission 
of hearsay evidence in South Africa is analysed from a constitutional point of view. 
1.4 Research methodology 
Of importance is that the research for this study consists primarily of a literature 
study that focuses on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the 
relevant legislation, viz. the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. In order to 
answer the primary questions posed in this study, the study will examine both the 
historical and comparative overview of the hearsay rule. Comparison with common 
law jurisdictions which currently use the hearsay rule principle in respect of a fair trial 
will also assist in formulating an informed opinion and views when making 
recommendations for the reform of existing legislation on hearsay evidence and the 
right to challenge evidence which is part of the right to a fair trial in South Africa. 
1.5 Aims of the study 
The aims of the study are, firstly, to examine the constitutionality of section 3 of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act, and, secondly, to examine and interpret the 
constitutional provision on the right to a fair trial which includes the right to adduce 
and challenge evidence. Furthermore, the study also aims to clarify whether the 
constitutional right to challenge evidence includes the right to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, and, in addition, whether the Law of Evidence Amendment Act violates 
the Constitution in this regard. 
1.6 Projected time scale 
The projected time scale of this study is November 2016. 
1.7 Outline of the chapters 
Chapter 1 – Introduction  
This chapter explains the problem statement, the point of departure, the aim of the 
study, the projected time scale, the research methodology, and it also provides an 
outline of the chapters. 
Chapter 2 – The historical development and background of the hearsay rule in 
England and South Africa 
This chapter discusses the origin and development of the hearsay rule in England 
and its adoption into South African law of evidence.  
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Chapter 3 – Examining the use of evidence considered admissible under the 
reforms introduced by the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 
This chapter probes and examines the admission of hearsay evidence under 
provisions of this Act with the view to establishing whether this Act is comprehensible 
and intelligible in providing for the admission of such evidence. 
Chapter 4 – The right to a fair trial: meaning and intention of the right to 
challenge evidence in the South African Constitution 
This chapter examines the meaning and intention of the right to challenge evidence 
in the Constitution with a view to establishing whether this right includes the right to 
cross-examine witnesses. 
Chapter 5 – The hearsay rule and the right of confrontation in other common 
law jurisdictions and in the European Court of Human Rights 
The aims of the study in this chapter is to probe how the hearsay rule and the right of 
confrontation are understood and applied in other common law jurisdictions and in 
the European Court of Human Rights. This comparative analysis will also assist in 
establishing and interpreting the magnitude and extent of the right challenge 
evidence in South Africa’s Constitution in the context of the use of hearsay evidence. 
Chapter 6 – The constitutional validity of section 3 of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988 
This chapter examines the effect of the use of hearsay evidence under this Act on 
the right to a fair trial. The constitutionality of the statutory tests, namely-, the 
interests of justice and the reliability evidence which form part of section 3, will be 
probed with a view to establishing whether this Act is compatible with the values 
protected by the right to a fair trial. In addition, a comparative analysis of these tests 
will be embarked upon in order to establish international perspectives in jurisdictions 
where these tests are used in determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence. The 
aim of the latter exercise will, in addition, be to assess the constitutionality of these 
tests which form fundamental features of section 3 of the Act. 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
This chapter will draw some conclusions and also attempt to answer the primary 
questions of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN 
ENGLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA                                            
2.1 Introduction  
The objective of the study in this chapter is to examine the historical unfolding and 
advancement of the hearsay rule in England and its influence in the South African 
law of hearsay evidence. This entails a probing into the origin, rationale and extent of 
the hearsay rule at its infancy and assessing whether it has been modified as well as 
studying the nature and extent of its development over centuries. This examination 
will also assess the various phases of development of the English hearsay rule and 
its primary features. Furthermore, the latter part of this chapter will assess the 
historical development and advancement of the English hearsay rule in South Africa 
after its adoption into South African law with a view to comprehending fully and 
assessing whether the current South African hearsay law is comprehensible, definite 
and intelligible. 
Paizes, when commenting on English hearsay rule and its influence in South African 
hearsay law, asked the question, “Is the hearsay rule the product of the adversary 
system or the child of the jury?”18 
In an endeavour to answer this question, Paizes argues that it seems more prudent 
to consider the fact that the rule developed as a result of two aspects, firstly, the 
blooming of the adversarial trial system with its main component being the 
presentation of oral evidence and the confrontation between the accused and his 
accusers, and, secondly, the jury system which has developed and become the 
driving force behind the adversarial trial procedure.19  
On the other hand, the hearsay rule seems not to have been the originally accepted 
principle in asserting the truth, and this is evident from the articulation of the nature 
and fundamental attributes of the law of the Roman Empire when one Roman 
Governor, named Felix, was asked to pronounce judgement against Paul, and he 
outlined the Roman law procedure for truth-finding and litigation and stated that, “it 
was not the custom of the Romans to deliver any man to destruction before the 
accused meets the accusers face to face, and has an opportunity to answer for 
himself concerning the charge against him.”20 Ancient Roman law was characterised 
by confrontation between the accused and his accuser.  
 
                                                          
18
 Andrew Peter Paizes “The Concept of Hearsay with Particular Emphasis on Implied Hearsay 
Assertions” a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
(1983) supra at 7,12. 
19
 Ibid at 12. 
20
 Acts 25:16, Holy Bible, New King James Version,1982. 
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Furthermore, Fedele has, after a detailed examination of Biblical history, expressed 
the opinion that this view of Roman law articulated by Felix and the arrest and 
prosecution of Paul took place during the reign of Roman Emperor Nero in A.D. 64.21 
2.2  Early history and development of hearsay evidence in England 
The English law of evidence can be grouped into three diverse, fundamental 
conservative phases which unfolded during its primitive historical era:22 the religious 
(primitive) phase-, with the fundamental belief that was accepted during this era 
being that a human being was incapable of judging another human’s affairs; the 
formal phase-, where the fundamental feature of  the era was the significance placed 
on receiving evidence under oath and the belief that a false oath or error could lead 
to death;  and, lastly, the rational phase-, where the fundamental belief was that it 
was no longer required that the trier of fact should simply confirm the procedural 
correctness of the method of conducting the trial but also had to employ and 
exercise cogitation and reasoning before giving judgement in the disputes. 
2.2.1 The religious (primitive) era 
The procedure that was employed during this phase in order to establish guilt and 
unearthing the truth was called “trial by ordeal”.23 Schwikkard,24when writing on the 
development of English law during this era, states that the “trial by ordeal” was 
deemed to be an accurate tool for establishing veracity in disputes, and it was a well-
known procedure in England. When commenting on the primary attribute of the “trial 
by ordeal”, Stein argues that this procedure was a petition in which God (deity, divine 
being) was entreated to judge the issues in dispute.25 In addition, Stein also explains 
this procedure and adds that, “In an age of faith, when there was a general belief in 
the direct intervention of divine providence in human affairs, it was not irrational to 
think that God knows what happened better than a human and He will indicate which 
party was in the right.” Where did this belief originate? The King James Bible seems 
to give some indication which points to its origin and rationale where it attests that, 
“My defence is of God, Who saves the upright in heart. God is a just judge, And God 
is angry with the wicked every day.”26 
It can be argued, therefore, that this Biblical assertion is the origin of the belief that 
God judges over human disputes and affairs, and is indignant with the guilty party, 
and he protects the innocent. 
                                                          
21
 Gene Fedele Heroes of the Faith (2003) at 14-15. 
22
 A. Esmein (translated by Simpson) A History of Continental Criminal Procedure with Special 
Reference to France: Continental Legal History Series (1968) at 617-9. 
23
 P J Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence (2009) at 3. 
24
 P J Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence supra at 3. 
25
 Peter Stein Legal Institutions: The Development of Dispute Settlement (1984) at 25. 
26
 Psalm 7:10-11, New King James Version (1982). 
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Moreover, Nokes has examined and written on the meaning and scope of the “trial 
by ordeal” and he concurs with the views expressed by Stein that the “trial by ordeal” 
was considered an entreaty that the contest be judged by God and that humans 
were deemed incapable of making judgement over other human’s affairs.27  
Schwikkard, on the other hand, identifies the existence of numerous types of ordeals 
that were employed by the Anglo-Saxons during this era.28 This views also seems to 
be in accord with those shared by Morgan who was further of the opinion that one of 
these ordeals was called “ordeal of the accursed morsel” (this ordeal was also called 
the corsnaed) during which it would be mandatory that the persons accused in the 
contest would be required to gulp a torrid piece of bread and this would go with a 
prayer to God that if the accused had lied and was guilty he should be throttled by 
the piece of bread.29 In one of the trials that was deemed to be the trial of the century 
where this ordeal was administered in 1053 it was reported that Edward the 
Confessor had charged Godwin, the Earl of Kent, with murder, and during the trial 
Godwin had suffocated and died after he tried to gulp his piece of bread. This 
outcome is believed to have astounded everyone who had attended the trial and the 
cruel and inhumane effect it presented were witnessed and questioned.30 
In addition, Damaska31 and Wigmore,32 when commenting on the nature and 
working of this ordeal, are in accord in suggesting that this trial procedure appeared 
to be unreasonable and ludicrous to the present-day reasoning. Moreover, Damaska 
clarifies her criticism of this ordeal in the following terms, “By irrational I mean 
procedural devices such as trial by ordeal, which rests on religious imaginings, 
especially the belief that the deity can be summoned to intervene in the screenings 
of the guilty from the innocent.”33 
Wigmore also detailed his disapproval of the trial by ordeal and argues that: 
“Up to the end of the 1200s, the history of the rules of Evidence, in the modern sense, is like the 
chapter upon ophidians in Iceland; for there were none. Under the primitive practices of trial by ordeal, 
by battle, and by compurgation, the proof is accomplished by a ‘judicium Dei’. There is no room for 
our modern notion of persuasion of the tribunal by the credibility of the witnesses; for the tribunal 
merely verified the observance of due formalities, and did not conceive of these as directly addressed 
to its own reasoning powers.”
34
 
                                                          
27
 G. D. Nokes An Introduction to Evidence (1967) at 18. 
28
 Ibid at 3. 
29
 William Forsyth History of Trials by Jury (1878) at 68. 
30
 Van der Merwe “Die Evolusie van die Mondelinge Karakter en Uitsluitingsreels van die Engelse 
Gemene Bewysreg” Stellenbosch L. Rev. (1991) at 288. (my translation). 
31
 M. R. Damaska “Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure” U. 
Pennsylvania L. Rev. (1972) at 556. 
32
 Wigmore Treatise para. 8. 
33
 Ibid at 556. 
34
 Ibid at para. 8. 
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There was no room for human reasoning required to be exercised by the trier of fact. 
Paton and Derham, on the other hand, express divergent views on this point and 
suggest that the “trial by ordeal” (corsnaed) was a sensible, judicious and prudent 
truth-finding procedure, and they argue that there was credible evidence indicating 
that emotions of blameworthiness and iniquity could bring dread which could cause 
dehydration on the mouth and which, in turn, could have made it hard to gulp a torrid 
slice of bread.35 These views are also advocated by Scolnick36 who is of the view 
that, “There are reports of a deception test used by Indians based on the observation 
that fear may inhibit the secretion of saliva. To test credibility, an accused was given 
rice to chew. If he could spit it out, he was considered innocent, but if it stuck to his 
gums he was judged guilty.”37 
In addition, Schwikkard has examined the working of the corsnaed and questioned 
whether “it would be far-fetched to suggest that the corsnaed was perhaps the early 
source of the modern rule that the demeanour of a witness may be taken into 
account as a factor affecting credibility.”38 The origin of the use of demeanour as tool 
to establish the credibility of a witness seems, therefore, to stem from this “trial by 
ordeal”. 
Furthermore, Holdsworth also examined the development of English law and the 
working of the ordeals during this era, and he argues that, in 1066, another form of 
ordeal, called trial by battle, was brought in. The main feature of this ordeal was that 
a physical fight between the parties to the dispute was believed to be a credible 
procedure to resolve the contest.39 The author also argues that summoning the 
parties to engage in a physical fight was not simply the determining factor as it “was 
not merely an appeal to physical force because it was accompanied by a belief that 
providence will give victory to the right. The trial by battle is the judiciam Dei par 
excellence.”40 As in the “trial by ordeal” the “trial by battle” was also accompanied by 
prayer or the belief that God would intervene in the affairs of man and judge which 
adversary was guilty or innocent. While the trial by ordeal called corsnaed was 
characterised by the swallowing of bread accompanied by a prayer to God, the trial 
by battle involved physical confrontation also accompanied by prayer as a mode of 
resolving disputes. What both these ordeals have in common was the fact that divine 
intervention was entreated to reveal the guilty litigant. 
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Van der Merwe,41 also embarked on a detailed examination of English law during the 
10th century and the working of the trial by battle, and he argues that one of the 
fundamental attribute of the adversarial trial procedure was the fact that it was 
required of the parties to the dispute not only to confront each other but also to 
subject each other to cross-examination, and he further reasoned that “physical 
confrontation (trial by battle) would later develop into verbal confrontation (cross-
examination).”42   Hence the origin of confrontation through cross-examination 
seems to stem from this ordeal which was called the “trial by battle”. 
Schwikkard is in accord with these views expressed by Van der Merwe on the 
metamorphosis of the trial procedure in that physical confrontation evolved and 
amounted to oral confrontation which includes cross-examination and the right of 
confrontation and this also suggests that this right bears an historical link in the 
development of the hearsay rule.43 The accused had to abandon and relinquish his 
right to confrontation through a physical duel and in return he was required to 
confront his accuser through cross-examination. 
2.2.2 The formal era 
This era of development of English law experienced some changes, and Van 
Caenegem argues that, during the twelfth century, there was an upsurge in individual 
intellect. He points out that, “in the field of evidence … people were turning their 
backs on age old irrational methods”.44 According to this author the various forms of 
trial by ordeals later came to be considered “old irrational methods” of dispute 
resolution. 
Van der Merwe also examined the development of English law during the 12th 
century and expressed the view that the effectiveness of the “trial by ordeal” was 
distrusted and there was growing suspicion about its coherence and validity as a trial 
procedure used for uncovering the truth. The author also cites incidents where a 
party to a dispute would bribe and ‘win’ a case through a false oath during the 
ordeals. Moreover, this injustice was also observed in the “trial by battle” as a form of 
“trial by ordeal” where a party would commission and pay someone else who was 
originally not party to the contest to fight on his behalf.45 When an outsider would be 
paid to be involved in a fray that was originally intended to be fought by the accused 
and his accuser, the trial by battle was seen to be achieving what was deemed to be 
an unintended effect which has also raised doubts regarding the  
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existence of this trial procedure because it was prayed that God would reveal the 
guilty party even though wrong parties would be involved in the fray.  
Thayer argues that during the 12th century there was a growing mistrust about the 
effectiveness and adequacy of the trial by ordeal and points out that these ordeals 
were overseen by the Roman Catholic priests. It was during this state of scepticism 
in 1215 that Pope Innocent III prohibited a priest’s involvement. The author also 
suggests that it was this Roman Catholic’s proclamation that brought the legitimacy 
of the whole trial procedure (trial by ordeal) into ruin.46 
Langbein concurs with the above view articulated by Thayer47 and argues that “the 
decisive prohibition of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, reinforced by the decretal 
of Honorius III in 1222, eliminated the ordeals from church practice, and effectively 
from secular courts as well.”48 
In addition, Langbein has also considered the significance and magnitude of this 
Catholic’s proclamation on the future role and character of the ordeals and argues 
that the influence of the forbidding of the involvement of priests in the administering 
of the ordeals in state courts resulted in priests no longer providing God’s 
intervention in settling disputes and this resulted in a jurisdictive dilemma.49 The 
author is also of the opinion that, because this was the age where the Catholic 
Church was deemed to be the only point of contact between human kind and God, 
and the withdrawal of priests from taking part in administering the ordeals had a 
monumental effect on the relevance and value of the trial by ordeals.50  
Langbein seems to agree with the views expressed by Caenegam that the original 
meaning and essence of the ordeals were gradually being abandoned, and he 
argues that their character and purpose was eroded and states that “the attempt to 
make God the fact finder for human disputes was being abandoned. Henceforth, 
humans were going to replace God in deciding guilt or innocence…”51 
Forsyth, in addition, has also identified the changing character of the trial system and 
argues that it was during this period in England that oath-helpers “compurgators” 
were employed, and they grew famous. The primary role of the oath-helpers was 
seen mostly in their willingness to take an oath and declare that reliance had to be 
placed on the oath of one of the parties even though they were not individuals who 
had observed the incidents in question.52 The author further explains the working of 
the oath-helpers and claims that the side which could gather a vast congregation of 
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oath-helpers was deemed the “winner” of the dispute.53 Now a dispute was decided 
by the size of the crowd that was willing to confirm whether an oath by either litigant 
was credible and not by prayer to God as in the trials by ordeals. 
Mannheim, when describing the main attributes of English law which distinguished it 
from the law which was used in other countries in Europe during this era, states that: 
“English law of evidence is mainly concerned with the question of admissibility, Continental law more 
with the question of value [weight]. English law eliminates a great deal of evidence from the very 
beginning, because it may mislead the jury. Continental law comparatively seldom prohibits the 
admission of evidence. That was originally a consequence of trial by jury…French and German 
judges ‘think there is no danger in their listening to evidence of hearsay, because they [French and 
German] can trust themselves entirely to disregard the hearsay evidence or to give it any little weight 
which it may seem to deserve.’ Nevertheless, this method of admitting as much evidence as possible 
has been retained in the Continental law…”
54
 
The English law of evidence focused on the question of whether the evidence at 
issue was admissible and it identified a danger in judges listening to hearsay 
evidence and later being able to exclude it and or determine its admissibility. 
Schwikkard, on the other hand, when examining the significance of the oath-helpers 
in the development of English law, also agrees with the views expressed by Forsyth 
and says that the number of oath-helpers was decisive in the outcome of a case and 
that it was not required that a case be decided on the quality of the evidence or its 
merits.55 As has been shown these views are also in accord with those expressed by 
Mannheim. 
2.2.3 The rational era 
White examined the significant input provided by the compurgators and how their 
role continued to shape English law, and he states that it did not take long to be 
comprehended that these oath-helpers were capable of providing a more substantial 
input into dispute settlements than anyone else. It was owing to their understanding 
of proceedings that their role changed from being required only to confirm which 
party’s oath was credible to one where they were also obligated to perform a judging 
role and give judgement against the litigants. White also explains the 
accomplishments brought by the oath-helpers into the development of English law of 
evidence, and he argues that as people in the community became more preoccupied 
with their own affairs as the inhabitants were growing. This resulted in more people 
not knowing the private affairs of their neighbours and the details of the contests. 
There was a growing need for witnesses who had observed the events to appear at 
the hearing and give oral testimony and the peculiarity of the jury trial system and the 
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hearing of evidence from witnesses who themselves have perceived the events soon 
became the fundamental attribute of English law.56 
This significant shift in the role of the compurgators resulted in the fact that their 
opinion in the accuracy of a litigant’s oath was no longer a prerequisite for taking part 
in the trial but rather that people who had observed the incidents were summoned to 
give evidence. The origin of eye-witnesses evidence and its value in uncovering the 
truth seems to be found in this era of the development of English law. In addition, it 
became necessary that the compurgators should be unaware and uninformed about 
the facts in dispute prior to the hearing and that their judgements should be based on 
the evidence presented during the trial.57 
On the other hand, it seems that this procedure was not strictly followed because at 
some stage the jury, which also developed during this era in England, was selected 
from neighbours who were more likely to be witnesses to the dispute. This aspect 
Langbein has called “self-informing”.58 
Moreover, Wigmore wrote about this role of out-of-court-witness during this era and 
states that, “By the 1500s, the constant employment of witnesses, as the jury’s chief 
source of information, brings about a radical change. Here entered, very directly, the 
possibilities of our modern system.”59 This latter view seems to be in accord with 
those expressed by White above on the origin of witnesses who would give oral 
evidence in the English law of evidence. 
Forkosch, seems to concur with the views expressed by White on the role of 
witnesses and also note the growing contrasting roles which witnesses and jurors 
were performing during this era. He argues that, “jurors now were assumed to enter 
the box with a cognitive tabula rasa so that facts could be writ upon their minds 
through, for example, the medium of witnesses giving oral testimony…”60 
Furthermore, Schwikkard also argues that the principle of orality was developed by 
the widespread admission of verbal evidence during this era because oral testimony 
was becoming the main source of evidence that could resolve disputes. On the 
growing role of oral testimony during this era, Van der Merwe also concurs with 
these views expressed by Schwikkard and is of the opinion that the working of the 
principle of orality during the medieval era can be rooted in the “trial by battle” which 
afforded litigants the right to confront each other physically and, from this right, he 
further argued “flowed cross-examination” as the physical confrontation turned into 
verbal confrontation.61 The admission of oral evidence is, therefore, according to Van 
                                                          
56
 R. White “Origin and Development of Trial by Jury” Tennessee L. Rev. (1961) at 15. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 John H. Wigmore A General Survey of the History of the Rules of Evidence, in 2 Select Essays in 
Anglo-American Legal History (1908) at 692. 
60
 M.D. Forkosch “The Nature of Legal Evidence” California L. Rev.(1971) at 1373. 
61
 SE Van der Merwe supra at 306. 
21 | P a g e  
 
der Merwe an input made by the oath-helpers (compurgators) into the common law 
system as “the spoken word was employed in taking the oath.”62  
Moreover, Turner, when commenting on the growing need for oral evidence which 
was witnessed during this era, has stated that it was during the twelfth century in 
England that the “need to exclude hearsay was first recognised. Though the dangers 
of hearsay evidence were first recognised in the thirteenth century…”63 
In summary, this stage of the development of the English law of evidence witnessed 
the beginning of the system where witnesses would give oral evidence and be 
required to recount the events in question and a well-thought-out judgement began 
to be given by the trier of fact. This oral character of these proceedings gave rise to 
what became the principle of orality. Furthermore, according to Schwikkard, the 
recognition of the principle of orality led to certain evidence, amongst others, hearsay 
evidence, to be considered inadmissible in certain circumstances.64 This notion of 
excluding hearsay evidence can also be seen as the origin of the rule against 
hearsay. 
2.3  Further development of hearsay evidence in England  
In the aftermath of the developments witnessed during the 12th and 13th centuries, 
the nature and scope of the English hearsay rule continued to develop, and the 
general scepticism regarding the admission of hearsay evidence remained at the 
core of its unfolding character. 
Blackstone, when outlining the character and development of English common law 
and the law of evidence in 1768, argued that that its main characteristic has for a 
number of years been seen in the method of giving evidence in a criminal trial by 
witnesses. It embodied what the he termed “common-law tradition” whereby 
common law and the adversarial trial system required that witnesses give live 
testimony, the inquisitorial system, on the other hand, had allowed examinations 
which took place in private.65 As in the preceding centuries this principle of orality 
was not always upheld and this is evident in the 1670 decision where the court in 
Lutterell v Reynell, after one of the witnesses could not attend the trial, held that 
sworn statements should be admissible where it was proved that the witness 
became sick on his way to trial and could not be present.66 
In another case that was also decided during the same period, in Green v Gatewick, 
the court also accepted that there were circumstances in which hearsay evidence 
could be received, and it held that evidence given by a deponent in pre-trial 
examinations could be utilised and also that an accused forfeited the right to 
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question that witness if the witness’s absence was caused by wrongdoing on the part 
of the accused.67 
Stephen, on the other hand, argues that, while English common law was developing 
firmly on the principle of oral evidence, there were also times where it embraced 
components of the civil-law mode of criminal procedure. Witnesses were examined 
by Justices of the Peace and statements taken prior to the hearing. The court would 
allow these examinations to be read instead of receiving live testimony. This 
procedure would lead the accused to demand that that the deponents appear and 
give live testimony, and these requests were at times turned down.68 
Furthermore, Langbein describes the procedure used in taking the examinations by 
the Justices of the Peace (JPs) and points out that: 
 “the JPs would bind over the accuser to prosecute. On pain of forfeiting his bond, the accuser would 
be obliged to appear at gaol delivery to give evidence before the assize
69
 judges and the two juries. 
The witness who lost his taste for revenge between the crime and the trial, or who was intimidated, or 
who was loath to make a long journey to the county town for assizes – he would now be bound to 
attend and give evidence.”
70
  
The notion that verbal confrontation would take place between the adversaries as a 
tool to resolve disputes was gradually becoming a fundamental attribute of English 
common law, and, in turn, the complainant was relinquishing his claim and 
prerogative to seek vengeance against the accused. 
This state of affairs in the common law hearsay rule was also influenced by the 
legislative developments which were enacted during the 16th century when Queen 
Mary passed a statute71 which introduced new changes in the rules of evidence. 
Section 11 of the relevant legislation provides that “all witnesses against the 
defendant were to attend court to give evidence against him in person if living and 
within the realm.”72  
Friedman examined the effect of this statues and the English common law during 
16th century and gave the opinion that:  
“one of the great prides of the English was that in their system, as in those of the ancient Hebrews 
and Romans, witnesses against an accused gave their testimony openly, “face-to-face” with the 
accused. As the system developed further, it also became clear that the accused had a right to 
subject witnesses against him to cross-examination.”
73
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Hence English common law is thought to have provided not only the notion of giving 
live evidence in the presence of both adversaries but also cross-examination as its 
fundamental attribute through this legislation. 
Civil-law depositions, on the other hand, could still be witnessed in some cases 
during this era, as this was evident in the 1603 treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. 
One Lord Cobham, and Raleigh’s co-accused, had written a letter which was read 
into evidence during the trial and which implicated Raleigh in a plot to overthrow the 
English monarch. The jury allowed this letter to be read into evidence instead of oral 
testimony. Raleigh objected and questioned this procedure and stated that “Cobham 
had lied to save himself, Cobham is absolutely in the King’s mercy; to excuse me 
cannot avail him; by accusing me he may hope for favour.”74 Raleigh also demanded 
that Cobham appear and give evidence in his presence. He thought this could lead 
to Cobham’s withdrawal of the letter and argued “the Proof of the Common Law is by 
witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my 
face …”75 His request, however, fell on deaf ears and the judges admitted the 
hearsay statement, and convicted him, and he was sentenced to death.76  
Furthermore, this uncertainty and the unpredictability of the procedure involved in 
receiving hearsay evidence was also evident in the Chief Justice’s remarks that the 
accused’s right to have the witnesses against him to attend the trial and give 
evidence against him was not absolute.77It was, however, not clear from the Treason 
Act of 1554, which was the legislation regulating the admission of evidence at the 
time, whether this views was the original intention of the legislature. These views 
expressed by the Chief Justice were also questioned and doubted when one of the 
judges who presided over Raleigh’s trial was subsequently reported to have 
regretted the procedure applied in admitting hearsay evidence and convicting 
Raleigh where he stated that “the justice of England has never been so degraded 
and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.”78 
Langbein, on the other hand, after he had extensively examined English common 
law during the time Raleigh’s State Trial was decided, questions the rationale in 
admitting hearsay evidence and also thought that the admission of hearsay evidence 
in this case created a deceptive and fallacious authority, and he identifies other 
reasons for such evidence’s admission where he points out that: 
‘Raleigh’s Case and the other State Trials of these years can, however, be misleading precedents 
when the concern is to understand the criminal procedure which was ordinarily used in cases of 
serious crime. The State Trials were extraordinary case, touching the interests of the political 
authorities. They were in several respects the subject of special procedures not followed in cases of 
ordinary felony. … But within common law criminal procedure, there were often significant differences 
between the State Trials and ordinary criminal cases. For the State Trials the judges were 
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handpicked. They sat under special commissions of oyer and terminer – in London, under the eyes of 
the political authorities. By contrast, ordinary felony was tried locally, usually before royal judges on 
their regular assize circuits. In most State Trials the juries were also handpicked for the particular 
case, and they heard only that case.’
79
 
Hence, the exact nature of the English hearsay rule during this period seems 
incomprehensible and imprecise. 
Furthermore, Bowen also examines the admission of hearsay evidence in Raleigh’s 
case and its effect on the development of English common law and concludes that 
this was the “shameful, unworthy, never to be forgotten treason trial.”80 
As a result of Raleigh trial’s hearsay evidence admission, however, courts 
established comparatively firm principles of unavailability of witnesses against the 
accused for the first time. If, however, it was shown that a witness could not attend 
the trial, the court would still receive evidence taken during examinations.81 
In the 1666 state murder trial of Lord Thomas Morley,82the prosecution intended to 
read an examination taken by the coroner witnesses who were absent because they 
had died prior to the commencement of the trial. The judges were asked to receive 
hearsay evidence contained in the coroner’s depositions, and, after considering 
English common law, the judges described the rules regarding the admission of 
hearsay and stated-: firstly, that hearsay evidence in the form of examinations by the 
coroner would be admissible if taken under oath and the witness had since died or 
not been able to attend the trial; secondly, if the witness who had made the 
deposition which was taken under oath was unable to attend the trial and the judge 
had after considering all the facts in the matter decided that such hearsay evidence 
be received in evidence; and, thirdly, if a witness who had been questioned under 
oath by the coroner could not be located after a diligent search; such hearsay could 
be read into evidence.83 
Moreover, Donaldson examines the extent and rationale of the judges’ decision in 
Lord Morley’s Case in outlining the admission of hearsay evidence during the 1600s 
and argues that the prevailing views on this point seem not to be unanimous 
because “there appears to have been some initial resistance to the rulings by the 
judiciary in Lord Morley’s Case.”84 Donaldson also suggests that the extent of these 
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disagreements amongst the judges in admitting hearsay evidence was based on the 
principle that hearsay evidence at times was not considered as forming part of 
English common law and, in other words, the admission of hearsay evidence instead 
of oral evidence still remained an unsettled legal principle in England’s courts.85 
In addition, Donaldson also noted that the court’s ruling in Lord Morley’s case “made 
clear that depositions were only admissible in a criminal case if a deponent was 
unavailable at the time of trial for some adequate reason and not merely absent.”86 In 
other words, more compelling reasons had to be shown by the prosecution before 
hearsay evidence could be deemed admissible. 
Furthermore, as the hearsay rule developed during this period it also became an 
established principle that a confession made by one person could not be allowed in 
evidence against others, but only against him.87 In King v Westbeer,88however, the 
court took a different stance.  One Curteis Lulham, an accomplice in Thomas 
Westbeer’s trial had produced a confession in writing implicating Westbeer before 
Lord Chief Justice Lee. The prosecutor proved that the circumstances of the death of 
Lulham were not related to any wrongdoing on the part of the accused and 
demanded to read Lulham’s written deposition as testimony against the accused.89 
The counsel appearing on behalf of the accused opposed the reading of the 
deposition and made submission that such procedure was against English common 
law. He pointed out that: 
 “as the act of God which the Law says shall not work an injury to any man, had, by Lulham’s death, 
deprived the Crown of the opportunity of producing him viva voce, the admitting of his deposition to be 
read in evidence would injure the prisoner, inasmuch as he would lose the benefit which might 
otherwise have arisen from cross-examination.”
90
  
The submission made on behalf of the accused was that the accused could not 
relinquish his prerogative to cross-examine the deceased witness because the 
witness’s death was not caused by any wrongdoing on the part of the accused and, 
further, that the denial of this right could prejudice the accused.  
In 1692, Henry Harrison was charged and appeared in the Old Bailey criminal courts 
for the murder of Dr. Andrew Clenche.91  When giving evidence during the pre-trial 
examinations the witness said that he had witnessed two individuals running away 
from the scene of the crime.92 These witnesses had subsequently identified Harrison 
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as one of the individuals they had seen at the crime scene.93 When the trial started 
these witnesses were nowhere to be found and Harrison was suspected of 
wrongdoing in their disappearance because one of his friends incriminated him.  
Harrison, on the other hand, recanted this accusation.94 Nevertheless, the judge, 
after considering the English hearsay rule on the unavailability of prosecution’s 
witnesses owing to fault on the part of the accused, stated that: “That is a very ill 
thing, and if it be proved, it will no way conduce to Mr. Harrison’s advantage.”95 In 
addition, the judge also held that the Crown prosecutor could make use of written 
examinations of the witness who had made an adverse statement against Harrison if 
the prosecution could “prove upon him that he made him keep away.”96 
Moreover, Wigmore, when commenting on the admission of hearsay evidence during 
this period, is of the opinion that, while hearsay evidence was received through 
depositions during the 1500s to the1600s, there was a growing dissatisfaction 
regarding its effects on an accused’s inability to question the deponent.97 
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, when summing up the state of affairs of the 
development of the hearsay rule and the admission of examinations in English law 
during this period, notes that “one recurring question was whether the admissibility of 
an unavailable witness’s pre-trial examination depended on whether the defendant 
had had an opportunity to cross-examine him.”98This question is also said to have 
been considered and have been answered favourably in the 1695 decision in the 
State Trial of The King v Paine,99where the defendant was tried in a misdemeanour 
of libel. During the trial the prosecutor intended to utilise depositions that had been 
obtained by the Mayor of Bristol in the absence of Paine.100 Paine’s solicitor insisted 
that the depositions should not be utilised, since admitting the deposition as 
evidence would result in Paine forfeiting every occasion of cross-examination. In his 
view such depositions were not taken in accordance with English law.101 
Moreover, within a short period after Paine trial, Sir John Fenwick was indicted for 
treason in Parliament (State Trial).102 Meanwhile there were statutory reforms 
regarding the admission of hearsay evidence which also came into effect during this 
period and were contained in the Act for Regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason 
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and Misprision of Treason.103 This legislation made it a requirement that there should 
be two witnesses testifying against an accused in treason trials.104 The prosecution 
asked that hearsay evidence which was contained in examinations taken prior to the 
trials be received as evidence against Fenwick.105 The solicitor for Fenwick, 
Bartholomew Shower opposed the admission of this hearsay statement and also 
argued that it was one of the primary features of English law that both parties to the 
dispute would be present, give oral testimony and be subjected to cross-examination 
and that the purpose of cross-examination was the uncovering of the truth.106 
In addition, in Fenwick, Shower also described English common law and argued that 
“No depositions of a person can be read, though beyond sea, unless in cases where 
the party it is to be read against was privy to the examination, and might have cross-
examined him… Our constitution is that the person shall see his accuser.”107 Hence 
the Fenwick case seems to have validated the standpoint that English common law 
required that, when examinations were taken and the accused had no opportunity to 
question the deponent, such examinations could not be admitted as evidence 
against the accused at trial. 
It was as result of this decision and the law that was outlined in Fenwick, that Lord 
Chief Justice Kenyon in 1790 in King v Eriswell,108 noted the injustice faced by an 
accused when hearsay evidence was received because its reliability could not be 
challenged or disputed, and he pointed out that: 
‘Examinations upon oath … are of no avail unless they are made in a cause or proceeding depending 
upon the parties to be affected by them, and where each has an opportunity of cross-examining the 
witness; otherwise it is res inter alios acta, and not to be received.’
109
 
Wigmore, seems to concur with the views and the scope of the English hearsay rule 
which were expressed by legal the representative in Ferwick’s case in that an 
accused could not be convicted on the strength of hearsay evidence and was also of 
the opinion that such a conviction “must have burned into the general consciousness 
the vital importance of the rule securing the right of cross-examination.”110 
Furthermore, in 1816, in the most popular statement made by Chief Justice 
Mansfield in the Berkeley Peerage Case, the Chief Justice reminded us of some 
fundamental attributes of the English hearsay rule when he stated that “in England, 
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where the jury are the sole judges of the fact, hearsay evidence is properly excluded, 
because no man can tell what effects it might have upon their minds.”111 
These views, expressed by the Chief Justice, about the essence of the English law 
of evidence at that time are also in accord with the submission made by Shower 
when describing English law in the Fenwick case where he said, “our law requires 
people to appear and give their testimony viva voce … and their falsity may 
sometimes be discovered by questions that the party may ask them, and by 
examining them…”112 
This latter feature and scope of English common law was also evident where 
Bentham questioned and distrusted the hearsay rule and gave the rationale for his 
views in that hearsay evidence was not given under the approbation of an oath and, 
therefore, it was not the “best evidence” and its sincerity and trustworthiness could 
not be determined because it was not probed by cross-examination.113 
2.4  Historical development of hearsay evidence in South Africa 
In 1806, the British army invaded the Cape, and the laws that were in operation were 
unaltered. While these laws were applied for two decades, there was growing 
disapproval of the system of justice including the Dutch laws that were utilised. The 
British government sent Commissions from England to review, improve and report 
on the state of affairs of the justice system. In addition, these reviews of the legal 
system resulted in the first Charter of Justice in 1827, which brought in a new legal 
framework, repealed the whole procedure used by the courts, and formed a new 
Supreme Court and lower courts.114 
Zeffertt and Paizes examined the influence the English Commissioners’ reviews had 
on the South African law of evidence, and summed it up as follows: 
‘In 1828 four new judges took up appointments to the Supreme Court established by the Charter. 
Besides their judicial duties the judges were also required to assist in the drafting of legislation and in 
due course they submitted to the Governor a draft Ordinance to declare and amend the law of 
evidence. This measure was promulgated as Ordinance 72 of 1830. Although now repealed, the 
Cape Evidence Ordinance is important for two reasons. First, because it was still largely in force for 
civil proceedings in the Cape Province on 30 May 1961. Consequently, when section 42 of the Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 says that a court shall apply the law in force on that date; this 
meant, for the former Cape Province, the Ordinance of 1830. Second, the Cape Ordinance formed 
the model on which virtually all subsequent South African legislation on the subject has been 
moulded. Most of its sections were reproduced in the Evidence Proclamations issued for the 
Transvaal and Orange River Colony after the annexation in 1902. The provisions applicable to 
criminal proceedings were taken over more or less intact by the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 
31 of 1917 and its successors, the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 and the Criminal Procedure Act 
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51 of 1977. A number of the sections applicable to civil proceedings are reproduced in the Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965. It follows that a good deal of fairly recent legislation can be 
understood only if it is remembered that it contains provisions that were originally intended to reflect 
the law of England 150 years ago.’
115
 
These unfolding events seem to attest to a process in which the English law of 
evidence was enacted into the South African legal system. This fact is also evident in 
section 44 of the Cape Evidence Ordinance of 1830 which read that “No evidence 
which is in the nature of hearsay evidence shall be admissible in any case in which 
such evidence would be inadmissible in any similar case depending in any of His 
Majesty’s Courts of Record at Westminster.” In other words, the admissibility of all 
hearsay evidence was to be tested on the framework and scope of English hearsay 
law. 
Zeffertt and Paizes, when commenting on the influence of English common law on 
the hearsay rule in South African law during this period, also expressed the opinion 
that the scope of the hearsay exceptions were a fundamental factor of this rule since 
the courts could no longer create new exceptions.116 In addition, Zeffertt and Paizes 
commented on the numerous definitions of hearsay evidence that were in force 
under English common law and the exclusionary rule, and they noted that the rule for 
keeping out hearsay was not adaptable, and this led to a host of hearsay definitions. 
There were, however, identified parameters of hearsay exceptions and hearsay 
found not to be within that scope could not be received.117 Hence, it seems that 
these dissimilar, and at times contrasting, definitions of English hearsay evidence 
have also added to what was already a legal dilemma in the reception and 
adaptability of English hearsay evidence into South African law. 
Maguire, when commenting on the numerous common law definitions which existed 
under English common law and which at times were infinite and inconsistent, 
concludes that the hearsay law was in a state of what he termed an “unintelligible 
thicket”.118  
Paizes, when commenting on the influence and importance of the plethora of these 
contrasting common law hearsay definitions, said that these definitions had not done 
much to resolve the bewilderment besieging the meaning of hearsay.119 
Furthermore, these diverse, and at times inconsistent, common law definitions of 
hearsay evidence also turned out to be incapable of determining whether evidence 
obtained through market-research surveys was hearsay or not. The Witwatersrand 
Local Division in 1975 held that evidence in the form of market-research surveys was 
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not hearsay and was admissible.120 In reaching this decision, Coetzee J reasoned 
that he was indisposed to exclude scientific, vital and useful evidence that provided a 
solution to a tantalizing real dispute. Coetzee J concluded that, after cautious 
consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the process used to obtain the 
evidence through interviewers who completed “structured questionnaires”, the 
evidence did not fall within the field of reference of the hearsay rule.121 
On the other hand, in 1980, in Die Bergkelder v Delheim Wines (Pty) Ltd,122the Cape 
Provincial Division held that such evidence was hearsay and was not admissible. 
Commenting on the conflicting reasoning of the judges in identifying hearsay 
evidence in these two decisions, Paizes argued that, in Rusmarc Coetzee J made 
reliance upon the truth in the contents of the surveys and made use of the assertion-
oriented definition, and Van Heerden J in Die Bergkelder, on the other hand, 
identified the nature of the evidence embodied in the surveys and held that it 
enclosed fundamental attributes of hearsay because it could not be tested through 
the cross-examination of the original declarant and so concluded that the market-
survey polls evidence was hearsay.123 
Moreover, these two classes of hearsay definitions, described by Paizes in latter 
cases, seem to be in accord with Park’s views of hearsay definitions and the hearsay 
rule. In addition, Park, when probing these classes of hearsay definitions, terms it the 
“declarant-oriented definitions” which requires trust be placed on the use of the 
spoken words or deeds in establishing the absent actors’ reliability. The second type 
of hearsay definition Parks calls the “assertion-oriented definitions” which requires 
dependency to be placed on whether statement made by the absent actor was 
utilised to establish the truth of its contents.124 Hence, the differences between these 
two definitions of hearsay is that the “declarant-oriented definitions” classify as 
hearsay any conduct or spoken words if such conduct or spoken words would be 
used and depended upon in establishing the absent declarant’s reliability. While the 
“assertion-oriented definitions” are aimed at looking at what purpose the statement 
made by the absent declarant was given to establish. 
Zeffertt and Paizes identify the fundamental attributes of these hearsay definitions 
and describe what could be the shortcomings and weaknesses embodied in these 
definitions. They argue that the declarant-oriented definition was abstractly preferred 
to its assertion-oriented equivalent, and they state that “it [declarant-oriented 
definition] brands as hearsay all evidence that is latently unreliable and susceptible 
to the so-called “’hearsay dangers”’ of insincerity and defective memory, perceptive 
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powers and narrative capacity.”125 The declarant-oriented definition utilises the 
reliability test in identifying hearsay evidence.  
The decision in Vulcan Rubber Works (Pty) Ltd v SAR & H, has exhibited the latent 
defects and infirmities embodied in the hearsay rule and in the exercise of its 
exceptions as the court found certain evidence to have fallen under the definition of 
hearsay but it was not covered by the well-known hearsay exceptions and, therefore, 
had to be excluded.  Furthermore, the court’s task was to determine whether it 
should continue to extend and develop the hearsay rule to include matters that were 
not originally defined and provided for in the hearsay rule and its exceptions when it 
was received from England. The court decided that it was not its task to create new 
exceptions to the hearsay rule but that the legislature should be tasked with such a 
function.126 
Furthermore, in Vulcan Rubber Works127 the court, when developing South African 
hearsay law, has further validated the assertion-oriented definition of hearsay 
evidence as part of South African law. These latter views, expressed by the court in 
Vulcan Rubber Works, were also aligned with the 1924 court’s decision in Estate De 
Wet v De Wet128 where hearsay was defined as “evidence of statements made by 
persons not called as witnesses which are tendered for the purpose of proving the 
truth of what is contained in the statement.” 
The South African court in 1939 had once again an opportunity to define and 
develop hearsay evidence in R v Miller and another,129 and Watermeyer JA 
elaborated and detailed what he had earlier stated in defining hearsay evidence in 
Estate De Wet in 1924. He relied on the assertion-oriented definition of hearsay in 
developing our hearsay evidence and defined hearsay as evidence given by a 
person who was called to testify in court which was not given by the declarant during 
the court’s proceedings and the objective of which must be to establish the accuracy 
of what is stated. The court also held that, if such out-of-court statement is given to 
establish not the accuracy of what it states but is of contingent and inferential value, 
then it is not hearsay and is admissible.130   
Moreover, this definition of hearsay was also applied by the court in International 
Tobacco Co (SA) Ltd v United Tobacco Cos (South) Ltd, where it was held that the 
“rumours” that were spread were admissible testimony because “the truth of the 
rumours” was not at issue but the fact that these “rumours” were spread.131  
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In addition, Zeffertt and Paizes examined the influence of the adoption of the 
assertion-oriented definition into our law and state that our law was disentangled 
from the hearsay rule’s complex definitions of hearsay and soon a “tension arose 
between the meaning of hearsay and the rationale underlying its exclusion.”132 
According to the authors, the assertion-oriented definition of hearsay formulated by 
our courts came at a price that would disqualify certain evidence that would have 
been admitted under the old hearsay rule.  
On the other hand, the significance of the 1964 decision of S v Van Niekerk,133 in 
developing our hearsay rule lies in the fact that the court’s standpoint on the 
definition of hearsay shifted and it held that implied assertions were also part of 
South Africa’s hearsay rule. This latter decision by the court has also created some 
scepticism and perplexity on the essence and efficiency of English common law 
which was gradually becoming unintelligible, illogical and incoherent even after its 
adoption into South African law. 
Furthermore, Zeffertt and Paizes134 also identified another rationale why the 1837 
English decision in Wright v Doe d Tatham, which had applied the implied assertion 
definition of hearsay, was still binding in South African courts prior to 30 May 1961. 
They added that it was because, up to this date, South Africa was a British territory 
and England’s laws were considered to be the laws governing such foreign 
territories.135 Schmidt136 seems to concur with the views expressed by Zeffertt and 
Paizes on the status of England’s common law in South African law during the period 
leading to 1961, and he adds that the prohibition of implied assertions was not part 
of South African law and was not well-founded on reasons of rules. In addition, in 
Kroon v J L Clarke Cotton Co (Pty) Ltd,137 Smalberger J analysed the use of implied 
assertions and acknowledged that implied assertions did form part of our hearsay 
rule. 
Moreover, Smalberger J also made reference to Estate De Wet when outlining the 
differences between implied assertions and the assertion-oriented definition of 
hearsay. In terms of the judgement of Smalberger J in Kroon, however, hearsay 
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evidence was not defined as “evidence of statements made by persons not called as 
witnesses which are tendered for the purpose of proving the truth of what is 
contained in the statement”138 as was the case in Estate De Wet, but in the Kroon 
case the court had to infer from certain unexpressed conducts of the representative 
of Teflan’s manufacturer, Bennie, which in the court’s view amounted to the “implied 
assertion that Teflan did not work.”139 
A closer look at the 1837 decision of Wright v d Tatham,140 might be warranted 
because it still remained part of South African law during the period leading to 1961. 
In this case the court had to determine whether one, Marsden, the testator, had the 
necessary testamentary ability when drafting his will. Three letters written on 
different occasions by three individuals who had known the testator were handed in 
as evidence with the objective of proving that Marsden had the necessary 
testamentary capacity as the language used by these individuals in communicating 
with him showed that he was of sound mind. It was inferred by the court that the 
writers of these letters had communicated with Marsden in a language they would 
have used with someone who had reasonable testamentary capacity and in this 
reasoning the implied-assertion hearsay definition was used. Hoffmann, on the other 
hand, has examined the court’s reasoning in Wright’s case and has argued that what 
was common between this case and Van Niekerk’s case above was that “they all 
involve implied assertions about what the maker of the statement himself has done 
or not done.”141  Hence the hearsay statement in question was not expressly stated 
but some non-verbal conduct was held to be amounting to hearsay statements. 
Paizes has examined these letters in the Wright case, and he seems to concur with 
the views expressed by the court in these letters which were interconnected to the 
issue and written in speech suitable for correspondence with a person having a 
sensible intellect and judgement. He adds that these letters were presented, not to 
establish the truth of any part of their stated subject matter, but to prove reliance on 
the part of the author that Marsden had satisfactory intelligence, and consequently 
that he did as a matter of fact possess such intelligence.142 This definition of hearsay 
was also different from those cited earlier in that in this instance the hearsay at issue 
was unspoken but inferred from certain circumstances. 
Furthermore, Morgan has also analysed the court’s decision of Wright and 
expressed a divergent view as to whether the evidence in question was hearsay or 
not, and he argues that the case entailed opinion evidence and not merely hearsay.  
He also adds that the testator’s attestation was implied from the three letters 
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addressed to Marsden in which all three writers entertained the opinion that Marsden 
was of sound mind which could have been indicative of his mental capability.143 
Hoffmann, on the other hand, also examined the effect of the Van Niekerk decision 
in South African law and argues that “the Court found itself exploring that twilight 
zone of the rule against hearsay in which a statement is tendered to prove a fact 
which the maker did not expressly assert, but which may be inferred from what he 
said.”144 
In 1982, Lansdowne and Campbell,145 when commenting on the dilemma and 
quandary facing South African hearsay rule which had become contradictory, 
inconsistent and unclear, argued that, “As the authorities now stand, … it cannot be 
stated with any confidence whether the rule against hearsay does not apply to 
conduct not intended to be assertive, or whether it does apply and is received in 
certain cases, such as to show relationship, under an exception to the rule.” 
2.5  Conclusion  
English common law has recognised a notion where an aggrieved party has a right 
to seek vengeance. During one of the trials by ordeals which were established to 
settle disputes, the litigants would engage in physical force to settle their disputes. In 
addition, over time, the wronged party has relinquished his right to seek vengeance 
and has entrusted the governing authority to punish the infraction he has suffered. 
Moreover, it was also during this period that the accused was given a right to verbal 
confrontation with his accuser, and this right, has developed into what later became 
the right to cross-examination. The hearsay rule also developed alongside this 
common law right of cross-examination and one of the fundamental attributes of 
English common law was that it gave preference to oral testimony during the 
proceedings where both parties would give their testimony and be subjected to 
cross-examination by the adversary in the presence of the trier of fact.  
Over time English common law was received in South Africa, and its main sources 
were English court’s decisions and textbooks written by various authors. These 
court’s cases and views of writers were divergent both on the scope and substance 
of the hearsay rule and in defining hearsay evidence. In addition, these divergent 
views have also caused confusion, mystification and uncertainty, which, at the same 
time, have contributed to making South Africa’s hearsay rule to be incompressible 
and incoherent. It was not long before that the South African courts and academics, 
when interpreting and making use of this bewildering state of English law, found 
themselves also developing an incomprehensible and incoherent South African 
jurisprudence in the area of hearsay rule.  
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Consequently, it became inevitable that the South African legislature would 
resolutely undertake some statutory reforms which would codify and improve the 
hearsay rule. The Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 was the result of 
these statutory reforms of the hearsay rule. Hence, in the succeeding chapter, these 
statutory reforms on the law of evidence will be examined. 
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CHAPTER 3 – EXAMINING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
UNDER THE REFORMS INTRODUCED BY THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
AMENDMENT ACT 45 OF 1988                                                                                                     
3.1 Introduction   
The objective of the study in this chapter is to examine whether the reforms 
introduced by Section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 have 
succeeded in making the hearsay rule more comprehensible, coherent and 
intelligible. This necessitates an investigation into the definition of hearsay evidence, 
the purpose of the Act, and whether section 3 of the Act formed a discretion or not. 
In addition, the various factors provided in the Act which should be considered when 
determining whether hearsay evidence should be admissible will also be examined. 
In 1983, Paizes146 embarked on a comprehensive survey of South African hearsay 
law and was moved to state that for a long period, there had been a growing need to 
reform the common law hearsay rule by legislation. He argued that the debate 
advocating reforms went back to 1898 when Thayer also identified the need for 
these reforms and argued that it would “restate the law so as to make what we call 
hearsay rule the exception, and make our main rule this, namely, that whatever is 
relevant is admissible”.147 Paizes was also of the opinion that this assertions made 
by Thayer in 1898 were prophetic and of a prognostic nature and that the need for 
reform had reached a turning point.148 As was discussed in the preceding chapter, 
the justification for legislative reforms in South Africa’s hearsay evidence was 
founded on the fact that this law had become incoherent and incomprehensible after 
it had been received from England and subsequent to its adoption into South African 
law. 
In 1986 the South African Law Reform Commission launched an investigation into 
the circumstances surrounding hearsay evidence with the objective of reforming, 
developing, improving our hearsay evidence law through a Project 6 Review of the 
Law of Evidence. The closing date for submissions in the consultation paper was 30 
May 1986.149  
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In addition, Paizes, when outlining the required hearsay evidence legislative reforms, 
formed a view which was also endorsed by the Law Commission in its review, in 
detailing the approach which should be used to establish the admissibility of hearsay 
in the following terms: 
“DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR HEARSAY REFORMS 
Section 2 – Admissibility  
(a) Subject to the provisions contained in this or any other law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible 
unless:  
(i) Its probative value exceeds the disadvantages caused by its reception; 
(ii) Its reception is in the interests of justice; and  
(iii) The maker is unavailable to be called as a witness.”
150
 
Moreover, the South African Law Commission, after careful analysis of this draft 
proposal, approved and incorporated it into its recommendations for reforms and 
reported that: 
“3(1) Hearsay evidence should not be admissible unless- 
(a) the accused or party against whom that evidence was to be adduced agreed to its admission;  
(b)  the person upon whose credibility the probative value of that evidence depended himself 
testifies at the proceedings;  
(c)  the court when considering certain factors is of the opinion that such evidence be admitted in 
the interests of justice.”
151
  
The impact of Paizes’ recommendations detailing the reforms to hearsay evidence 
was very evident in the Law Commission’s recommendations to the legislature which 
was proposing reforms to the hearsay rule. Furthermore, it was thought that these 
recommendations were also very comprehensible, regarding the tests to be used for 
the admissibility of hearsay, viz. the party against whom this evidence was adduced 
could give consent, or the person who bore the reliability of this evidence could 
testify. For the first time judicial discretion was statutorily legislated with specific 
enumerated factors.152 
It was as a result of the Law Commission’s recommendations that the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 was adopted by the South African legislature. 
It came into effect on 3 October 1988. A closer look at section 3 of the Act attests to 
the influence of these recommendations. It reads:  
(1) Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be admitted as 
evidence at criminal or civil proceedings, unless –  
(a) each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the admission thereof 
as evidence at such proceedings; 
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(b) the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, himself 
testifies at such proceedings; or 
(c) the court, having regard to –  
(i) the nature of the proceedings; 
(ii) the nature of the evidence; 
(iii) the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; 
(iv) the probative value of the evidence; 
(v) the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility 
the probative value of such evidence depends; 
(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail; and 
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account-, 
is of the opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice.  
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not render admissible any evidence which is 
inadmissible on any ground other than that such evidence is hearsay evidence. 
(3) Hearsay evidence may be provisionally admitted in terms of subsection (1)(b) if the court is 
informed that the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence 
depends, will himself testify in such proceedings: Provided that if such person does not later 
testify in such proceedings, the hearsay evidence shall be left out of account unless the 
hearsay evidence is admitted in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection(1) or is admitted by the 
court in terms of paragraph (c) of that subsection. 
(4) For the purposes of this section – “’hearsay evidence’” means evidence, whether oral or in 
writing, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility of any person other than the 
person giving such evidence; “’party’” means the accused or party against whom hearsay 
evidence is to be adduced, including the prosecution.” 
What will now follow is a probe into the various facets which have relevance in this 
Act and its implementation. 
3.2 The purpose of section 3 of the 1988 Act 
When commenting on the purpose of the Act, Schwikkard gave the opinion that 
section 3 of the Act was intended to develop, enhance and reform the inflexibility and 
inelasticity of the common law hearsay rule because “no matter how relevant, 
hearsay evidence at common law could only be admitted if it fell within closed list of 
exceptions.”153 
Paizes, seems to concur with Schwikkard and also argued that section 3 of the Act 
has reconstructed hearsay evidence and the unreasonableness of the hearsay rule 
and its exception. He also argued that the rule created by this Act amounts to the 
intelligibility and comprehensibility of South African hearsay evidence.154 
Furthermore, the court in Makhathini v Road Accident Fund,155 when construing the 
provisions of the Act stated that, “the purpose of the Act is to allow the admission of 
hearsay evidence in circumstances where justice dictates its reception.” 
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The court in Metedad v National Employers’ General Insurance Co Ltd,156 also 
described the purpose of the Act and stated that it allows the admission of hearsay 
evidence in conditions where strict common law hearsay rule would not have allowed 
and that it also provides for the admission of reliable hearsay statements. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, in S v Ndlovu,157 also echoed the same sentiments 
as in Metedad, where Cameron JA stated that the Act formed a structure which 
replaced the strict, unpliable and unadaptable common hearsay rule. 
In addition, Schwikkard and Van der Merwe claimed that the Act, as part of its 
objective, has removed and weakened the inflexibility and inevitability of the common 
law.158 In other words, the above views of the courts and some academics seem to 
be that the Act has improved the framework governing the admission of hearsay 
evidence. 
Rall, on the other hand, questions and disputes these above endorsements of 
section 3 and concludes that this is a statute which provides an “unintelligible 
objective”. He adds that: 
“The intention of the Legislature in enacting the above two sections [sections 3 and 9 of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988] appears to be clear. However, a careful examination shows 
that it is by no means clear that the sections achieve their objective”
159
 
In other words, Rall’s views are that the Act is incomprehensible, incoherent and 
meaningless and, therefore, incapable of developing and reconstructing our hearsay 
rule. By implication, Rall’s views suggest that the standpoints endorsed by Paizes, 
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe on the objectives of the Act which were expressed 
above are ill-advised, ill-considered and misguided. 
3.2.1 Definition of hearsay evidence 
Paizes, in his thesis, also surveyed different common law hearsay definitions which 
have been advanced by academics, and he commented on the attributes of a 
definition that would be suitable for South African hearsay evidence taking into 
account its common law heritage. He stated that the definition of the envisaged 
hearsay reform should provide a practical model that would empower courts in 
applying its discretion.160 In other words, he envisioned a new definition which would 
include and empower a notion of judicial discretion to admit hearsay evidence. 
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In addition, Paizes also elaborated on the envisaged proposed definition of hearsay 
and stated that: 
 “hearsay evidence means any evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit to be 
attached to the witness himself, but rests in part or in whole on the veracity and competence of some 
other person, hereinafter referred to as the ‘maker’”.
161
 
The new definition of hearsay evidence as it later appeared in section 3(4) of the Act 
seems, however, not to contain a similar text containing the elements which formed 
part of Paizes’ reform proposals because it states that “evidence, whether oral or in 
writing, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility of any person other 
than the person giving such evidence.”  
Moreover, Van der Merwe and De Vos162 examined this definition and wrote that the 
determining question which forms the fundamental attribute of this definition is now 
whether the probative value of such evidence depends upon that person’s credibility.  
In addition, the authors also noted that the assertion-oriented approach which 
focused on whether the statements depended “upon the purpose for which they are 
tendered as evidence”163has been abandoned and replaced with the declarant-
oriented approach which “focuses on whether the use of the act or utterance 
requires reliance to be placed on the credibility of the out-of-court declarant”.164 In 
other words, the assertion-oriented definition has been abandoned, and, in its place, 
the implied oriented definition was adopted. Schwikkard and Van der Merwe, when 
commenting elsewhere seem to concur with these views expressed by Van der 
Merwe and De Vos and also state that the initial phase when making use of this 
definition is to establish “what the probative value of the evidence is”.165 
Zeffertt, has described this definition as being distinguished from the common law 
definition, and he also seem to concur with these views expressed by Van der 
Merwe, Schwikkard and De Vos. He also argues that the new definition does not 
require that, in order for a hearsay statement to be received as evidence, it should 
be given with the aim of establishing the accuracy or truthfulness of what it 
contained. The Act now focuses on the probative value of the hearsay statement in 
order to establish whether such statement is hearsay.166 
The court in Mdani v Allianz Insurance Ltd, however, did not approve of Zeffertt’s 
interpretation and application of the definition when establishing whether a certain 
statement was hearsay or not. Van Heerden JA reasoned as follows when he 
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concluded that, relying  on Zeffertt’s views regarding the hearsay definition and its 
test in determining whether a statement was hearsay, could be flawed: 
‘There the authors deal with the effect of section 3(4) of the Act. That subsection defines ‘hearsay 
evidence’ as ‘evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the 
credibility of any person other than the person giving evidence’. According to the authors the words 
‘depend upon’ should be given the meaning of ‘to rest primarily upon’ or ‘to be governed by’. … the 
authors appear to be of the view that the probative value of hearsay evidence given by a witness 
depends primarily upon the credibility of that witness, and that, having regard to the definition of 
‘hearsay evidence’ in section 3(4), evidence given by a witness as to extra-judicial admissions by 
another person therefore cannot be admitted under section 3(1). Apart from the fact that on this view 
section 3(1)(c) would have little, if any, practical significance, there is a basic flaw in the authors’ 
reasoning. I say so because in my view the passage confuses two different questions, i.e. whether an 
extra-curial admission was made and whether its content is true.’
167
 
Of equal concern, is that the above reasoning by Van Heerden JA in Mdani was 
criticised by Schwikkard where she argued that the court’s reasoning in Mdani was 
incorrect and deceptive because it considered certain phrases or words not in the 
context of the whole Act and could not be supported by a wording of the Act and 
especially the words “its probative value would depends upon”.168 In other words, 
Schwikkard’s approves of Zeffertt’s application of the hearsay definition. 
Rall, on the other hand, also examined the definition of hearsay in section 3(4) of the 
Act and questions the views which suggest that it was coherent and comprehensible, 
and he argues that it was inconsistent and contradictory and incapable of enhancing, 
ameliorating and developing South African hearsay law. He also explained the 
premise for his conclusion in the following terms: 
‘The new definition is meaningless. In order to analyse the definition, the use of traditional hearsay 
statements is helpful. A witness (W) states ‘D (a non-witness declarant) said: “I saw the accused 
shooting the deceased”.’ The evidence in question is the evidence of W, i.e. what is said in court, and 
not the statement by D. To this extent the new definition is similar to the old one which was ‘evidence 
of statements made by [an out-of-court declarant]’.Under the old rule, if W’s evidence was tendered to 
prove: 
(a) that the accused shot the deceased it was inadmissible (true hearsay evidence); but if tendered 
to prove: 
(b) that D uttered the words in question, it was admissible (not being hearsay at all).’
169
 
Rall went further by putting forward what he considered to be an uncomplicated, 
coherent and unambiguous definition of hearsay evidence because, he argued, the 
Act has already given wide discretion in section 3(1)(c) to admit hearsay and the 
definition should include components of both types of definitions, viz. declarant and 
assertion-oriented. In addition, according to Rall, the much- needed hearsay 
definition which was required during this legislative reform process had to affirm 
these types of definitions and, therefore, it should states that, “Any evidence of any 
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statement, including statements by conduct made outside the proceedings in 
question by someone other than a witness or party in the proceedings.”170 This 
definition would also be coherent and intelligible, Rall argued, correctly, it is 
submitted, because it would take into account not only oral or written statements but 
would also merge this type of hearsay with implied assertions.171 
Schmidt, on the other hand, has compared the common law definition contained in 
Estate De Wet v De Wet172with the new definition provided by section 3(4) of the Act 
and argues that the new definition “is a very wide definition – so wide that it would 
have been unacceptable if the inflexible common law admissibility rules had still 
applied.”173 In other words, Schmidt’s views are that common law would not have 
permitted such a broad and open definition. 
Recently, in 2015, the definition of hearsay evidence provided by the Act also came 
under the spotlight in the Supreme Court of Appeal when a submission was made on 
behalf of the applicants that a certain report compiled by the Public Protector was 
hearsay and should not be admissible because it was used to prove the truth of the 
subject matter in the respondent’s application.174 In dismissing this argument the 
Supreme Court of Appeal stated that: 
‘The Public Protector’s Report is not hearsay. The Public Protector has confirmed the content of the 
Report under oath. If it was ever hearsay, it no longer is. That does not mean that a court must accept 
the truth of the Public Protector’s finding.’
175
 
Hence the court’s view was that the report was no longer a hearsay statement after 
the truthfulness of what it stated had been verified under oath in writing. The 
question can still be asked: Is this definition of hearsay evidence in the Act clear, 
comprehensible and precise? If the answer is in affirmative, why then does this 
“confusion” amongst lawyers when interpreting this definition in 2015 still exist? This 
state of affairs seems to be indicative of the quandary in the interpretation and 
application of this definition which was already identified by Rall in 1990. It is 
submitted that the above state of disenchantment and uncertainty might also be 
indicative of the fact that the 1988 Act did not resolve and satisfactorily improve 
some difficulties and rigidity contained in the common law hearsay rule and its 
exceptions which had also been experienced before this statutory reforms. 
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3.2.2 Does section 3 create a rule or discretion? 
In 1983, Paizes, in his thesis176 when making recommendations about the nature 
and scope of the required legislative reforms into South African hearsay evidence’s 
dilemma, argued that the reforms should “liberate hearsay from its traditional maze 
of exceptions” and added that a “judicial discretion” would be an answer. When 
elaborating on the scope of such discretion, Paizes added that “a court should have 
the discretion to admit or exclude hearsay, depending on the extent to which the 
values of the adversary trial procedure are prejudiced by its reception.”177 
The1986 South African Law Reform Commission report, as has been shown above, 
has incorporated these latter views in its recommendations for reforms.178  
The legislature, on the other hand, when enacting this Act and adopting these 
recommended hearsay reforms, fell short of openly and distinctly specifying whether 
this Act provides a judicial discretion and indicating that the determination of the 
factors provided for establishing the admissibility of hearsay includes a discretion. As 
a result this facet of section 3 of the Act has caused intense debates involving 
contrasting standpoints amongst academics and the courts on the existence of 
discretion in this Act. 
Spindle, has examined the application and scope of a discretion in common law 
courts over the centuries and argues that: 
“Judicial discretion is not to be exercised at the arbitrary will of the judge; not invoked maliciously, 
wantonly or arbitrarily or against logic and the effects of facts; not applied against reasonable, 
probable and actual deductions; not employed to defeat the ends of justice.”
179  
The 1839 edition of the Bouvier’s Law Dictionary throws some light on the 
application of a common law judicial discretion and states that:- 
“The discretion of a judge is said to be the law of tyrants, it is always unknown, it is different in 
different men, it is casual and depends upon constitution, temper, and passion. In the best, it is 
oftentimes caprice, in the worst, it is very vice, folly and passion, to which human nature is liable.”
180
 
In addition, the 1891 English decision in Sharp v Wakefield, described common law 
discretion as “when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the 
authorities that something is to be done according to the rules of reason or justice, 
not according to private opinion, according to the law and not humour.”181  One of the 
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primary attributes of English common law judicial discretion seems to be that it 
cannot include private beliefs or convictions of the judge but should be based solely 
on legal principles. Hence, this common law feature of a discretion stands in sharp 
contrasts to the wording of section 3(1)(c) in paragraph (vii) which provides that: 
 “hearsay evidence shall not be admitted as evidence at criminal or civil proceedings, unless – the 
court, having regard to any other factor which should in opinion of the court be taken into account, is 
of the opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice.”  
The court is permitted to take into account its own private opinions when applying 
this provision which amounts to rewriting and redefining the scope of the hearsay law 
when establishing whether it could in the interests of justice to admit the evidence. 
Moreover, what can be noted from the above English common law decision is that 
the common law notion of discretion excluded the use of private opinions in its 
application. 
How do South African courts construe these provisions? Does this Act provide a rule 
or discretion?  Since this Act’s commencement there have been divergent views 
given by our courts on whether section 3 contained a discretion to admit hearsay 
evidence or not. The following cases present a random sample where these views 
are evident: 
The Transvaal Provincial Division in Hewan v Kourie NO and another182 examined 
the intention of the legislature in enacting section 3 of the Act and held that the Act 
has created a discretion to admit hearsay evidence. During the same year, 1993, the 
Appellate Division, in S v Ndlovu,183 also concluded that section 3 of the Act has 
created a discretion to admit hearsay evidence. These views by the Appellate 
Division were also reached in its 1991 decision in Mdani v Allianz Insurance Ltd.184 
These were also the views shared by the Eastern Cape Division in S v Cekiso and 
another,185 where it was held that the Act has created a discretion. Furthermore, in 
Hlongwane and others v Rector, St Francis College and others,186 the Durban and 
Coastal Division also examined section 3 of the Act and its purpose and held that it 
has given a court a discretion to be exercised when admitting hearsay evidence after 
weighing the enumerated factors. 
In addition, the Cape Provincial Division in Mnyama v Gxalaba and another,187 when 
commenting on the nature and the scope of section 3 of the Act, also held that the 
Act created what it found to be an “immense discretion” to be exercised when 
admitting hearsay statements.188 Furthermore, in its decision in Metedad v National 
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Employers’ General Insurance Co Ltd,189 the Witwatersrand Local Division also held 
that the Act created a discretion. 
In McDonalds’s Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd and 
another,190 however, the Appellate Division questioned and rejected the rationale in 
the notion that, when applying section 3 or admitting hearsay evidence under its 
provisions, a court would be exercising a discretion, and Grosskopf JA pointed out 
that: 
 “A decision on the admissibility of evidence is, in general, one of law, not discretion, and this Court is 
fully entitled to overrule such a decision by a lower court if this Court considers it wrong. There is in 
my view nothing in section 3 of the Act which changes this situation.”
191
 
Moreover, in 2002, in Makhathini v Road Accident Fund,192 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal court also cited with approval its 1997 decision in McDonald’s Corporation 
where it stated that the admissibility of evidence is not a discretion but “one of law” 
and it rejected the notion that the provisions of section 3 of the Act contained a 
discretion. When deciding that this Act did not create a discretion in McDonalds and 
Makhathini the Supreme Court of Appeal was, however, also rejecting its earlier 
decisions in S v Ndlovu and Mdani v Allianz Insurance Ltd where it stated that the 
Act has created a discretion. 
 Furthermore, in 2007, in S v Shaik and others,193 the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
confirmed its views in the McDonalds and Makhathini cases that section 3 does not 
create a discretion. This court, however, again altered its standpoint on the nature 
and scope of section 3 of the Act recently in its 2011 decision-, in Giesecke & 
Devrient Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Safety and Security,194a 
judgement by Brand JA where Lewis, Cachalia, Mhlanta and Shongwe JJA 
concurred, where it was held that this provision created a discretion to admit hearsay 
evidence.195 
In summary, the courts’ views remain conflicting on the nature and the scope of 
section 3 of the Act and whether these provisions have created a discretion to admit 
hearsay evidence or not. 
Furthermore, the views of academics also seem to be divergent on whether the Act 
created a judicial discretion or not, and they are as follows: - 
As was shown above, Paizes, in his 1983 thesis, proposed legislative reform into the 
hearsay rule which should include a discretion to admit hearsay evidence when 
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certain circumstances were met.196 The authors of the Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act, on the other hand, when commenting on the nature and scope of the 
text of section 3(1) of the Act, disputed the existence of a discretion in section 3 and 
have advanced the opinion that these provisions contained a “legal rule.”197 They 
further added that they had reached this conclusion because the nature of the 
determination on the admissibility of evidence in terms of these provisions remained 
“one of law and not discretion.”198 These latter views are also in accord with those 
expressed earlier by the Supreme Court of Appeal in McDonalds and Makhathini 
which it has since questioned and rejected in its 2011 decision in Giesecke & 
Devrient above. 
De Vos and Van der Merwe, on the other hand, when commenting on the nature of 
the court’s determination in admitting evidence under this Act, have expressed the 
view that, while the courts do not seem to have been given some form of authority 
which they did not have in the past, section 3 of the Act did create a discretion.199  In 
addition, Schwikkard and Van der Merwe are also in accord with these latter views 
and conclude that section 3(1) of the Act created a “judicial discretion”.200 
Schmidt is also in accord with these views on the nature and scope of section 3 of 
the Act and suggests that it does contain a discretion.201  Moreover, Naude is also in 
accord with these views and has argued that the Act has created what he termed 
“discretion to admit hearsay”.202 In summary, when considering the proposal for 
reforms by Paizes, the South African Law Commission report, the divergent views by 
the courts and what seems to be the overwhelming views of academics, as well as 
taking into account that the fact that the Act does not comprehensibly and coherently 
state whether it provides a discretion, there seems to be sufficient unanimity in the 
standpoint that the fact that the Act provides, and was in actual fact intended to 
provide a discretion. On the other hand, without section 3 of the Act stating distinctly 
and comprehensibly that it gives courts a discretion to admit hearsay evidence these 
above views which are based on the interpretation of section 3 might not resolve the 
defects or infirmities embedded in this Act. 
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3.2.3 Admissible by agreement – section 3(1)(a)  
In terms of section 3(1)(c)(i) hearsay evidence can be admissible if a party affected 
by its admission consents that it be admitted.203 
Van der Merwe, when commenting on the nature of the required consent, argues 
that what form such consent should be given remains not plainly articulated from the 
Act.204  
Paizes and Zeffertt, on the other hand, after taking into account the nature of the 
required consent under common law have argued that such consent would 
preferably be expressed than “tacit consent”.205 The court in S v Aspeling,206 
however, also considered the nature of consent that might be appropriate in criminal 
cases and held that the accused’s counsel signalling that he was ‘happy’ with that 
information which amounted to hearsay evidence, was a sufficient form of consent 
that the hearsay evidence be admissible. The correctness of this judgment can be 
questioned because the meaning of the words ‘happy’ might be doubted as such 
consent does not seem to be assertive and firm. 
In addition, De Vos and Vander Merwe seem to agree with these views expressed 
by Paizes and Zeffertt and state that the consent which would meet the provision of 
section 3(1) of the Act “should be expressly made and it must be clear that the 
accused gave it freely and was in his full senses.”207 
3.2.4 Admissible where the declarant testifies – section 3(1)(b)  
The reason for the admissibility of hearsay evidence under this subsection is that, 
because the person who made the statement is present and would later give his 
testimony and be subjected to cross-examination, his testimony would be reliable 
and thus the hearsay evidence it contains would be admissible.208   
In 2000, the court in S v Ndlovu and others,209 examined whether this section was 
applicable only if the declarant would retell what he said out-of-court during the 
proceedings and whether such a statement made by a co-accused was also 
permissible against one accused. Goldstein J concluded that section 3(1)(b) did not 
require that a witness should retell what he had said out-of-court and that such 
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statement made by a co-accused was also permissible against one accused.210 
When reaching this conclusion Goldstein J motivated as follows: 
“subsection 3(1)(b) would have no or little purpose since an extra-curial statement, which is repeated 
under oath, need not be referred to at all, and is indeed of doubtful admissibility, constituting as it 
does a previous consistent statement”. 
These views were questioned and rejected by the Supreme Court of Appeal when 
this case later appeared before this court in its 2002 decision where Cameron JA 
stated that this subsection permits the admission of hearsay statements made by a 
co-accused against one accused if both of the accused testify during the 
proceedings.211 After establishing the justification for this subsection Cameron JA 
stated as follows: 
“Before the Act, a witness whose narrative was conjoined with that of a later witness could not refer at 
all to the latter’s hearsay statements. This could render the delivery of evidence fragmentary and even 
incoherent. Any allusion to hearsay would be met with justified objection, and the court would have to 
wait for the later witness to be called for coherence to emerge. In these circumstances the provision 
permits the first witness to testify fully and without objection, provided the court is informed that the 
declarant will in due course be called. If the declarant is not called the hearsay is ‘left out of account’ 
unless the opposing party agrees to its admission or the interests of justice require its admission 
under section 3(1)(c).”
212
 
Schwikkard, on the other hand, examined both Ndlovu decisions and gave the 
opinion that Goldstein J in Ndlovu did not consider the role of cross-examination by a 
co-accused against whom such hearsay statement might be deemed admissible.213 
On the other hand, the author has raised no similar concerns on the correctness of 
Cameron JA’s reasoning in Ndlovu which might be deemed to be her implied 
approval of this decision. Furthermore, Cameron JA’s decision in Ndlovu was later 
criticised and rejected by the Supreme Court of Appeal in its 2007 decision in S v 
Balkwell and another214  where Ponnan JA said that “Ndlovu offers no guidance as to 
how the receipt of the extra-curial admissions which it allows under section 3, should 
be approached given the rationale at common law for their exclusion or what role, if 
any, the various common law safeguards should play.” 
The Act also provides that paragraph (b) of section 3(1) should be read together with 
subsection 3(3), which requires that the court might be informed at the time the 
hearsay evidence is presented that the declarant will later testify so that the hearsay 
can be received provisionally. De Vos and Van der Merwe, when commenting on the 
provisional receiving of hearsay, conclude that the Act did not introduce any new 
principle because under common-law hearsay evidence was also provisionally 
admissible if the original declarant would later testify during the proceedings.215  In 
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addition, subsection 3(3) also states that, if the declarant does not testify at the trial, 
the hearsay evidence must be left out of account unless it is admitted under 
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) or it is admitted under paragraph (c).216  
Dlodlo J, in S v Carstens,217held that, that where the prosecutor knew that a certain 
witness would not be called to testify and failed to inform the court that the original 
declarant of that out-of-court statement would not testify, such conduct has caused 
grave prejudice to the accused. 
The Constitutional Court, in S v Mhlongo; S v Nkosi,218 also rejected the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Ndlovu, and Theron AJ reasoned that the decision in 
Ndlovu was flawed because: 
‘First, it did not deal with the common-law rule against allowing admissions to be tendered against a 
co-accused. Second, the court in Ndlovu did not deal with the provisions of section 3(2) of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. Third, Ndlovu did not seem to have regard to the provisions of 
section219A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 – which expressly allows an admission to be 
admitted only against its maker and is silent regarding other persons. Fourth, the court in Ndlovu 
seemed not to have had regard to whether the Evidence Amendment Act altered the common law.’ 
3.3 Admissible in the interests of justice – section 3(1)(c)  
In terms of section 3(1)(c), a court may, when considering the various enumerated 
factors in (i) to (vii) of that subsection, if it is “of the opinion that such evidence 
should be admitted in the interests of justice” receive the hearsay evidence against 
any of the parties to the proceedings. 
Where is the origin of the “interests of justice” exception? Paizes, when commenting 
on the legislative reforms which were required prior to the enactment of this Act, 
argued that the interests of justice test which formed part of the United States 
Federal Rules of Evidence and which was applied to determine the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence should be incorporated into South African hearsay evidence 
because, he added, “this principle [the interests of justice residual exception] may 
beneficially be utilized in the formulation of the proposed discretion.”219 
Meanwhile there was already some scepticism surrounding the effect of the interests 
of justice test on the trial proceedings long before it was incorporated into South 
African law, and this is evident in the submission made by Zwick when commenting 
on its nature and scope where it was noted that “inasmuch as the residual 
exceptions are formulated so inexplicitly, courts will have to be especially 
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circumspect when applying them in criminal cases to avoid possible infringement of 
the defendant’s right of confrontation.”220 
Wigmore, on the other hand, recognised the necessity and trustworthiness of the 
evidence as important factors under the common law hearsay exceptions, and 
Paizes argued that Wigmore’s views should not be abandoned but be made part of a 
judicial discretion which would take into account the interests of justice when 
admitting hearsay evidence.221 It is not the intention or purpose of this study to 
embark on a survey of the United States hearsay evidence in this chapter as it will 
be discussed in chapter five. A brief probe into the interests of justice application in 
that jurisdiction might, however, be necessary in order to appreciate its application. 
The United States Federal Rules of Evidence was adopted in 1975 and has created 
the residual exception called “interests of justice” which should be considered by the 
courts when admitting hearsay evidence.222 The relevant Federal Rules of Evidence 
provides as follows: 
‘Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement 
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it 
is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of 
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless 
the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the 
statements and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.’
223
 
Furthermore, Paizes, when commenting on the constructive outcome the interests of 
justice test would bring into South African hearsay law, argued that it would take into 
account the application of the right to confrontation while it contains a judicial 
discretion to admit hearsay, and he added that: 
‘The interests of justice: The residual exceptions require that “the interests of justice must best be 
served by admission of the statement into evidence”
224
, a requirement which the United States courts 
seem to have conflated with the constitutional confrontation rule of the Sixth Amendment. This 
concept of protecting the interests of the accused also finds an echo in the Australian proposal, which 
distinguishes between the reception of hearsay in civil and criminal trials on the ground that “the 
criminal trial is premised on the view that we should minimize the risk of convicting the innocent even 
though this may result in the acquittal from time to time of the guilty”.
225
 It is submitted that this 
principle may beneficially be utilised in the formulation of the proposed discretion, thereby making 
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allowance for the right of confrontation which has become inextricably fused with the hearsay rule in 
the United States.’
226
 
Zwick, on the other hand, has also surveyed the common law hearsay rule in the 
United States and the rationale for the legislative reforms which include the residual 
hearsay exception “interests of justice”, and she argues that originally, when debated 
in the United States Congress, the thought was that such a statutorily test should be 
applied “very rarely and in exceptional circumstances” because of the effect it would 
have on the right to confrontation and the fact that it would lead to unpredictability in 
the evidence presented to prove guilt or innocence.227 
Of equal concerns is the fact that the apprehension expressed by Zwick on the 
application of the interests of justice on an accused’s right of confrontation had never 
crossed the mind of the South African Law Reform Commission when it 
recommended that the interests of justice should form part of South African hearsay 
legislative reforms. There could have been various justifications behind the lack of 
consideration of this aspect, but one that comes strongly to mind is that, in 1986, as 
will be discussed in chapter four, our legislature and the South African Law Reform 
Commission did not have to consider the accused’s right to confrontation when 
reforming and enacting legislation. Hence the interests of justice exception was 
included in South Africa’s hearsay law without due consideration of its effect on the 
accused’s right to be confronted with witnesses. It is respectfully submitted that one 
can safely come to this conclusion because there is nothing in the South African Law 
Reform Commission’s recommendations and the Act that suggests otherwise. 
Moreover, Paizes, when commenting on this residual exception “interests of justice” 
and the hearsay rule, stated that the United States courts “seem to have conflated it 
with the constitutional confrontation rule of the Sixth Amendment”.  The extent and 
substance of these views were, however, left unexplained by Paizes. Baker, on the 
other hand, advocates a divergent view where he states that, “the parameters of the 
hearsay rule and the right of confrontation are not coextensive.”228 
Yasser has also examined the intention of the United States Congress in enacting 
the interests of justice statutory test and concurs with Zwick that it was intended to 
be used rarely and that the major concern was the very broad extent a judge would 
have to consider the admissibility of hearsay, which still remains untested evidence. 
He argues further that “the Committee indicated that it intended that the residual 
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hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances 
and that no broad license for trial judges was granted.”229 
Furthermore, Zeffertt and Paize also agree with these views that the hearsay 
exceptions which allows for the admission of hearsay evidence in the interests of 
justice after considering the factors listed in section 3(1)(c) are broad and 
exceptionally excessive.230 As it will be shown later, in its 2009 report the Hong Kong 
Law Reform Commission had rejected statutory reforms to its hearsay rule which 
would include this test because it “was concerned about the open-endedness of the 
discretion.”231 
The other dimension which led to this Act being incomprehensible with regard to this 
aspect seems to be the lack of intelligibility in Paizes’ proposals for reforms and in 
the South African Law Commission’s recommendations in articulating the fact of 
whether the envisaged interests of justice statutory reforms should be applied 
sparingly or not. What will follow is an evaluation of court decisions where these 
provisions of the Act have been interpreted with the view to determining whether it 
should be applied sparingly or not. 
In 1990, the Eastern Cape Local Division in S v Cekiso and another, when 
considering the provisions of the Act and the effect the interests of justice test would 
have on an accused, Zietsman J held that “section 3(1)(c) of the Act should not be 
lightly applied.”232 
On the other hand, in 1992 the Witwatersrand Local Division in Metedad v National 
Employers’ General Insurance Co Ltd, Van Schalkwyk J questioned and rejected 
Zietsman J’s views in Cekiso and stated that the interests of justice test should be 
applied whenever the court deems it fit and that there was nothing in the Act 
providing otherwise or limiting its application under certain circumstances.233 
This state of confusion did not end there because, during the same year, in 1992, the 
Witwatersrand Local Division in Aetilogy Today CC t/a Somerset Schools v Van 
Aswegen & another, also questioned and rejected its earlier decision in Metedad and 
held that Zietsman J’s views in Cekiso were correct in concluding that this test 
should be applied sparingly.234 In addition, in 1993, the Transvaal Provincial Division 
in Hewan v Kourie NO and another, also considered whether section 3(1)(c) should 
be applied sparingly or not and Du Plessis J, after a comprehensive analysis of the 
common law hearsay rule and the provisions of the Act and what he considered to 
be the intention of the legislature in the enactment of this Act, rejected Zietsman J’s 
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views in Cekiso and also held that the decision in Aetiology Today (supra) was not 
sound  and could not be supported by the text of section 3(1)(c) of the Act. Hence it 
was held that there was nothing in the Act limiting its application.235 
In 2002, in Skilya Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lloyds of London Underwriting,236 
the Transvaal Provincial Division once again had to decide on this aspect of the Act, 
and, after considering what it found to be the intention of the legislature, it approved 
the views in the Hewan and Metedad cases to be sound where it was stated that the 
Act contained no provision that this test should be applied sparingly. 
The courts, when interpreting these provisions of the Act, have given divergent 
standpoints on whether the interests of justice test should be applied sparingly or 
not. This dilemma seems to be caused by the fact that this legislation is 
incomprehensible about whether the interests of justice test should be applied rarely 
or not, and this fundamental component of this Act has been overlooked by the 
legislature with the result that the courts find themselves having to come up with 
what could be deemed the proper and true meaning of the Act.  
3.3.1 The nature of the proceedings –section 3(1)(c)(i) 
When a court determines whether to admit hearsay evidence in the interests of 
justice, the nature of the proceedings remains an important factor which should be 
taken into account. According to Paizes, there is a rationale behind this factor, and 
he argues that this is because our criminal law has placed a certain benchmark 
which evidence has to meet before it can be considered to have discharged a certain 
burden resting on the prosecution, a notion which he suggests is founded on idea 
that “it is better that ten guilty men go free than one innocent man be convicted.” 
Hence the interests of justice test in criminal proceedings will, in his view, take this 
burden of proof into account.237 Paizes does not, however, elaborate on how the 
interest of justice test has given an advantage to the burden of proof in criminal 
proceedings. As will be shown in chapter five, these favourable views regarding the 
interests of justice are questioned and disputed by Brodin who argues that “it is a 
product of the perception that criminals were escaping conviction because of legal 
technicalities”.238 
Furthermore, Van Schalkwyk J, in the Metedad case, concurs with these views 
expressed by Paizes, and, when commenting on the provisions of the Act and the 
admission of evidence in the interests of justice, he added that, because of the 
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presumption of innocence principle applied in criminal law cases, courts have been 
hesitant in relying on hearsay evidence to convict an accused.239  
The court in Hewan v Kourie NO and another also examined the provisions of 
section 3(1)(c)(i) and nature of criminal and civil proceedings, and Du Plessis J 
stated that: 
‘Thus the Court having regard to the nature of the proceedings …might be inclined to admit evidence 
which is by its nature less reliable where the evidence is tendered in motion proceedings, but, in order 
to prove a central issue in a criminal case, the Court would in turn probably require a high degree of 
reliability or a substantial probative value before exercising its discretion in favour of admitting 
evidence.’
240
 
In addition, Schutz JA in Ramavhale241 cited with approval the views of Van 
Schalkwyk J in Metedad and Du Plessis J in Hewan and also seems to have 
concurred with these views on the application of the Act. He added that, in criminal 
cases, a court has to remain alert to the fact that the evidence has to prove the 
accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.242 
3.3.2 The nature of the evidence – section 3(1)(c)(ii)  
According to Schwikkard, the decision of the courts have provided no direction with 
regard to what the criteria for the admission of evidence in terms of section 3(1)(c)(ii) 
could be. She added that the decision by the court in Hewan v Kourie NO243might be 
indicative of the fact that the “reliability of the evidence when it comes to its nature” 
would be considered.244 
Du Plessis J, in Hewan v Kourie NO, examined the common law hearsay rule and 
the provisions of section 3(1)(c)(ii) of the Act in order to determine the application of 
these provisions of the Act, and he stated that: 
‘The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence at common law is, essentially, that it is unreliable 
because it cannot be tested in cross-examination. When regard is had to the common-law exceptions 
to the hearsay rule, the rationale is that there is otherwise reason to accept that such evidence would 
be reliable. Hence, the Court should only exercise its discretion to admit hearsay evidence in terms of 
section 3(1)(c) if there is something to suggest that, despite the absence of cross-examination, the 
evidence is reliable. … It would follow in logic that hearsay evidence should only be admitted if the 
Court is satisfied that such evidence is inherently reliable.’
245
 
In other words, the reliability of hearsay evidence is also found to be the primary 
justification for its admission in terms of these provisions. 
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Zeffertt and Paizes, on the other hand, when commenting on these provisions of the 
Act stated that it has its basis on the nature of hearsay evidence, in that hearsay 
contains inherent dangers because it is untested, and they pointed out that it 
requires the court to be mindful of the following factors: 
    “(a) insincerity on the part of the absent declarant or actor;  
     (b) erroneous memory;  
     (c) defective perception; and 
     (d) inadequate narrative capacity.”
246
 
The memory of witnesses in regard to certain events was also questioned in Skilya 
Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lloyds of London Underwriting,247and the court, in 
making reliance on the witness’s written statements to establish their memory, stated 
that, “the statements were taken from the witnesses on 27 July 1998, 28 July 1998 
and 12 August 1998 when the facts were probably still fresh in their memories.”248 
Furthermore, the court in S v Ndlovu and others249 considered the perception aspect 
in a witness’s testimony, and Goldstein J found it to be a helpful tool in determining 
the admissibility of the hearsay statement. He explained that: 
‘… such relates to the information conveyed in the case of accused No 3 voluntary and 
spontaneously, and before he had any opportunity to fabricate. The information related to a very 
recent event of which he must have had a clear memory and in respect of which he had an adequate 
opportunity for observation. He had personal knowledge of the facts. There is no reason to doubt his 
ability to observe and perceive properly what occurred.’
250
 
In addition, the time the events were recorded by the witnesses seemed to have 
given some indications as to whether the court should rely on the perception of these 
witnesses relating to the events. 
Goldstein J, in Ndlovu, also considered the narrative capacity of the witness in 
establishing whether these provisions of section 3(1)(c) were applicable, and he held 
that the witness’s evidence was clear and understandable and was given 
immediately after the incident. Hence these provisions of the Act were found to be 
applicable to admitting the hearsay statements.251 
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3.3.3 The purpose for which the evidence is tendered – section 3(1)(c)(iii) 
The old common law assertion-oriented definition of hearsay evidence placed 
reliance on the purpose for which the evidence was given when establishing whether 
it was hearsay evidence. Paizes examined the assertion-oriented definition of 
hearsay evidence and the provisions of section 3(1)(c)(iii) which takes into account 
the purpose for which the hearsay evidence was given when establishing whether 
the interests of justice require that it should be admissible. He explained that: 
‘Hearsay is no longer defined according to the purpose for which it is tendered but rather according to 
the extent to which one is asked to rely on the credibility of an out-of-court actor or declarant. This is 
not to say that the first inquiry no longer has any utility: it is, invariably, the first step in determining the 
degree of reliance that will have to be placed on the credibility of the absent declarant and, 
accordingly, the extent of the dangers that will have to be addressed by the court under (ii) above in 
resolving the question of admissibility.’
252
 
In other words, the purpose for which the hearsay statement is given still remains a 
factor when examining whether hearsay statements should be admissible or not. 
While hearsay evidence is admissible under this paragraph of section 3(1)(c) of the 
Act, the Supreme Court of Appeal, in Mamushe v S,253 gave a caveat against the 
admission of hearsay evidence in terms of this part of the Act in criminal trials where 
such evidence relates to fundamental issues that needed to be proved against an 
accused. 
In Hlongwane and others v Rector, St Francis College and others254 the court also 
examined the purpose for which the hearsay statement was given and the fact that it 
was argued by respondents that it should be admissible because “two prefects have 
since left the school … and are in hiding for fearing of their lives” when finding that 
the hearsay was admissible. As in the Mamushe case, the court also rejected the 
admission of hearsay evidence under these provisions of the Act if it was tendered 
for the purpose of determining “fundamental issues” against any party in the absence 
of cross-examination.255 
Moreover, the court in Hewan v Kourie256also agreed with the approach in 
Hlongwane where Du Plessis J held that untested evidence that would prove a main 
issue in the proceedings should not be admissible.257 
 
                                                          
252
 Du Toit et al Commentary of the Criminal Procedure Act supra, (2013) at ch24-p50D-3.  
253
 [2007] 4 All SA 972 (SCA) at para.18. 
254
 1989 (3) SA 318 (D) at 321f-g. 
255
 Ibid. 
256
 1993 (3) SA 233 (T). 
257
 Ibid at 241d.  
57 | P a g e  
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeal, in S v Ramavhale,258 also cautioned 
against the reliance on hearsay evidence under this paragraph of section 3(1) of the 
Act if it would be decisive in the case for the prosecution, and Schutz JA stated that: 
‘I would agree with remarks in Metedad supra at 499e-f, the effect of which is that a Judge should 
hesitate long in admitting hearsay evidence which plays a decisive or even a significant part in 
convicting an accused, unless there are compelling justifications for doing so.’
259
 
The court, on the other hand, when commenting on the purpose for which the 
hearsay statement was tendered in Metedad, stated that: 
‘The fact that the Court is required to have regard, inter alia, to the purpose for which the evidence is 
tendered in deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion to allow hearsay evidence under section 
3(1)(c)(iii) of the Act … means only that evidence tendered for a compelling reason would stand a 
better chance of admission than evidence tendered for a doubtful or illegitimate purpose.’
260
 
De Vos and Van der Merwe seem to concur with these views expressed by the 
courts, and they also argue that the reliability of the hearsay statement is a factor to 
be considered when a court has to establish the admissibility of hearsay under these 
provisions of the Act.261 
3.3.4 The probative value of the evidence – section 3(1)(c)(iv) 
Schwikkard, when commenting on the application of the probative value of the 
hearsay statement in the Ndlovu case, argued that this subparagraph of section 
3(1)(c) requires that a court answers two issues when determining the admissibility 
of the hearsay: “Firstly, it must be established what the hearsay evidence will prove if 
admitted and, secondly, whether this would constitute reliable proof.”262 Hence the 
reliability of the hearsay framework has also become a fundamental component of 
this Act. 
In the Ndlovu case Cameron JA seems to agree with these views expressed by 
Schwikkard when examining the probative value of the hearsay in question, and he 
found that this subparagraph provides a test which requires the reliability of a 
hearsay statement to be established. He also stated that the “’probative value’ 
means value for purposes of proof. This means not only-, ‘what will the hearsay 
evidence prove if admitted?’, but also ‘will it do so reliably?’ In the present case, the 
guarantees of reliability are high.”263 
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Furthermore, the court, in Makhathini v Road Accident Fund,264 examined the 
probative value of the hearsay evidence requirement contained in the Act, and 
Navsa JA held that the “relevance and reliability” of the hearsay evidence form a 
significant feature in determining its probative value. 
Moreover, Zeffertt and Paizes argue that the admission of hearsay evidence in the 
interests of justice based on its probative value and on the fact of whether the 
hearsay statement would prejudice one party is indicative of “a realistic 
acknowledgement of the fact that, although the rules relating to relevance and 
hearsay may be kept apart for the purpose of analysis, they are, in effect, co-
determinants of the same practical inquiry – that of admissibility”. 265The probative 
value of the hearsay evidence and the issue of whether the hearsay evidence would 
prejudice one of the parties both rely on the relevance of the evidence. In other 
words, these provisions also empower the court to consider not only the reliability of 
the hearsay statement but also its relevance. 
During 2008, the South African Law Commission investigated the link between 
hearsay evidence and relevance of evidence under this subparagraph of section 
3(1)(c) and in subparagraph (vi), and it reported that: 
‘Logically relevant evidence does not guarantee admission. … Legal relevance requires that the 
probative value of the evidence outweigh any prejudice that may accrue as a result of its admission. 
Prejudice in this context does not refer to the possibility of a finding of fact being made against a 
particular party, it refers to unfair prejudice which at common law includes not only procedural 
prejudice but also prejudice that arises out of the possibility of the fact finder being misled or unduly 
swayed by a particular item of evidence.’
266
 
Hence, in determining the relevance of evidence, a court has to consider whether its 
prejudicial outcome is diminished and weakened by the admission of the hearsay 
evidence when considering its probative value. 
3.3.5 The reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose 
credibility the probative value of such evidence depends – section 3(1)(c)(v) 
Wigmore, when commenting on the admissibility of hearsay evidence, in common 
law and the need to test the credibility of the original declarant, argued that the 
admission of hearsay statements hinged on two justifications, viz. trustworthiness 
and necessity.267 In addition, he also added that all common-law exceptions to the 
rule against hearsay evidence were considered through these justifications.268 
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Paizes, on the other hand, examined these views expressed by Wigmore on 
trustworthiness and necessity of hearsay evidence as grounds for its admissibility 
and gave the opinion that the legislature, in enacting section 3, refined these 
grounds of admissibility from what he termed “the cloudy and unscientific mix into 
which the common law had degenerated”.269 He also added that “trustworthiness” is 
provided in the provisions of subparas (ii) and (iv) and “necessity” is located in the 
provisions of subparas (iv) and (v).270 Therefore, subpara (ii) requires the court to 
consider “the nature of the evidence” and subpara(iv) “the probative value of the 
evidence”. On the other hand, subpara (v) requires the court to consider “the reason 
why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the probative 
value of such evidence depends”. 
The following illustrates a random examination of how our courts have considered 
the witness’s justification for not testifying by making reliance on this subparagraph 
of section 3(1)(c) of the Act -: 
- In Hlongwane’s case the reason for not testifying was that the witnesses feared 
for their lives and “two prefects were assaulted”, and the hearsay statement was 
deemed to be admissible-.271 
- In S v Ndlovu and others272the court examined the reason for the witnesses not 
testifying, viz. they disavowed their statement which they had given to police 
prior to the trial, and the court concluded that the hearsay evidence contained in 
these statements should be admissible in the interests of justice because it was 
deemed to be reliable and given immediately after the incident-. 
- In S v Ramavhale, Schutz JA noted that the hearsay evidence could not be given 
by the person who was considered the maker of such statement because he was 
dead, and, after considering all the evidence presented by prosecution the court 
held that the accused’s guilt was not proved by the hearsay evidence-. 273 
- In Giesecke & Devrient Southern Africa v The Minister of Safety and Security,274 
the witnesses had disappeared from their criminal case when they had to testify, 
and they could not be located when this case appeared for hearing.-, Brand JA 
held that the witnesses could not give their testimony because they could not be 
located and stated that it was in the interests of justice to admit the hearsay 
statements. 
- In S v Shaik and others275 the witness who did not testify was Thetard, and the 
reason was that he refused to come to South Africa and there was, in the view of 
the court, sufficient evidence incriminating this witness to the crimes against the 
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accused. The court also found this reasons to be sufficient to admit the hearsay 
evidence in the interests of justice. 
 3.3.6 Any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might 
entail – section 3(1)(c)(vi)  
Paizes, when commenting on these provisions of this Act under this subparagraph 
which admits hearsay evidence in the interests of justice and taking into account the 
prejudice which might be incurred through the admission of such evidence, argued 
that, because the hearsay rule is believed to be an invention of the adversarial trial 
procedure system, this is an important aspect. He also added that this is because 
any witness may give false evidence or make a mistake and, therefore, all evidence 
is probably risky. The adversarial trial system has formed specific procedures for 
uncovering and discovering trustworthy and untrustworthy mistakes. Hearsay is 
differentiated from other evidence not by the magnitude of its intrinsic dangers but 
because the dangers it contains cannot be uncovered and appraised. The 
adversarial trial mode which was developed for the objective of uncovering the 
trustworthiness of testimony can exclusively be correctly used when they are aimed 
at confronting the “person upon whose credibility the probative value of the evidence 
depends”.276 
Cross, on the other hand, argued that the prejudice caused by the admission of 
hearsay evidence at common-law was in the form of the deprivation of an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the statement.277 Morgan 
concurs with the views expressed by Cross on the primary attribute of prejudice 
caused by the admission of hearsay evidence when he argued that the main 
justification for excluding hearsay was the absence of an occasion to cross-examine 
the adversary.278 
The court in Hlongwane’s case considered the prejudice which might be caused 
when admitting hearsay evidence against the applicants, and it stated that this 
subparagraph highlights the injustice which an accused might have to face when 
hearsay evidence is admitted. It added that the peculiar factors of each case should 
be considered when a court determines whether to receive hearsay evidence in the 
interests of justice under this subparagraph.279 
The court, in Hlongwane, also weighed the extent of the inconvenience and harm the 
admission of the hearsay would cause the applicants against the harm and risk it 
would cause the respondent if such evidence was not considered inadmissible. The 
court also noted that the fact that the respondent, the school, was prepared to allow 
the applicants to write their final examinations even if this application was granted 
through the use of hearsay evidence, and this factor, the court considered to be 
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mitigating the extent of the prejudice the applicants could suffer if the hearsay 
evidence was received.280 
The trial court in Ndlovu’s case also examined the scope of the prejudice which the 
admission of hearsay might cause to an accused, and it noted that such evidence 
should be admissible in the interests of justice because: 
 ‘as to (vi), any prejudice which the evidence may entail, of course its admission strengthens the State 
case against each of the remaining accused in some cases substantially so. This is, however, so it 
seems to me, not the kind of prejudice the Legislature can have intended to provide for since an 
accused who is justly convicted can surely not be said to be prejudiced.’
281
 
Hence Goldstein J’s view is that a conviction based on hearsay evidence, which he 
termed “justly”, cannot constitute prejudice to an accused.  
Furthermore, the appeal court in Ndlovu’s case, on the other hand, when 
commenting on the prejudice which might be caused through the admission of 
hearsay evidence, explained that: 
‘Prejudice’ in section 3 clearly means procedural prejudice to the party against whom the hearsay is 
tendered. It envisages the fact that the party against whom the hearsay is tendered cannot cross-
examine the original declarant. The prejudice is always present when hearsay is admitted. It must be 
weighed against the reliability of the hearsay in deciding whether, despite the inevitable prejudice, the 
interests of justice require its admission.’
282
 
In addition, Cameron JA also said that, “prejudice has to be weighed against the 
reliability of the hearsay evidence.”283 The prejudice should be looked at not in 
isolation, but a court should never lose sight of the trustworthiness of the evidence. 
The reliability of the evidence is a factor which plays a role in determining the 
admissibility of hearsay under this subparagraph. 
Moreover, the court, in Ramavhale’s case, considered the fact that the hearsay 
evidence was received by the trial court in convicting the accused and its 
admissibility was decided only during judgement. It held that this procedure had 
prejudiced the accused and rendered the hearsay inadmissible.284 
A ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence was, in the court’s view, required to 
be made after the State had closed its case because of the prejudice the admission 
of such evidence might cause to the accused and this would also have enabled the 
accused to prepare his defence accordingly.285 A timeous ruling on the admissibility 
of hearsay statement would, in the court’s view, mitigate the prejudice which is 
inherently embodied in the admission of a hearsay statement. 
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Schwikkard, when commenting on the provisions of this Act and the nature and 
extent of the prejudice it might entail, argued that “given the definition of hearsay it is 
submitted that the prejudice envisaged by the 1988 Act is the inability to cross-
examine the person upon whom the probative value of the evidence depends.”286 
In addition, Schwikkard also seems to agree with the views expressed by Cameron 
JA in Ndlovu in identifying the nature of the prejudice caused by the admission of 
hearsay evidence, in that she argued that it is “procedural prejudice”.287 
3.3.7 Any other factor which should, in the opinion of the court be taken into 
account – section 3(1)(c)(vii) 
This subparagraph permits a Judge to use his private or personal opinions in 
determining whether hearsay evidence should be admissible in the interests of 
justice.  
Van der Merwe and De Vos, when commenting on this provision of the Act, claimed 
that this subparagraph has its sight set on ensuring that the court’s discretion should 
not lie only on the factors enumerated in section3(1)(c).288 In other words, the court 
is empowered to look outside the provisions of this Act and redefine what other 
factors could be relevant under this subparagraph. Hence this subparagraph might 
also be seen as empowering the court to redefine the scope and content of the 
interests of justice statutory test. 
As was discussed above, the courts’ views relating to whether section 3(1)(c) has 
created a discretion remains divided and contradictory. Consequently, if it were to be 
accepted that the provisions created a discretion, the use of private opinion in 
exercising that discretion seems to form a curious contradiction of its own because, 
in common law, a discretion did not include the use of private opinions, and this is 
evident in the 1891 English decision where Lord Chief Justice Halsbury said: 
‘”Discretion” means, when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities 
that that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private 
opinion; according to law and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and 
regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man, competent to the discharge 
of his office, ought to confine himself.’
289
  
What still remains incomprehensible relating to these provisions of the Act-, is 
whether this Act is coherent and intelligible? 
The provisions of section 3(1)(c) seem to create another difficulty-, in that they seem 
to be in violation of another fundamental common law principle, viz. the principle of 
legality or legal certainty which forms an integral part of the rule of law. The problem 
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is evident in the uncertainty which is created by this subparagraph of the Act. 
Snyman, when commenting on the common law principle of legality, argued that this 
notion does not allow judges to make use of their own personal opinions when 
exercising their official duties and explained that:  
‘The principle of legality states that the law should be as certain as possible (ius strictum). Judges 
should not be allowed to extend the operation of criminal law [rules of evidence] by following their own 
personal opinions, based on their own social, ideological or religious points of view, as to what 
conduct ought to be punishable… There is always the danger that a court may be swayed or 
influenced by passions which the act of the individual accused or the ordeal of the individual 
complainant may generate. Arguments in Parliament, on the other hand, tend to be more abstract in 
that they concentrate on the social evil in general; the temptation to be aroused by the passions 
generated by what happened in a particular instance with a particular accused or complainant is 
smaller.”
290
  
Snyman also adds that “the principle of legality is now a constitutional right under 
section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution.”291 While section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution 
refers to criminal conduct, it is submitted that the same common law principle of 
legality could have the same effect in ensuring that the rules of evidence should be 
as certain and definite as possible under section 3(1)(c) of the Act. The uncertainty 
created by this provisions was also evident in the views shared by Ponnan JA in 
Balkwell and another when commenting on the admissibility of hearsay evidence 
which was made by a co-accused and implicated an accused but which was not 
subjected to cross-examination where he asked, “how is an accused person to 
regulate his conduct and to make informed choices about the conduct of his 
defence?”292  
In addition, the rule of law is also a constitutionally guaranteed principle, and section 
1 of the Constitution attests to this fact where it states that: 
‘The Republic of South Africa is … democratic state founded on the following values: 
 …. 
(a) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.’
293
 
Hence the courts are bound to apply laws in compliance with the values protected by 
this constitutional principle.  
Maxeiner seems to agree with these views expressed by Snyman and Ponnan JA on 
the attributes and significance of this principle, and he adds that: 
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‘Legal certainty requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with 
appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail.’
294 
This principle enables an accused to predict how his case would be handled by the 
courts and also to ensure the predictability of evidentiary rules.  
Maxeiner adds that “a legal system without a modicum of legal certainty is scarcely 
worthy of the name.”295 
In addition, the Constitutional Court has questioned the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence in circumstances which might be viewed as offending this principle in S v 
Molimi, where Nkabinde J stated that, “in order to be said that the accused had a fair 
trial, he must have known what the case against him was.”296  
Looking at all these views on the application of the principle of legal certainty in court 
proceedings, one can ask the following questions? 
- Are the provisions which allow a court to consider “any other factor which should 
in its opinion be taken into account” creating the kind of foreseeability which 
would allow an accused to conduct his case with the “sufficient precision”? 
- Do these provisions create the discretion where its limits are clearly stated in 
order to protect an accused from subjective and inconsistent application by the 
courts? 
- Does section 3(1)(c)(vii) indicate, with particular intelligibility and simplicity, the 
scope of the discretion it has created? 
When a court is applying this subparagraph to receive hearsay evidence, an 
accused is unable to comprehend the nature and scope of evidentiary rules and 
factors which will be used in admitting hearsay statements because the judge’s 
private opinion will also be a relevant factor in deciding his case. Justice Ewaschuk 
of Canada when commenting on the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission’s 
consultation paper where this provision of the Law of Evidence Act was discussed, 
he rejected the interests of justice test and stated that “the test of ‘in the interests of 
justice’ for the admissibility of hearsay evidence is too open-ended and too 
subjective. It permits of personal value-judgement and is often referred to as ‘palm-
tree justice’”.297 
The Constitutional Court, in S v Jordan and others (Sex Workers Education and 
Advocacy Task Force and others as Amicus Curiae), has also considered the 
principle of legality in the South African legal system, and it stated it was necessary 
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that certainty in the definition of crimes was embodied.298 As shown earlier, this 
notion of certainty is also required in the application of evidentiary rules. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court also approved this views when it considered 
the need for legal certainty in legislations and the role of the courts in interpreting 
and not creating legislations in its decision in Investigative Directorate: Serious 
Economic Offences & others v Hyndai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd & others, and 
added that: 
‘It is the duty of a judicial officer to interpret legislation in conformity with the Constitution so far as this 
is reasonably possible. On the other hand, the legislature is under a duty to pass legislation that is 
reasonably clear and precise, enabling citizens and officials to understand what is expected of them. 
A balance will often have to be struck as to how this tension is to be resolved when considering the 
constitutionality of legislation.’
299
 
Does section 3(1)(c) comply with the principle enunciated in this judgment of the 
Constitutional Court or conform to this benchmark? It is respectfully submitted that 
the answer has to be in the negative because the court is not only empowered to 
construe these provisions but also has to use its private opinion or a subjective 
yardstick as opposed to an objective test and apply factors which are not established 
as law by the legislature. Hence this subparagraph seems to be very wide, and it 
gives the court the authority to redefine the interests of justice test in a manner which 
creates uncertainty in the law and might, at the same time, be viewed as legislation 
which empowers a court to create the law and not only interpret it. 
Plato, when commenting on the idea of rule of law which has been in place for 
centuries and its significance to society, stated that: 
 ‘Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of a state, in 
my view, is not far off, but if the law is the master of government and the government its slave, then its 
situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings all the gods shower on the state.’
300
  
Moreover, the principle of predictability has also been described as an important part 
of the system of precedent or doctrine of stare decisis. Lansberg, when commenting 
on the notion of predictability and its effect in court proceedings, has argued that, if a 
court would decide cases without reference to prior cases or existing legal principles, 
that would lead to the collapse of predictability of the law and the system of 
precedent would be eroded.301  
As was stated earlier, the section 3(1)(c)(vii) discretionary rule to admit hearsay 
evidence makes it impossible for an accused to “appreciate the full evidentiary ambit 
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he or she faces”,302 and the nature and scope of the factors that would be used in 
making this crucial determination cannot be foreseeable in order to enable him to 
prepare his case accordingly. What this subparagraph does, on the other hand, is to 
authorise the courts to redefine the interests of justice principle governing the 
admission of hearsay in a manner that creates uncertainty in the law of evidence. 
3.4 Conclusion 
As the scope and nature of the provisions of this Act can be accurately 
comprehended only in its proper context if the justification for its existence is to be 
understood, the fundamental components of this Act have been examined and 
numerous problems have been identified. 
The proposed legislative reforms and the recommendations of the South African Law 
Commission, which were based on the proposed reforms by Paizes, envisaged a 
reform to the hearsay rule which included the creation of a judicial discretion to 
establish the admissibility of hearsay evidence under certain circumstances. The 
wording of the Act, however, contained no indication of the existence of this 
discretion. Over the years after the Act’s enactment there has never been a 
comprehensible jurisprudence on this point because the courts have given 
contradictory decisions. Given the many conflicting views on the existence of a 
discretion, if the views which suggest that the Act created a discretion can be 
accepted as correct, then the discretion is susceptible to attack on another point, viz. 
it contains latent defects and could be flawed when considering the application and 
substance of this principle under common law. 
The capability of the Act to provide a comprehensible and coherent definition of 
hearsay evidence has also been questioned and doubted. This state of affairs still 
exists because, as recently as 2015, the court was again asked to determine 
whether a certain report compiled by the Public Protector was hearsay or not. In 
addition, the hearsay definition has also been criticised and questioned because it is 
thought to have abandoned the implied assertion category of hearsay and included 
only written or oral statements. 
While the objective of the Act was thought to be the development and disentangling 
of the hearsay rule, it is questioned and disputed whether the wording of the Act has 
achieved this purpose. The Act is also thought to be incomprehensible and 
unintelligible. 
Moreover, the interests of justice test which forms part of this Act is thought to be 
“too open-ended and too subjective”303 and the scope of its application has not been 
definite. The Act also empowers a court to take into account factors which are not 
listed in the Act and which are redefined by making reliance on the judge’s private 
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opinions. This point seems to offend one of the fundamental common law principles, 
viz. legal certainty, which also forms part of the rule of law. Consequently, the Act 
authorises a court to create the scope and content of the interests of justice principle 
when making reliance upon its own private opinions in establishing the interests of 
justice content and scope.  
Hearsay evidence admitted through this Act remains evidence which has not been 
presented in the presence of the adversary and has not been subjected to the 
constitutional right to challenge evidence or cross-examination. Hence the next 
chapter will probe the nature and meaning of the right to challenge evidence in the 
context of the admission of hearsay evidence. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: MEANING AND INTENTION OF THE 
RIGHT TO CHALLENGE EVIDENCE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION                                                                                                                        
4.1 Introduction  
The discussion in this chapter will examine the meaning and the intention of the right 
to challenge evidence as provided by the Constitution,304and the focal point will be 
on the rationale for the existence of this right and the reasons put forward for its 
protection. This necessitates a probe into the fundamental values which this right 
helps to guarantee and its role and function in the adversarial trial system. The 
adversarial trial system, has, according Paizes, also developed the hearsay rule.305 
Hearsay evidence cannot be challenged through cross-examination, which is one of 
the adversarial trial system tools for establishing the reliability of evidence; hence 
cross-examination, which forms part of the principle of orality, will assist in preparing 
the way to fully comprehending the meaning and intention of the right to challenge 
evidence. 306 
Section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution guarantees an accused’s right to a fair trial which 
includes the right to challenge evidence.307This constitutional right, however, seems 
to be incomprehensible and incoherent because the Constitution does not define its 
meaning, content and intention nor whether it includes the right to cross-
examination. 
The courts, on the other hand, have endeavoured to construe these provisions of the 
Constitution, but this effort seems not to have yielded constructive results because 
the courts’ decisions on this point remain divergent. These contrasting views are 
evident in the 2002 decision where the court in S v Ndlovu and others,308 held that 
the right to challenge evidence does not include the right to cross-examine the 
original declarant of the hearsay statement.309 This standpoint on the meaning and 
content of the Constitution was, however, later rejected in the 2010 decision in S v 
Msimango and others310 where the court held that the right to challenge evidence 
includes the right to cross-examination.311 
In order to understand the nature and scope of the constitutional right to challenge 
evidence fully, it might be necessary to probe the meaning of the concepts of cross-
examination, challenge and confrontation, which, as it will be seen in this chapter, 
seem to be aimed at protecting similar values which are guaranteed by this right. 
                                                          
304
 Section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996.  
305
 AP Paizes thesis supra at 15. 
306
 PJ Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence supra at 3. 
307
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996. 
308
 2002 (2) SACR 325 (SCA). 
309
 Ibid at para. 24. 
310
 2010 (1) SACR 544 (GSJ). 
311
 Ibid at para. 27. 
69 | P a g e  
 
The 2015 edition of the Collins English Thesaurus defined “confrontation” as “to 
tackle, deal with, cope with, brave, beard, face up to, meet head-on, face, afflict, 
challenge, oppose, encounter, defy, call out, stand up to, come face to face with, 
accost, face off”.312 
The word “confront” seems to have a similar meaning as the word “challenge” which 
is used in section 35(3)(i) of the South African Constitution. The Collins English 
Thesaurus also described the word “challenge” in a manner that exhibits some 
resemblance to “confrontation” where it states that it means “dare, provocation, 
summons to contest, test, trial, opposition, confrontation, defiance, face off, dispute, 
question, tackle, confront, defy, object to, disagree with, take issue with, invite, throw 
down the gauntlet, interrogate.”313 
In addition, the Collins English Dictionary describes “cross-examination” as “to 
question (a witness for the opposite side) in order to check his or her testimony, to 
question closely or relentlessly.”314  
The word “question” seems to form a common thread that runs through the 
definitions of the words “challenge”, “confrontation” and “cross-examination.” Hence 
what will follow is a probe into the content of the right to challenge evidence which 
will include the use of these words within the context that has been outlined above. 
4.2  The principle of orality 
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe when commenting on the development and 
influence of English law on South African law, identified amongst other things the 
principle of orality as a factor which has given rise to the adversarial trial system and 
cross-examination as its fundamental attribute, and they pointed out that: 
 ‘most of our exclusionary rules and even some of our rules pertaining to the evaluation of evidence – 
can be attributed directly to trial by jury. It may be said that the jury was perhaps the single most 
significant factor in shaping the law of evidence. But the adversarial method of trial, the principle of 
orality, the oath, the doctrine of precedent and the so-called best evidence rule collectively contributed 
to our present intricate system in terms of which facts should be proved in a court of law.’
315
 
Furthermore, Daniels concurs with Schwkkard and Van der Merwe on the genesis of 
the principle of orality and its role in the adversarial trial system. He also adds that it 
can be traced back to the origin of the trial by jury in the common law system of 
evidence.316 This scope and nature of the principle of orality is also evident in 
Jacob’s writing on English common law of evidence and its method of presenting 
evidence where he states that the principle of orality is a fundamental characteristic 
of English criminal and civil law. English criminal and civil proceedings have been 
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governed by this principle for centuries. The principle of orality has also, over the 
centuries, became a central attribute of the adversary trial system which permits 
opposing litigants to present oral testimony in the presence of the trier of fact and 
give them an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.317 Jacob also considers the 
principle of orality to be profoundly inbuilt and deep- rooted English common law 
principle.318 
Moreover, De Vos also examined the principle of orality and its role in common law 
and as a fact-finding tool, and stated that it was based on, and manifests, the notion 
that parties to a dispute are given the right to put forward their cases by way of “oral 
evidence and oral arguments.”319 The parties to a dispute have a right to present 
their cases in each other’s presence through oral evidence. 
Broodryk, seems to agree with these views expressed by De Vos regarding the 
nature and scope of the principle of orality and adds that it also “entails that evidence 
on disputed questions of fact should be given by witnesses called before the court to 
give oral testimony of matters within their knowledge.”320 
There seems to be a further justification for this principle, and Dennis argues that it 
allows the parties to “confront through cross-examination those witnesses who testify 
against them.”321 While the opportunity to cross-examine a witness remains at the 
core of this principle, Hoffmann and Zeffertt also add that the use of the principle of 
orality allows the court to establish another truth-finding tool apart from cross-
examination, viz. the demeanour of the witness giving the evidence which enables 
the determination of reliability of the evidence.322 
Furthermore, Broodryk comments on the importance of this principle under the 
common law rules of evidence and points out that: 
‘the importance of the principle of orality in the common law of evidence is evinced inter alia by the 
fact that, in South African law of evidence, much greater weight is attached to answers given by 
witnesses in court on oath or affirmation than to written statements previously made by them.’
323
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal concurred with these views expressed by Broodryk in 
its decision in S v Adendorff where the court found it to be prejudicial to an accused 
that his counsel had prepared a memorandum to be read to the court at the close of 
the case for the State instead of presenting viva voce evidence and the accused be 
subjected to cross-examination in the presence of the court. The court’s finding was 
that the accused had been prejudiced by the admission of such evidence because 
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he was unable to present oral evidence to challenge the evidence presented against 
him.324 
Heher JA also noted the absence of the principle of orality in this case in the light of 
our adversarial trial system, and he stated that, “The result was that the court was 
deprived of the benefit of hearing him give evidence-in-chief and had no means of 
assessing the accuracy of his confirmation.”325 
Hence the reading of the memorandum into record also robbed the court of the 
opportunity to test and evaluate the exactness and veracity of its contents. This 
court’s reasoning in this decision also highlights the significant role this principle 
occupies in our law of evidence. 
Furthermore, Schwikkard and Van der Merwe concur with the views of Heher JA in 
Adendorff on the meaning and influence of the principle of orality in presenting 
evidence, and they argue that litigants should give their testimony verbally in both 
criminal and civil cases. There is justification for this principle, the argument 
continues, because “parties should have an opportunity to confront the witnesses 
against them and should be able to challenge the evidence by questioning.”326 The 
rationale for the principle of orality is that the litigants should be able to confront each 
other through cross-examination. 
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe, in justification of these views, add that the 
“opportunity to confront” and the “ability to challenge the evidence by questioning” 
are the core notions behind the principle of orality.327 In other words, the standpoint 
of Schwikkard and Van der Merwe is that there is a strong link between the ancient 
principle of orality and the “opportunity to confront witnesses and the ability to 
challenge evidence by questioning” which is constitutionally guaranteed by section 
35(3)(i) of the 1996 Constitution. 
In addition, Schwikkard and Van der Merwe also examined the role and use of 
witnesses in common law and under adversarial trial system and the rationale why 
oral testimony is the acceptable means of presenting admissible evidence, and they 
argue that witnesses are required to tender “oral testimony” and “the general receipt 
of oral testimony established the principle of orality.”328 
Erasmus, when commenting on the principle of orality in our law stated that the 
South African procedure in criminal trial is guided by the Criminal Procedure Act329 
and that “in essence a criminal trial is conducted through the medium of the spoken 
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word and is, therefore, essentially oral in nature.”330 Steytler seems to agree with 
these views expressed by Schwikkard, Van der Merwe and Erasmus in describing 
the essence of our criminal trials and states that orality is the fundamental and 
central principle of the South Africa’s adversarial trial system.331 
While this study does not intend to examine the proceedings of the International 
Criminal Tribunals, the general application of this principle by these tribunals might, 
however, be informative at a later stage when making recommendations for reforms.  
Combs examined the far-reaching influence of the principle of orality as well as the 
presentation of evidence in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and concluded that that the adversarial trial system 
was used during these proceedings and “each party was permitted to examine and 
re-examine the witnesses they call and to cross-examine the opposing party’s 
witnesses.”332 
Recently, in the International Criminal Court, in the case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo and the “Situation in the Central African Republic”, the 
principle of orality was also at issue where the accused’s defence counsel had 
argued that the court should not have received as evidence transcripts of interviews 
of witnesses which were conducted with those witnesses who did not give evidence 
during the hearing. The Court agreed with this submission and held that as a general 
norm “witnesses should be called to give evidence in order to assess the reliability 
and credibility of the information in their possession.”333 There seems to be some 
reluctance on the part of the court to receive hearsay evidence and or to decide a 
case solely on an out-of-court statement. 
The use of oral evidence in English law and the central role it played in trial 
proceedings have also been seen to be closely linked to the right of confrontation 
through cross-examination in the adversarial trial system. The verbal nature of 
testimony under common law and the occasion of cross-examination have been 
seen to be fundamental characteristics of our law. Hence it is submitted that the 
principle of orality is a central part of the confrontation which litigants are entitled to 
have through cross-examination. 
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4.3 The origin of cross-examination 
The origin of cross-examination can be traced back to 605 B.C. where the accusers 
and adverse witnesses were questioned by, or on behalf of, the accused in order to 
establish the credibility of the accusations.334 This is evident from the Book of Daniel 
where it attests to the fact that the ancient Hebrews had employed cross-
examination as a truth-finding process where some elders brought false fornication 
charges against one female, named Susanna. Daniel, the judge, when setting forth 
the Hebrew legal system relating to the admission and testing of evidence 
questioned the accuser and the accused with a view to determining whether the 
accusations were true.335 
This idea of truth-finding also has some similarities to one of the trials by ordeal 
where it was thought that God would judge human disputes and show which party 
was innocent. Daniel questioned the two witnesses separately in order to determine 
whether their testimony was reliable and credible. It is also remarkable in the 
application of the Hebrew law that he was bound to hear oral testimony and examine 
both the accused and the accuser before deciding which party should be believed. 
Younger, on the other hand, when commenting on the development and use of 
cross-examination in Biblical times, as well as in the ancient Greek era, argued that 
confrontation between the accused and his accusers was an essential attribute of 
the proceedings, and cross-examination in the fullness of time became a crucial 
characteristic of common law trial procedure336 This fact that cross-examination 
developed to be an essential characteristic of the common law, as has been shown 
earlier, was evident in the 1603 treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in the House of 
Lords where, after he was denied an opportunity to face his accuser, complained 
that “the Proof of the Common law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let 
him speak it. Call my accuser before my face.”337 
McCormick agrees with the views expressed in Raleigh’s case, outlining English 
common law at the time, and giving the opinion that hearsay statements were 
excluded during that period because the person who made such a statement could 
not be cross-examined.338 
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Moreover, Wellman seems to concur with the views expressed by Young on the 
ancient role of cross-examination and its influence in common law and points out 
that:  
“the system is as old as the history of nations. Indeed, to this day, the account given by Plato of 
Socrates’s cross-examination of his accuser, Miletus, while defending himself against the capital 
charge of corrupting the youth of Athens, may be quoted as a masterpiece in the art of cross-
questioning.”
339
 
Church, when commenting on Socrates’ trial in the work of Wellman argues that 
Socrates found fault in the proceedings because it disqualified him from confronting 
some of his accusers in that cross-examination was restrained and impeded in 
Athenian law.340  
Epstein, on the other hand, urges that caution should be exercised before accepting 
Wellman’s views on the history of cross-examination, and he argues that “there is no 
veracity to Francis Wellman’s claim that the system of adversarial cross-examination 
is as old as the history of nations” because, he adds that, in his view there:  
“have been confrontation rights as early as ancient Rome, anonymous accusations were not 
actionable because the accused had the right to confront his accusers, but these rights did not include 
cross-examination and were more of the nature of investigative tools rather than trial procedure as we 
understand the extent of cross-examination today.”
341
  
According to Epstein, therefore, cross-examination was originally not used as a 
procedural tool as it is used today but as form of investigative procedure, and, 
hence, Wellman’s standpoint on this aspect is questionable and disputed. 
Moreover, Graham seems to concur with the views expressed by Epstein detailing 
the nature and scope of cross-examination in Roman law, and he argues that 
Roman law did approve the right of cross-examination, but cross-examination was 
more of an investigative procedure and not a procedural trial device as it is known 
today.342 
In addition, Langbein 343 traced the origin of cross-examination to 1730s and concurs 
with the views expressed by Epstein and Graham that originally cross-examination 
began as an investigative device. He also found three incidents which justified its 
changes in English trial procedure, which in his view altered its form and nature into 
a trial procedural device -: firstly, during 1700s the investigative and trial stages had 
witnessed an expansion of accused’s persons resorting to defence lawyers-; 
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secondly, witnesses who gave testimony that would prove a crime during that era 
were given a reward and this resulted in an increase in treacherous evidence, and 
cross-examination became an essential remedy to uncover “the corrupt motive”-; 
and, thirdly, because of “the crown witness system for obtaining accomplice 
evidence in gang crimes, a prosecutorial technique that created further risks of 
perjured testimony.”344 Wigmore, also identified the justification for the development 
of cross-examination to be a significant fact-finding process, argued that there was a 
growing perception that mistakes could be made when admitting hearsay evidence, 
and claimed that the main cause for these mistakes was seen to be the absence of 
the testing of the reliability of evidence through cross-examination.345 
4.4 The role of cross-examination as an essential evidentiary testing device 
Emsley, Hitchcock and Shoemaker, when commenting on the position of cross-
examination during 1674 to 1913 at the London’s Central Criminal Court (The Old 
Bailey), argued that it was during this period that judges had began allowing criminal 
defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses called to testify against them, and 
they pointed out that: 
‘Cross-examinations were conducted by the judges, the defendants, or, increasingly, by defence 
lawyers. There was no presumption of innocence (until early nineteenth century), and no right to 
remain silent. Defendants were expected disprove the evidence presented against them and establish 
their innocence. The assumption was that, if the defendants were innocent, they ought to be able to 
prove it. They could cross-examine prosecution witnesses and, from 1702, call their witnesses but, 
unlike prosecutors, they could not compel witnesses to attend. And since trials were not scheduled, it 
was impossible to predict precisely when a witness would need to appear in court.’
346
 
In addition, Wigmore, when commenting on the origin and position of cross-
examination in the common law and Anglo-American hearsay evidence trial, claimed 
that “Cross-examination is the most powerful instrument known to the law in eliciting 
truth.”347 
In 1809, Peake, when describing the crucial role of cross-examination, stated that 
English law did not give recognition to simple allegations which were not made under 
oath and where the maker of such statement was not cross-examined by the 
adversary.348  
The law was said not to give credibility to statements which were made but not 
accompanied by cross-examination. What was the reason behind this notion? The 
maker of the out-of-court statement was required to be subjected to an oath and 
cross-examination and, in order for the evidence he gave to be credible, he was to 
have personal knowledge of the events. 
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Epstein, when commenting on cross-examination in common law courts and its 
position as truth-finding tool, stated that, “It cannot be denied that cross-examination 
is viewed as a core aspect of the trial process, both in criminal and civil cases, and 
its use and purported power are omnipresent.”349 
Underwood seems to concur with the views expressed by Epstein, and, when 
describing the role of cross-examination, adds that “it carried the power to confront 
and break the false witness.”350  
In South Africa, the right to cross-examination is not only a common law principle but 
also a statutorily regulated right which is provided in section 166 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which reads: 
(1) An accused may cross-examine any witness called on behalf of the prosecution at criminal 
proceedings or any co-accused who testifies at criminal proceedings or any witness called on 
behalf of such co-accused at criminal proceedings, and the prosecutor may cross-examine any 
witness, called on behalf of the defence at criminal proceedings, and a witness called at such 
proceedings on behalf of prosecution may be re-examined by the prosecutor on any matter 
raised during the cross-examination of that witness, and a witness called on behalf of the 
defence at such proceedings may likewise be re-examined by the accused.” 
Du Toit, when commenting on this right to cross-examination and its meaning and 
content, expressed the opinion that, “Cross-examination is one of the essential 
components of the adversarial system of justice. It is the name given to the 
questioning of the witnesses by the party (or parties) who did not call the witness.”351  
Hence the central and historical role played by cross-examination in the adversarial 
trial system seems to have remained intact according to the authors after cross-
examination was statutorily regulated in South Africa. 
Furthermore, Van der Merwe argues that verbal confrontation, which developed as a 
form of a trial procedure, is also thought to have included cross-examination, and he 
states that cross-examination has for centuries formed a central characteristic of the 
adversarial trial system. He adds that in South Africa it has an actual and symbolical 
foundation and the accused’s constitutional right to challenge evidence also 
embodies this right to cross-examination.352 
According to the author, there is constitutional link between the right of cross-
examination which has its origin in common law and the constitutional right to 
adduce and challenge evidence contained in section 35(3)(i) of the 1996 
Constitution. Cross-examination, therefore, is no longer merely a common law or 
statutory right but also a constitutional right. 
                                                          
349
 Jules Epstein “Cross-examination: Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipresent, and “At Risk”” 
Widener L. Rev. supra at 430. 
350
 Richard H. Underwood “The Limits of Cross-examination” Am. J. Trial Advoc. (1997) at 117. 
351
 Du Toit et al Commentary on Criminal Procedure Act supra (2014) at ch22-p76. 
352
 SE Van der Merwe “Regterlike Inkorting Van Kruisondervraging: ‘N Gemeenregterlike,Statutere en 
Grondwetlike Perspektief“ Stellenbosch L. Rev.(1997) at 359. (my translation). 
77 | P a g e  
 
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe, also seem to concur with these views and point out 
that: 
“Cross-examination is a fundamental procedural right. It is one of the essential components of the 
accusatorial or adversary trial and a natural part of our trial system, where emphasis is placed on 
orality. Cross-examination is the name given to questioning of an opponent’s witness.”
353
 
The court, in its decision in Caroll v Caroll,354 considered the historical development 
and the objectives of cross-examination and held that the aim of cross-examination 
was to test the reliability, trustworthiness and worth to be attached to evidence in 
general. Cross-examination was also found to be a tool to uncover the truth and 
contradictions in a witness’s statement. 
In 1961, the court, in its decision in R v Ndawo and others,355 when commenting on 
the denial of the right to cross-examination, held that the absence of cross-
examination in common law could result in a failure of justice. The accused was 
considered to have suffered prejudice because of the lack of cross-examination. 
In Distillers Korporasie (SA) Bpk v Kotze,356 the court also had to determine the 
impact on the proceedings of the refusal by the trial court that the defendant be 
questioned on a certain matter that was also disputed by the plaintiff. Schreiner JA, 
when commenting on the restrictions placed on cross-examination, held that is was 
first important to establish whether there was an irregularity in the proceedings. 
Because the trial court had prevented the defendant from cross-examining adverse 
witnesses this conduct resulted in an irregularity which also caused immeasurable 
prejudice to the accused. 
The court, in President of the Republic of South Africa and others v South African 
Rugby and Football Union and others,357 also considered the scope and rationale of 
cross-examination in common law and the need to challenge evidence through 
questions put during cross-examination, and it pointed out that: 
‘The institution of cross-examination not only constitutes a right, it also imposes certain obligations. As 
a general rule it is essential, when it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on 
a particular point, to direct the witness’s attention to the fact by questions put in cross-examination 
showing that the imputation is intended to be made and to afford the witness an opportunity, while still 
in the witness-box, of giving any explanation open to the witness and of defending his or her 
character. If a point in dispute is left unchallenged in cross-examination, the party calling the witness 
is entitled to assume that the unchallenged witness’s testimony is accepted as correct.’
358
 
In S v Boesak359the accused failed to challenge some evidence and documents 
through cross-examination which formed part of the case for the prosecution. The 
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Constitutional Court held that, if the accused had failed to confront and challenge 
certain evidence through cross-examination, he could not be able to argue that such 
unchallenged evidence should not be admissible. 
The important role played by cross-examination in challenging an adverse witness’s 
testimony was highlighted in the court’s reasoning. 
The court, in its decision in S v Pistorius,360 has also examined the objectives of 
cross-examination, and, when commenting on unchallenged evidence that was 
presented by the prosecution, remarked that, if a witness fails to challenge adverse 
testimony through cross-examination, it could be difficult to argue that such 
unchallenged evidence contained discrepancies and contradictions. 
The court’s view in this latter case was that the concept of cross-examination 
requires that a witness has to be confronted with disputed evidence and be given an 
opportunity to reply while in the witness-box.  Admitting untested evidence might 
cause prejudice to the party affected by such evidence and the court cited with 
approval the approach in the SARFU’s case.361 
Furthermore, in S v Mavinini,362the Supreme Court of Appeal also cited with approval 
the approach in the SARFU’s case363and examined evidence that was untested in 
the witness-box and commented that a witness had to be challenged through cross-
examination while still in the witness-box. The confrontation of a witness was found 
to be through cross-examination. 
The court, in its decision in S v Naidoo,364 also examined the common law right to 
cross-examination and its impact on untested evidence, and it held that, if the 
contended issue is left undisputed in cross-examination, “the party calling the 
witness is entitled to assume that the unchallenged evidence may be considered as 
correct.”365 
In S v Fortuin, however, where the prosecution failed to cross-examine an accused 
and the court considered the impact of the absence of cross-examination in the 
proceedings, and it pointed out that:  
“there is no absolute rule that a failure by a party to cross-examine a witness precludes such a party 
from disputing the truth of the witness’s testimony, such a failure, especially by a prosecutor in 
criminal proceedings, may often be decisive in determining the accused’s guilt.”
366
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These latter views by the court might, however, be questioned and doubted because 
its seems to be contrary to the Constitutional Court decision in the SARFU where it 
was held that, “if a point is left unchallenged in cross-examination, the party calling 
the witness is entitled to assume that the unchallenged witness’s testimony is 
accepted as correct.”367 In other words, the failure to cross-examine a witness might 
have adverse effect on a party who is required to subject that witness to cross-
examination. 
In S v Mdali,368 the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to cross-
examine witnesses called by the prosecution against him, and this prompted the 
following criticism from the review court (High Court) on the admission of what 
seemed to be uncross-examined evidence: “The accused’s constitutional right to a 
fair trial, and in particular his right to adduce and challenge evidence, was grossly 
violated.”369 The court’s view in this decision is that when an accused was denied his 
right to cross-examine witnesses his right to challenge evidence was also denied. 
In R v Ndawo and others,370 it was held that evidence untested through cross-
examination was prejudicial to an accused. The court’s reasoning was that the denial 
of the common law right to cross-examine witnesses by an accused can never be 
excusable. The views in this judgement were later reinforced in S v Tyebela371 where 
it was stated that evidence untested through cross-examination could be prejudicial, 
and this resulted in a conviction which has been based on such evidence to be set 
aside.  
Furthermore, in S v Nkabinde372the court examined the efficacy of cross-examination 
and its influence in uncovering inconsistencies and contradiction from adverse 
witness’s evidence, and it remarked that, “Cross-examination of the witnesses 
revealed the flaws inherent in their testimony in this case.” 
It is evident from the discussion of the case law that the intention and meaning of the 
right to cross-examination seems have been closely linked and considered to include 
the constitutional right to challenge evidence. This is despite the fact that section 166 
of the Criminal Procedure Act which protects the right to cross-examination does not 
also state whether this right includes the constitutional right to challenge evidence or 
that this provisions should be read together with section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. 
The succeeding paragraph will examine the meaning and intention of the right to 
challenge evidence. 
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4.5  The meaning and intention of the right to challenge evidence 
As stated earlier, the 1996 Constitution remains incomprehensible and unintelligible 
on whether the right to adduce and challenge evidence includes the right to cross-
examine witnesses. In other words, the Constitution alone does not resolve this 
question. The interpretations and views given by the courts in interpreting these 
constitutional provisions and the views of academics will now be probed in order to 
seek clarity and to answer one of the primary questions of this study. 
In 2002, the court, in its decision in S v Ndlovu and others,373 has considered this 
question and concluded that the right to adduce and challenge evidence does not 
include the right to cross-examine witnesses when hearsay evidence is deemed 
admissible under section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act and the core of 
Cameron JA’s reasoning was as follows: 
‘The Bill of Rights does not guarantee an entitlement to subject all evidence to cross-examination. 
What it contains is the right (subject to limitation in terms of section 36) to ‘challenge evidence’. 
Where that evidence is hearsay, the right entails that the accused is entitled to resist its admission 
and to scrutinise its probative value, including its reliability. The provisions enshrine these 
entitlements. But where the interests of justice, constitutionally measured, require that hearsay 
evidence be admitted, no constitutional right is infringed. Put differently, where the interests of justice 
require that the hearsay statement be admitted, the right to ‘challenge evidence’ does not encompass 
the right to cross-examine the original declarant.’
374
 
According to Cameron JA’s reasoning in the Ndlovu’s case, the right to adduce and 
challenge evidence does not include the right to cross-examine the witness who 
made the hearsay statement. 
In 1996, the court in K v The Regional Court Magistrate NO, and others375 
considered whether section 25(3) of the 1993 Constitution376 which guaranteed an 
accused’s right to challenge evidence included the right to cross-examine witnesses 
against him, and Melunsky J held that section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution did 
not cite the right to cross-examine witnesses but provided the right to challenge 
evidence, and he added that this right did contain the right to cross-examine 
witnesses because cross-examination was, in his view, a central right in common 
law. 
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In 2005, in S v Manqaba,377 the court also examined whether the constitutional right 
to challenge evidence includes the right to cross-examine witnesses, and Satchwell 
J held that it was a commonplace notion that cross-examination was included in the 
basic right to challenge evidence.378 
Moreover, the court, in its 2008 decision in S v Mgudu,379 also had to determine 
whether the right to adduce and challenge evidence included the right to cross-
examine witnesses, and Madondo J held that cross-examination was included in this 
constitutional right, and added that: 
“Section 35 of the Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial. The weight of decided cases 
supports the view that there can be no fair trial without the exercise of the right to cross-examine 
witnesses called by the opposing party. The continued refusal by the magistrate to recall the witness 
and to allow the defence attorney to cross-examine her will certainly offend against the right to a fair 
trial and seriously violate the right to adduce and challenge evidence, in particular, entrenched in 
section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution.”  
In addition, Madondo J, in Mgudu, also commented on the common law right of 
cross-examination and its content and held that the refusal of this right might also 
have resulted in a violation of the accused’s constitutional right to adduce and 
challenge evidence. Furthermore, he added that this view was based on what he 
deemed to be a well-established historical link between the common law right of 
cross-examination and the constitutional right to adduce and challenge evidence.380 
The court, in its decision in S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane,381 considered whether 
section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977382 which provides for the use 
of an intermediary in certain circumstances violated the accused’s right to challenge 
evidence, and it held that “the accused is in terms of section 35(3)(i) of the 
Constitution entitled to ‘adduce and challenge’ evidence. This should include the 
right to face his or her accuser and to test the averments against him or her, which 
could only be done through proper cross-examination.” The court’s views in the latter 
case are also that the accused’s right to challenge evidence includes a right to 
confront his adversaries and to subject their evidence to the test of cross-
examination.  
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Schwikkard, on the other hand, has doubted and questioned Cameron JA’s 
reasoning in S v Ndlovu which held that the right to challenge evidence does not 
include cross-examination and, on the contrary, has maintained that “there can be 
little doubt that the right to challenge evidence must ordinarily include the right to 
cross-examine.”383  
Furthermore, in 2010, the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Libazi and another,384 
also expressed some doubt regarding the correctness of Cameron JA’s reasoning in 
S v Ndlovu on the content and scope of the right to adduce and challenge evidence, 
and Mthiyane JA pointed out that:  
“the right to challenge adverse evidence is a foundational component of the fair trial rights regime 
decreed by our Constitution in section 35(3). Cross-examination is integral in the armoury placed at 
the disposal of an accused person to test, challenge and discredit evidence tendered against him.”
385
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in this decision, viz. in Libazi described the right to 
challenge evidence as including the right to cross-examine witnesses and gave the 
opinion that a court, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, should employ what it 
termed a “generous” approach. In addition, this approach by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in construing hearsay evidence and the content of the right to challenge 
evidence also stand in sharp contrast to its earlier decision in Ndlovu where it held 
that the right to challenge evidence did not include cross-examination in similar 
circumstances where hearsay evidence and the provisions of section 3 of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 were at issue. Hence this latter decision by this 
court has also created a dilemma and uncertainty regarding the meaning, intention 
and content of the right to challenge evidence. 
Schwikkard, on the other hand, has identified what she termed the objectives of the 
constitutional right to adduce and challenge evidence and gave the opinion that, “It 
also has certain features that arguably cannot be replicated by substituted indicia of 
reliability. For example, contradictions between witnesses or apparent inconsistency 
in a witness’s statement are better explored through cross-examination than the logic 
of inferences.”386 In other words, the author’s views on this point seem to be that this 
constitutional right includes cross-examination. 
The court’s view in S v Matladi387 also seems to concur with the view expressed by 
Schwikkard where it was held that the accused’s right to testify in his own defence 
can be deemed to include the constitutional right to adduce and challenge evidence. 
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On the other hand, the court, in S v Muller and others,388 when commenting on the 
content of the right to adduce and challenge evidence, held this right to be fully 
articulated in the maxim audi alteram partem and the court also found this principle 
to be “an integral part of the accused’s right to adduce and challenge evidence.”389 
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the audi alteram partem is a Latin 
expression which means “listen to the other side”, or “let the other side be heard as 
well”.390 The Duhaime Legal Dictionary also outlines the link between the audi 
alteram partem and the common law right of confrontation and states that this 
principle means that, “No person should be judged without a fair hearing in which 
each party is given the opportunity to respond to the evidence against them.”391 It is 
submitted, therefore, that there is an historical link between common law right to 
confrontation and audi alteram partem principle, and the justification for both of these 
principles is that both sides should be able to present their case and confront each 
other through questioning. 
In 2010, in S v Msimango and another,392 the court also had to establish whether the 
right to challenge evidence included cross-examining a witness who had died before 
her cross-examination was completed. Mochidi J rejected the notion that this right 
does not include cross-examination and held that, “The right of an accused person to 
adduce and challenge evidence as enshrined in section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution, 
undoubtedly includes the right to cross-examination.” 
In reaching this conclusion, Mochidi J, also found that “there was overwhelming and 
persuasive authority for this proposition.”393 These views on the scope, meaning and 
intention of this right, as was shown earlier are undoubtedly in conflict with those 
expressed by the court in the Ndlovu case.  
Steytler, when commenting on the right to challenge evidence in the South African 
Constitution and the confrontation clause contained in the United States 
Constitution,394 argued that the right to challenge evidence was rooted in the 
common law right to cross-examine witnesses and added that:  
“The primary interest of the confrontation clause in the Sixth Amendment, the US Supreme Court held 
in Douglas v Alabama, is the right to cross-examination. The same is true in South Africa; the right to 
challenge evidence includes the right to cross-examine. A prerequisite for cross-examination is that all 
evidence is produced in court and witnesses testify viva voce. Where an accused has been deprived 
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of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness … the use of such untested evidence will result in the 
infringement of this constitutional right.”
395
  
The author has established some shared values between these two Constitutions 
and concluded that our constitutional right to challenge evidence is similar to the 
right of confrontation provided by the United States Constitution. He also found the 
objectives of the right to challenge evidence in the South African Constitution to be 
the need to cross-examine adverse witnesses and argued that it also included the 
right to cross-examine witnesses. 
Furthermore, Naude, when commenting on Cameron JA’s decision in Ndlovu which 
held that the right to challenge evidence does not include the right to cross-examine 
witnesses, argued that, because an accused has a right to cross-examine witnesses, 
procedurally the court’s decision in Ndlovu might be viewed in different ways.396 In 
other words, this view by Naude seems to suggest that cross-examination as 
procedural tool should be included in the constitutional right to challenge evidence 
and that the court’s reasoning in Ndlovu might be questionable. 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Nedzamba397 also considered the 
meaning, intent and extent of the right to adduce and challenge evidence as well as 
the objectives of cross-examination, and it held that, after the accused could not 
cross-examine witnesses who testified against him, his right to adduce and 
challenge evidence was violated. 
Steytler commented further on the substance of the right to challenge evidence and 
its link with cross-examination and stated that, at the centre of establishing the 
reliability of the evidence against the accused, is the right to challenge evidence. He 
added that cross-examination also brings to light some positive evidence from a 
witness and that the constitutional challenging of evidence was through cross-
examination.398 
The South African Law Commission, in its 2001 report examined the content and 
meaning of the right to adduce and challenge evidence and made recommendations 
which approved Steytler’s views that section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution is sound and 
comprehensible and that it includes the right to cross-examination.399  
4.6 Conclusion 
While the text of the Constitution remains incomprehensible and ambiguous on the 
question whether the right to a fair trial which includes the right to challenge 
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evidence includes the right to cross-examine witnesses, the majority of the court 
decisions suggest that the values which are protected by these two rights are 
inseparable and they, consequently, answer this question in the affirmative. In 
addition, these are also the widespread views of academics.  
Moreover, section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution forms part of the Bill of Rights, and 
when construing provisions contained in the Bill of Rights a court is also enjoined to 
consider international and foreign laws.400 Hence the succeeding chapter will 
examine international and foreign laws relating to this right and the hearsay rule in 
other common law jurisdictions with a view to understanding fully the true 
perspective and justification for the existence of this right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
400
 Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum – (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.” 
86 | P a g e  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 – THE HEARSAY RULE AND THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IN 
OTHER COMMON-LAW JURISDICTIONS AND IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS                                                                                                              
5.1. Introduction 
The influence of the hearsay rule as a fundamental component of the common law 
right of confrontation was recently demonstrated in the decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v The United Kingdom401  which 
involved the admission of hearsay evidence and the common law right of 
confrontation. It was argued that the United Kingdom Supreme Court has erred in 
finding that the admission of hearsay evidence did not violate the accused’s right of 
confrontation and should have considered the influence and effect of these principles 
(hearsay rule and right of confrontation) and their common law background in other 
common law jurisdictions which included Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New 
Zealand, Ireland, the United States, and South Africa, which was given 
prominence.402  
What do these countries have in common? These are all former British colonies and 
they have inherited the common law hearsay rule403 which began during the Middle 
Ages in England.404  Furthermore, the historical link in the application of this common 
law principle in these countries which also formed a fundamental part of the 
accused’s submission in Al-Khawaja supra will be evident in the discussions that 
follow. 
In this chapter, the objectives of the study will be to examine critically the hearsay 
rule and its application with regard to the right of confrontation in these countries and 
in the European Court of Human Rights [“ECHR”] in order to establish how the 
admission of hearsay evidence impacts on the accused’s right to confront witnesses 
who testifies against him or her. Moreover, South Africa and these countries are also 
considered the “major common law jurisdictions”405 and, therefore, the jurisprudence 
in the area of hearsay evidence in these countries might be informative in answering 
the questions which form the primary subject of this study on the hearsay rule.  
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  5.2 United States 
In the United States the accused’s common law right to cross-examine opposing 
witnesses which originated from Roman law was developed together with the 
hearsay rule during the beginning of the eighteen century when the United States 
was still a British colony. This right became a constitutionalised right during the same 
period, for example-, the Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) of the United 
States Constitution which was adopted in 1790 provides that “in criminal cases the 
accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”406 
In addition, Taylor, when examining the reason why the common law right of 
confrontation received constitutional protection, agrees with the views expressed by 
Pollitt in claiming that there seems to be another reason that motivated this 
constitutionalisation when he states that: 
 ‘in the late 1700’s, when the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted, the 
general rule against hearsay had been established in England. The same mistrust of out of court 
statements that gave rise to the hearsay rule doctrine was present in the mind of the framers of the 
Constitution.’
407
 
It seems that the constitutionalisation of the common law right of confrontation was 
born out of the fear and concern that hearsay evidence would prejudice an accused 
and that there was some mistrust about whether government officials who were 
entrusted with administering the law would not protect this fundamental right as was 
shown in the Raleigh treason trial above. Taylor’s views are also evident in the 
argument made by John Adams, the second president of the United States who is 
also considered to be “a principal architect of the United States Constitution,” in a 
case where he represented a trader408 where he argued that “examinations of 
witnesses upon interrogatories are only by the Civil Law. Interrogatories are 
unknown at Common Law, and Englishmen and Common Law Lawyers have an 
aversion to them if not an abhorrence of them.”409 
In 1895 the United States Supreme Court described the rationale and objective of 
the inclusion of the right of confrontation in the United States Constitution, and 
remarked that, “The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to 
prevent depositions of ex parte affidavits being used against the prisoner”410 These 
views expressed by the court are also in accord with those expressed by Taylor and 
Pollitt above. 
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As was shown in chapter two, however, the ex parte depositions were the kind of 
documents or letters that were at times deemed admissible as evidence and this is 
evident in the Raleigh treason trial referred to above. In 2004, the same court 
reiterated the objectives of the Confrontation Clause which seem not to have 
changed over centuries, when Scalia J stated that: 
 “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal 
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. It was 
these practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like Raleigh’s [Sir Walter Raleigh 
was tried for treason, convicted, and later executed, largely based upon on out of court statement]; 
that the Marian statutes invited; that English law’s assertion of a right of confrontation was meant to 
prohibit; and that the founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with 
this focus in mind.”
411
 
Furthermore, Taylor also examined the consequences of integrating the hearsay rule 
into the Constitution and concluded that it became a constitutionally protected notion 
that the right of confrontation could no longer be changed in federal courts.412 In 
addition, this historical link between the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation 
led Taylor to conclude that these principles were intended to safeguard the same 
values.413 
Read also concurs with Taylor on the interaction between these principles and also 
argues that one of the values safeguarded by these principles was that of cross-
examination.414  
In addition, Read comments on these values protected by these principles and 
states that “both the right to confrontation and the hearsay rule reflect the belief that 
some evidence which might be of probative value should not be admitted unless the 
declarant has actually appeared in court and has been cross-examined.”415 
Hence it is the chance to cross-examine witnesses which is safeguarded by the rule 
On the constitutionalisation of the rule against hearsay, Wigmore also argues that it 
created three fundamental factors which courts have to consider when receiving 
hearsay, and he states that, firstly, the primary device in determining hearsay was 
cross-examination of witnesses who give adverse evidence against an accused. In 
addition, he argued that the hearsay rule has two components which he termed 
‘cross-examination proper’ and ‘confrontation.’ Confrontation, he argued, meant the 
face-to-face encounter between the accused and his accuser. And he also reasoned 
that cross-examination was a vital device of confrontation and was one of the key 
components of the hearsay rule.416 
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Secondly, he argued that the main question to be considered when determining 
whether the right of confrontation was protected is whether the accused was allowed 
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Wigmore adds to these views and 
states that, “If there has been a cross-examination, there has been a confrontation. 
The satisfaction of the right of cross-examination disposes of any objection based on 
the so-called right of confrontation.”417 
Thirdly, Wigmore argues that if the above two components are proved then the “the 
rule sanctioned by the Constitution (referring to the sixth amendment right of an 
accused to confront the witness against him) is the hearsay rule as to cross-
examination, with all the exceptions that may legitimately be found.”418 
In addition, Wigmore examined what he termed the similarities and connection 
between the right to cross-examination and the right of confrontation and argued 
that:  
‘there never was at common law any recognised right to an indispensable thing called confrontation 
as distinguished from cross-examination. There was a right to cross-examination as indispensable, 
and that right was involved in and secured by confrontation; it was the same right under different 
names. This is very clear from the history of the hearsay rule, and from continuous understanding and 
exposition of the idea of confrontation. It follows that, if the accused has had the benefit of cross-
examination, he has had the very privilege secured to him by the Constitution.’
419
 
It seems that the constitutional right to be confronted with witnesses was protected 
and articulated through cross-examination, and cross-examination and the right of 
confrontation were different terms which protected the same values. 
Friedman, however, disagrees with the views of Taylor, Pollitt and Wigmore that the 
confrontation clause had constitutionalised the rule against hearsay and suggests 
that the result of the constitutional provision was that:  
‘The Clause should not be regarded as a constitutionalisation of the rule against hearsay. Rather, it 
reflects a principle of long standing in common law systems, and even in some other circumstances, 
that a statement that is testimonial in nature may not be introduced against a criminal defendant 
unless he has had an opportunity to confront and examine the witness who made the statement.’
420
 
According to Friedman, there has never been a constitutionalisation of the rule 
against hearsay but rather a recognition that hearsay evidence should not be 
admissible unless the accused had an opportunity to “confront and examine” the 
original declarant. In addition, he points out that:  
‘the confrontation clause gives the accused more than a right to confront ‘”all those who appear and 
give evidence at trial”’. Its primary impact is to ensure that prosecution witnesses do give their 
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evidence at trial, or if necessary at pre-trial proceedings at which the accused is able to confront 
them.’
421
 
Like Wigmore, Friedman also identified what he termed ‘values’ or factors that can 
be accomplished through face-to-face confrontation between the accused and his 
accuser, and he states that confrontation ensures truthfulness and honesty in the 
procedure; confrontation enables the accused to expose shortcomings in the 
testimony against the accused; confrontation disheartens deception and 
untruthfulness in testimony.422 
In Friedman’s views, therefore, confrontation can be used as a procedural tool while 
it also assists the court in observing the demeanour of the witness and, at the same 
time, uncovers the untruthfulness in statements. Nevertheless, it seems Friedman 
does agree with Wigmore in one thing, viz. that the right of confrontation as 
contained in confrontation clause provides an accused with an opportunity to cross-
examine the prosecution’s witnesses.423 
Park, on the other hand, argues that the confrontation clause which has been viewed 
by some academics to be constitutionalising the rule against hearsay enables an 
accused more than simply an opportunity to be gazed at during the trial but it also 
contains cross-examination which he considers to be more important than a mere 
face-to-face encounter with the prosecution witnesses.424 
Furthermore, Friedman is in accord with these views expressed by Park, and he 
states that “it is clear that confrontation ordinarily includes the accused’s right to 
have those witnesses brought “face-to-face”, in the time honoured phrase, when they 
testify. But confrontation is much more than this “face-to-face” right. It also 
comprehends the right to have witnesses give their testimony under oath and to 
subject them to cross-examination.”425 
Confrontation includes, and takes into account, the right to cross-examine witnesses 
and not only a ‘face-to-face’ encounter. Wigmore, for instance, has also articulated 
similar views in the following terms, “the defendant demands confrontation not for the 
idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the 
purpose of cross-examination”.426 Cross-examination is the primary objective for the 
right of confrontation rather than only enabling an accused to stare and look at 
his/her accusers.  
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In addition, Douglas, when commenting on the purpose and meaning of the 
confrontation clause, argued that confrontation signifies and implies deed and 
exploits and includes intense and rigorous cross-examination.427 These views are in 
accord with those expressed by Wigmore above on the primary objective of the right 
of confrontation. 
There seems to be overwhelming consensus by academics that the confrontation 
clause’s fundamental objective is to protect the right to cross-examination and that 
the constitutional right of confrontation also includes cross-examination. On other 
hand, as was shown above, academics have divergent views on the point of whether 
the confrontation clause has constitutionalised the hearsay rule. 
What will follow is an examination of how the United States Supreme Court has 
construed these constitutional provisions in cases where the hearsay rule was also 
seen to be applicable with a view to establishing the content and meaning of this 
constitutional provision. 
 In Barber v Page428 the State brought an application that transcripts of an 
interview of some witnesses which were taken during the preliminary hearing be 
admitted as evidence against the accused in lieu of oral testimony. It was argued 
on behalf of the accused that the admission of these transcripts would deny the 
accused his right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The court held 
that admitting these transcripts would deny the accused his right to be 
confronted with witnesses against him and also that this right included cross-
examination. 
 The court in Crawford v Washington429 examined the content, intention and 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause in the light of the hearsay rule, and it held 
that the confrontation clause was fulfilled and realized through cross-
examination. 
 In Idaho v Wright430the court had to determine whether a hearsay statement 
which was given by a child to a paediatrician denied the accused’s right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him. The court considered the meaning of 
the right and the hearsay rule, and it held that the accused’s right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him was denied by the admission of the 
hearsay statement and amongst the reasons for its exclusion, was the absence 
of an opportunity for cross-examining the declarant of the statement. 
 The court in Greene v McElroy431 examined the hearsay rule and the meaning of 
the right to confrontation and cross-examination, and it held that the values 
protected by these principles “have ancient roots. They find expression in the 
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Sixth Amendment which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall 
enjoy the right to ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” 
 In Pointer v Texas,432 the court also considered the meaning and intention of the 
constitutional right to be confronted with witnesses and the hearsay rule and 
stated that cross-examination and the right of confrontation formed an essential 
component of the constitutional right. The court was also in accord with the views 
that the right to be confronted with witnesses included cross-examination. 
 The court in California v Green,433 when examining the hearsay rule and 
accused’s right to confrontation, held that these concepts safeguard much the 
same values and that the constitutional right of confrontation allowed “personal 
examination and cross-examination.” 
 In Mattox v United States434 when examining the hearsay rule and confrontation 
clause, it was held that the fundamental objective of the constitutional right to 
confrontation was to allow an opportunity for the cross-examination of witnesses. 
 The court in Dutton v Evans435 was also in accord with its views in California v 
Green that the accused’s constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses 
and the hearsay rule originated from the protection of similar principles and that 
an opportunity for cross-examination realised this constitutional right. 
 In Chambers v Mississippi,436the court held that the right of cross-examination 
was inherent and contained in the constitutional right of confrontation after a 
detailed examination of the historical background of the hearsay rule. 
 The court in Douglas v Alabama,437 held that the right of confrontation required a 
face-to-face encounter between the accused and adverse witnesses during the 
trial, and that the fundamental value protected by this constitutional right was that 
of cross-examination. 
 In Kentucky v Stincer,438 the court also held that the fundamental objective of the 
constitutional right of confrontation was to enable an accused an opportunity to 
cross-examine witnesses.  
 The court, in Pennsylvania v Ritchie,439 was also in accord with its decision in 
Kentucky v Stincer that the accused’s right to be confronted with witnesses is 
safeguarded by the right cross-examination. 
 In Maryland v Craig,440 the court, when considering the fundamental objective of 
the right of confrontation and the hearsay rule, held that cross-examination was 
one of primary features of the right of confrontation. 
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Hence the court’s interpretation of the right to be confronted with witnesses seems 
to be consistent in finding that this right includes cross-examination when 
considering the application and scope of the hearsay rule. 
Furthermore, the hearsay rule in the United States has in recent years witnessed 
legislative reforms which have resulted, as was shown earlier, in the inclusion of the 
residual hearsay exception which allows for the admission of hearsay evidence in 
the interests of justice.441 This reform is contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
which was adopted in 1975.442 The Federal Rules of Evidence contained residual 
hearsay exceptions that permit trial judges, under certain circumstances, to admit 
hearsay that did not fit within specific exceptions to the hearsay rule under common 
law.443 
A close look at the Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5), which were 
briefly discussed in chapter 3, shows that they contain the residual hearsay 
exceptions when they state that: 
‘Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement 
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it 
is offered that any other evidence which the opponent can produce through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests  of justice will best be served by admission 
of the statement into evidence…’ 
Furthermore, as was discussed in chapter 3, Yasser stated that the Senate 
Committee when enacting these residual hearsay exceptions intended that they 
[residual hearsay exceptions] would be used very rarely and only in exceptional 
circumstances and that no “broad licence should be given to trial judges” to admit 
hearsay evidence because of the concern such admission would have on the 
accused’s right to be confronted with the witnesses against him/ her.444  The residual 
hearsay exception, which allows the admission of hearsay evidence in the interests 
of justice, seems to be the primary feature in the legislative reforms to the hearsay 
rule in the United States. 
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 5.3 United Kingdom 
English common law placed importance on the idea of face-to-face confrontation 
between the accused and his accusers as a guarantee of both the reliability of the 
evidence and the fairness of proceedings.445 The common law right of confrontation 
is said to have laid the basis for English common law and is thought to be linked with 
the hearsay rule.446 This view is also affirmed by Swergold, and he argues that the 
right to confrontation became a customary part of English trials during the late 
sixteenth century.447 
In addition, Lord Bingham was also in accord with this view expressed by Swergold 
in Davis v R,448 and he stated that, “it was a long-established principle of the English 
common law that, subject to certain exceptions and statutory qualifications, the 
defendant in a criminal trial should be confronted by his accusers in order that he 
may cross-examine them and challenge their evidence.” English common law 
recognised that an accused has a right to confrontation so that he may cross-
examine his accusers.  
In recent years the English common law which regulates the admission of hearsay 
evidence has been legislatively reformed by the enactment of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 (“CJA”).449 This legislation bears similar provisions to the South African 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. Furthermore, section 114 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides as follows: 
‘Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence –  
(1) In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is admissible 
as evidence of any matter stated if, but only if – 
(a) any provisions of this Chapter or any other statutory provision makes it admissible, 
(b) any rule of law preserved by section 118 makes it admissible, 
(c) all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible, or  
(d) the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible. 
(2) In deciding whether a statement not made in oral evidence should be admitted under subsection 
(1)(d), the court must have regard to the following factors (and to any others it considers relevant) 
– 
(a) how much probative value the statement has (assuming it to be true) in relation to a matter in 
issue in the proceedings, or how valuable it is for the understanding of other evidence in the 
case; 
(b) what other evidence has been, or can be, given on that matter or evidence mentioned in 
paragraph (a); 
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(c) how important the matter or evidence mentioned in paragraph (a) is in the context of the case 
as a whole; 
(d) the circumstances in which the statement was made; 
(e) how reliable the maker of the statement appears to be; 
(f) how reliable the evidence of the making of the statement appears to be; 
(g) whether oral evidence of the matter stated can be given and, if not, why it cannot; 
(h) the amount of difficulty involved in challenging the statement; 
(i) the extent to which that difficulty would be likely to prejudice the party facing it.’ 
The court is provided with a discretion to admit hearsay evidence in the interests of 
justice under section 114(1)(d). Furthermore, the court, when admitting hearsay 
evidence in the interests of justice, can also consider any other factor which it deems 
to be relevant under section 114(2). As in the South African law of evidence Act 45 
of 1988, some of the factors to be considered when interpreting section 114(2) of the 
CJA are not statutorily provided, but the court is empowered to make use of its 
private opinions in establishing or redefining these factors.  
Moreover, the CJA does not expressly state whether the interests of justice 
exception should be applied sparingly or not. The court in Sak v Crown Prosecution 
Service,450 however, held that “the interests of justice provision is a limited 
inclusionary discretion to be used only exceptionally.” In addition, in another decision 
the court also reiterated these sentiments, in R v Z,451 where it was held that “section 
114(1)(d) … is to be cautiously applied.” Moreover, Choo seems not to be favourably 
moved by these decisions by the courts, and he argues that they are not helpful to 
trial judges in indicting the balance that ought to be struck on the application of these 
provisions of the 2003 Act because, he adds, there’s lack of express provisions in 
the Act suggesting such application.452  Hence the author’s views are that the 
legislation in question, the CJA, is incomprehensible and does not expressly 
provides whether this discretion to admit hearsay evidence in the interests of justice 
should be applied sparingly or not and that a court might not be suitably capable of 
making an informed determination that the provisions should be applied only in a 
certain manner. As was discussed in chapter 3, this difficulty in interpreting similar 
provisions contained in the South African law of evidence, the 1988 Act, has also 
attracted divergent views from the courts and academics, and it also remains 
unresolved.  
Because the Law Commission, when surveying the English hearsay rule, had to look 
at Article 6 of the European Convention for Human Rights453 which provides an 
accused’s right to examine witnesses against him, it has asked the question, “Will a 
statement be inadmissible if the accused has never had a chance to question the 
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witness?”454 The Commission gave an answer to this question and stated that: “in a 
literal reading of Article 6, the answer might well be in the negative. If the evidence in 
question counts as the statement of a witness it may not be used in evidence unless 
the defence had a chance to put its questions to the witnesses.”455 In addition, the 
court in R v Central Criminal Court ex parte Bright and others456 seemed to concur 
with the Law Commission’s latter assertion that the common law right of 
confrontation had fundamental links with the Article 6 right to examine witnesses and 
that the hearsay rule requires out-of-court statements to be subjected to question by 
adverse witnesses. 
Moreover, in the English Court of Appeal, in Martin v R,457 the defendant’s conviction 
was based mainly on untested evidence which amounted to hearsay evidence and 
which was read to the jury. On appeal, it was held that the defendant had been 
denied the opportunity to challenge the evidence by cross-examination and this had 
resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial. This conclusion was reached after the 
court had considered the hearsay rule and its exceptions. 
In Al-Khawaja v R,458the defendant was convicted based on a written statement that 
was made by the complainant, who had since died, in a sexual assault charge. The 
accused opposed the admission of the hearsay statement and argued that it would 
violate his common law right to confront witnesses which, as was stated earlier, is 
thought to be the origin of the right to examine witnesses under the European 
Convention. The trial court held that it was in the “interests of justice” for the 
complainant’s statement to be received in evidence. Al-Khawaja has appealed this 
decision in the European Court of Human Rights, and he argued that his basic 
human rights, which included the right to examine witnesses against him, were 
violated by the admission of hearsay evidence. As will be shown later when the 
jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights is discussed, that court 
[European Court for Human Rights] when considering the hearsay rule, held that the 
admission of hearsay evidence against Mr Al-Khawaja had violated his right to 
examine witnesses under the Convention. 
Furthermore, in Sellick and another v R,459some statements were read to the jury as 
evidence based on the fact that some witnesses had been kept away and were in 
fear of their lives. The submission was made that the defendants were not given an 
opportunity to challenge the statements through cross-examination. The court held 
that “evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing and as general rule 
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Article 6(3)(d) requires a defendant to be given a proper and adequate opportunity to 
challenge and question witnesses.”460 The Court also stated that the accused’s right 
to examine witnesses against him had been breached through the admission of 
hearsay and that such conduct had rendered the trial unfair because the defendants 
were not given an opportunity to cross-examine the declarants of the statements.461 
On the other hand, the Davis v R462 case also involved evidence from an anonymous 
witness who was cross-examined by the counsel for the defendant behind a screen 
because his identify could not be disclosed to the accused for fear that his life would 
be in danger. Here the Court held that the trial had been fair and that the defendant 
had been correctly convicted.463 The defendant appealed to the House of Lords in 
Davis v R464 where Lord Bingham held that for centuries the custom of confronting 
defendants with their accusers so that they may be cross-examined and the truth 
established was recognised by English authorities such as Sir Matthew Hale in 
1820,465Blackstone466and Bentham as one of its fundamental principles .467 The 
latter author had regarded the cross-examination of adverse witnesses as “the 
indefeasible right of each party, in all sorts of causes” and condemned the 
inquisitorial trial system used on the continent of Europe, where admission of 
evidence would take place under a “veil of secrecy” and the opportunity was created 
for “wide open to mendacity, falsehood, and partiality.”’468 Lord Bingham further 
stated that the “basic common law rule required witnesses on issues in dispute to be 
identified and cross-examined with knowledge of their identity and permitting the 
defence to know and put to witnesses otherwise admissible and relevant questions 
about their identity.”469 He also expressed some concerns and misgivings that the 
right to cross-examination was hindered by the witness’s anonymity and concluded 
that the defendant could not be said to have had a fair trial.470 The court in another 
case has held that the common law right of confrontation under England’s law was 
also said to be forming a fundamental principle of the law in England and Wales and 
that “in criminal trials witnesses giving evidence are to be examined in court at the 
trial.”471 
In addition, another case which involved anonymous witnesses is R v Mayers, 
Glasgow and others.472 In this case, the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 
2008 was applied. This Act was said to represent Parliament’s response to the 
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decision in R v Davis,473 discussed in the preceding paragraph. The common law 
rules providing for anonymous witness were nullified by this legislation.474 Section 1 
of the Witness Anonymity Act 2008 created new rules which apply to witness 
anonymity in criminal proceedings. The section provides that 
 ‘(2) The common law rules relating to the power of a court to make an order for securing that the 
identity of a witness in criminal proceedings is withheld from the defendant (or, on a defence 
application, from other defendants) are abolished. (3) Nothing in this Act affects the common law rules 
as to the withholding of information on the grounds of public interest immunity.’ 
The defendant’s right to know the identity of witnesses who incriminate him was 
maintained and fully asserted by this Act.475 The Act, however, also introduced 
circumstances in which the identity of witnesses can be withheld from the 
defendants. In R Mayers, Glasgow and others the witnesses’ identity was kept away 
from the defendants and, when applying this new provisions to the evidence of the 
anonymous witnesses, the court held that, because this evidence was precise and 
scrupulously probed the accused has not been prejudiced by its reception. The court 
also concluded that the accused’s right to examine witnesses was not denied by 
these provisions.476 In other words, the statutory reforms which provided for the 
anonymity of prosecution witnesses under certain circumstances is considered not to 
be violating an accused’s right to examine witnesses against him if the conditions 
stipulated in the respective legislation are met. 
In Y v R,477a man termed Y was charged and tried alone. The Crown applied, under 
section 114(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, that  the court should admit 
hearsay evidence contained in a confession made by X in separate court 
proceedings which incriminated Y despite the fact that Y did not have an opportunity 
to cross-examine X. The court considered the hearsay rule and held that this 
hearsay evidence was admissible in the interests of justice despite the lack of 
opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the witnesses.  It is notable that, when 
English common law hearsay rule was argued by the counsel appearing on behalf of 
the accused, he stated that “in common law, a confession was admissible, as an 
exception to the general exclusion of hearsay, but the exception extended only to 
make it admissible in the case of the person making the confession.”478 In addition, 
reference was also made to an unreported case, R v Ibrahim, in the Woolwich Crown 
Court 4 June 2007, where Fulford J held that, “The interests of justice provisions in 
section 114(1)(d) is incompatible with the common law rule. The latter rule is 
absolute in prohibiting the use of a confession against a defendant who was not 
present when it was made, whereas a discretionary decision under section 114(1)(d) 
admitting confession evidence would result in the confession becoming generally 
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available for use against the defendants who were not present when the 
incriminating out of court statement was made.”479 
The views expressed by the court in R v Ibrahim were that the interests of justice test 
was contrary to the common law, that English common law had recognised an 
accused’s right to confront witnesses, and that the interests of justice exception 
failed to take into account what the court deemed to be common law evidentiary 
rules applicable to confessions made by co-accused. 
Furthermore, the human rights organisation, JUSTICE,480 during the consultation 
stage of the Criminal Justice Bill in the House of Commons, which led to the 
adoption of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, made the following submission that  
‘the provisions on hearsay in Chapter 2, Part 11 of the Criminal Justice Bill allow a wide exceptions 
that the general exclusionary rule is more or less redundant. Far from simplifying the law, these 
clauses are highly complex, are likely to lead to uncertainty for those involved in trial preparation, and 
will lead to lengthy legal arguments as to whether evidence should be admitted in a particular case.’
481
  
As shown earlier, the concerns were based on the extent of the uncertainty which 
would be introduced by the inclusion of the interests of justice hearsay exception, in 
that these provisions do not enable an accused to know the evidentiary rules 
applicable to his case. Furthermore, these provisions are also seen not to have 
caused the law of evidence to be more comprehensible or predictable.  
In addition, Lord Thomas of Gresford QC, during the consultations stage of this Bill, 
also argued that “the interests of justice” test provided in clause 114 was “extremely 
vague and broad and introduced into the law of evidence in criminal cases hearsay 
evidence wholesale.”482   
Cross and Tapper, when examining the admission of hearsay evidence in the 
interests of justice under the 2003 Act also argue that the Law Commission 
anticipated the discretion in section 114(1)(d) to be “very limited exception” and that 
it could be formidable how this legislative objective can be accomplished where the 
legislation in question [the 2003 Act] does not expressly make such provision.483 
These views are also in accord with those expressed by Choo and other academics 
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as shown in this chapter in identifying the difficulty in the application of this 
legislation.  
In addition, Blackstone,484 when examining ‘the “interests of justice” test in section 
114(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, seems to be in agreement with the views 
expressed by Cross and Tapper that this concept was initially thought by the Law 
Commission to be a safeguard for the admission of evidence that would otherwise 
be inadmissible in extraordinary circumstances only and that there is nothing 
contained in legislation indicative of this intention of the legislature in section 
114(1)(d). 
Moreover, Murphy also expressed some concerns relating to the impact the 
admission of hearsay evidence under section 114(1)(d) in the interests of justice 
would have, and he argued that it will, however, lead to “serious question as to 
whether the fairness of the trial is harmed by giving the judge such a wide and 
largely unbridled power to admit hearsay evidence and thereby depriving the 
accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him.”485 
Hence, the general sentiments among most academics seem to be that the interests 
of justice test contained in section 114(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was to 
be used only in rarely and  in exceptional circumstances. As stated earlier, however, 
the provisions of the Act failed to state expressly that this would be the case.  
Mulcahy486 concurs with the views expressed by Murphy on the impact the interests 
of justice test might have on the accused’s right to be confronted by witnesses as 
guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights and argues that these 
provisions violates an accused’s right to a fair trial. He reasoned that:  
‘the Law Commission needed to pay attention to the mandates and work of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. In aftermath of World War ll, a number of European countries decided to codify 
certain basic fundamental rights within a treaty, and this resulted in the Convention. The rights 
contained in the Convention are similar to the sentiments expressed by the United Nations in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.’
487
  
Furthermore, Mulcahy adds that the admission of hearsay evidence in the interests 
of justice is a very contentious and disputed issue because of its impact on an 
accused’s right of confrontation in common law and the main problem being the fact 
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the provisions are too broad and gives unbridled powers to a court to use personal 
beliefs.488 
On the other hand, there was a strong disagreement with Mulcahy’s views that the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, in admitting hearsay evidence in the interests of justice, is 
inconsistent with the right to a fair trial and the right to confrontation as well as the 
right to examine witnesses as provided for in Article 6(3)(d) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights when the England and Wales Court of Appeals, in 
Horncastle and others v R,489 held that the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 do not deny an accused the right of confrontation. The court further held that 
the “principled solution provided for by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 in relation to 
hearsay evidence is consistent with the right of confrontation.”490 
Furthermore, Brodin seems to agree with the views expressed by Mulcahy on the 
constitutional validity of the interests of justice legislation and argues that the 
enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which gives courts discretion to admit 
hearsay evidence in the interests of justice have brought about unfair consequences. 
He also adds that the: 
 ‘CJA has achieved its goal of inviting more hearsay into criminal trials (usually in the prosecution’s 
case). Conviction rates have gone up since its adoption from 75 to 83 percent,
491
including a slight rise 
in rape convictions, but it is of course not possible to attribute that increase to any one factor, such as 
ready admissibility of out-of-court statements.’
492
  
Brodin also argues that the hearsay law reforms introduced by the CJA have merged 
and integrated the “traditional exceptions with open-ended discretion,” a process, he 
argues, has resulted in the failure to make this law more comprehensible and 
intelligible.493 
In addition, Birch and Hirst494seems to agree with these views expressed by Brodin 
in examining the consequences of the CJA in providing that hearsay could be 
admissible in interests of justice, and they, during 2010, bemoaned the fact that:  
‘For years, the English courts had struggled but failed to provide a clear, watertight definition of what 
was or was not hearsay at common law. Six years on, however, it seems that the new concept of 
hearsay under the CJA is no more satisfactory, and no better understood, than the old. One set of 
complexities has merely been exchanged for another, and the complexities include some that the 
courts have yet to master.’ 
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Furthermore, Birch and Hirst also note a scenario which seems to be more difficult 
and vexatious to comprehend in that they also argue that the CJA has considerably 
strengthened and enhanced “the chances of a trial being influenced by second-hand 
evidence of which the witness in court has not first-hand knowledge.”495 These 
concerns seem to be directed at the “interests of justice” test and the admissibility of 
hearsay because it is deemed reliable. 
Brodin496 also agrees with the views expressed by Birch and Hirst and further argues 
that defence attorneys have also shown dismay at the CJA lowering and running 
down the right of confrontation.497  Furthermore, the provisions of the CJA which 
admit hearsay evidence in the interests of justice and the right of confrontation were 
recently at issue in a case that appeared in 2012, and Lord Justice Aikens, when 
commenting on England’s common law, stated that, “the basic rule of the law of 
England and Wales in criminal trials is that witnesses giving evidence are to be 
examined in court at the trial. It has long been recognised as a vital principle and is 
sometimes called the “right of confrontation.””498 
Besides the interests of justice statutory test, the UK’s hearsay jurisprudence also 
makes provisions for the admission of hearsay evidence when it is considered to be 
reliable by the court. The court in Horncastle had to consider the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence which was deemed to be reliable and found that such evidence 
could not be said to be denying an accused his right of confrontation; Lord Justice 
Thomas reasoned as follows: 
 ‘a court can be trusted to assess the reliability of hearsay. When the hearsay is demonstrably 
reliable, or its reliability can properly be tested and assessed, the right of the defence are protected, 
there are in the language of the European Court of Human Rights sufficient counter-balancing 
measures, and the trial is fair.’
499
  
Nevertheless, this views that hearsay evidence should be admitted because it is 
found by the court to be reliable and, therefore, not violating an accused’s right to be 
confronted with witnesses, are disputed by Justice Scalia where he held that 
“dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”500 Furthermore, 
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Scalia J also stated the reasons in support of his views that the reliability test cannot 
be trusted as a tool to determine the reliability of evidence and protecting the right to 
be confronted with witnesses when he said that, “reliability is an amorphous, if not 
entirely subjective, concept. Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends 
heavily on which factors the judge considers and how much weight he accords each 
of them. Some courts wind up attaching the same significance to opposite facts.” 
Hence, in Scalia J’s words, the reliability test is irregular, unstructured, non-objective, 
intuitive, biased and unconstitutional. Moreover, the above decision of the Court of 
Appeals in Horncastle was confirmed by the United Kingdom Supreme Court where 
Lord Phillips held that the Court of Appeals’ decision that the 2003 Act in allowing 
hearsay evidence to be received when considered reliable was compatible with the 
accused’s right to examine witness against him501 The correctness and accuracy of 
this finding by the UK Supreme Court was, however,  later questioned by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v The United 
Kingdom.502 In this matter Al-Khawaja complained that, “the trial judge’s decision to 
allow the statement of a witness to be read at his trial meant that he was denied the 
opportunity to examine or have examined the witness against him, whose evidence 
was the sole or decisive evidence in respect of one of his convictions”. In the latter 
decision the court doubted the soundness of a safeguard that would consider 
hearsay reliability when determining whether the accused’s right to examine witness 
has been violated. What the court also took into account in reaching this outcome-, 
was the argument that hearsay evidence should not be admissible because it was 
considered reliable, and it was stated that it was because “it would violate this 
ancient right of confrontation and the right of cross-examination for a person to be 
convicted solely or to a decisive extent upon uncross-examined testimony, 
regardless of how reliable it may otherwise appear.”503 
In addition, it can be noted that, in chapter 3 when the South African law of evidence 
was discussed, in particular section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 
1988, it was established that Cameron JA in 2002 in S v Ndlovu,504when construing 
the provisions of this Act on the admissibility of hearsay evidence, also made used of 
the reliability of hearsay test when establishing that the hearsay evidence presented 
by the State against the accused was admissible against his co-accused, and he 
held that such evidence did not violate an accused right challenge evidence. He also 
cited the 1992 decision of the United States Supreme Court in White v Illinois505 
where it was held that hearsay evidence might be admissible if the existence of 
“sufficient guarantees of reliability” are proved and that that would “satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause”. This test, termed “sufficient guarantees of reliability” of 
hearsay evidence, was also applied by the United States Supreme Court in the1980 
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decision in Ohio v Roberts506 where it was held that “the right to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him does not bar admission of an unavailable witness’s 
statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears adequate indicia of 
reliability”.507  In its 2004 decision in Crawford v Washington508 the Supreme Court, 
however, reversed and rejected this decision in Roberts, where Scalia J, as was 
discussed earlier, held that admission of hearsay evidence had denied the accused 
his confrontation clause right because “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to 
satisfy constitutional demands is confrontation.”509  In addition, Scalia J also 
described why hearsay evidence, even if considered to be reliable, violated the 
confrontation clause, and he stated that, “the Confrontation Clause commands that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination. Roberts allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary 
process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability, thus replacing the 
constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign 
one.”510  According to Scalia J, reliability of evidence can be determined through 
confrontation and cross-examination in terms of the accused’s Constitutional right to 
be confronted with witnesses against him. Furthermore, the court’s reasoning in 
Crawford was also to the effect that uncross-examined and untested evidence can 
never be deemed to be reliable, irrespective of how adequate the indications of 
reliability might appear to a judge. These decisions on the reliability of hearsay seem 
to support an overwhelming view which cast far-reaching and grave doubts on the 
safeguards and soundness of the reliability of hearsay evidence test, and, it is 
submitted, bring forth some fundamental flaws and cracks in Cameron JA’s 
reasoning in Ndlovu on the trustworthiness, logic and rationale of this test. Scalia J’s 
views expressed above did find some support amongst academics, viz. Friedman 
who argued that the reliability of hearsay evidence approach is an unsatisfactory, 
mediocre, deficient and below par benchmark for deciding whether evidence is 
permissible or not.511 Like Scalia J, Friedman also added that “reliability is 
notoriously difficult to determine. It puts the cart before the horse, essentially asking 
whether the assertion made by the statement is true as a precondition to 
admissibility.”512 In addition, Friedman also identifies another problem relating to the 
comprehension and application of the term reliable hearsay evidence and seems to 
be deeply perplexed by what he finds to be a lack of understanding of this concept. 
He argues that the reliability of hearsay evidence is a widely misapprehended and 
misconstrued principle and that, as a result, most people when talking about it are 
unable to define it.513 This state of perplexity has prompted Friedman to give a 
definition of the reliability of evidence approach, and he states that, “Evidence is 
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reliable proof of a given proposition if and only if, given the evidence, it is highly 
improbable that the proposition is false.”514  
Furthermore, the trial court must be convinced that evidence given against an 
accused is reliable before it can lead to a conviction, but-, a court must also 
determine whether it would have made a difference to an accused if he had had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the adverse witness. The caveat was sounded by 
Megarry J in John v Rees,515 where he said that 
 ‘As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn about 
with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in 
the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and 
unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a charge. Nor are those with any knowledge 
of human nature who pause to think for a moment likely to underestimate the feelings of resentment 
of those who find that a decision against them has been made without their afforded any opportunity 
to influence the course of events.’ 
People seem to show indignation and bitterness towards a decision in matters which 
affect them and if such decision was made without their participation. A similar 
warning was sounded by Lord Justice Sedley, in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AF and others,516 where he reasoned that: 
‘There can be few practising lawyers who have not had the experience of resuming their seat in a 
state of hubristic satisfaction, having called a respectable witness to give apparently cast-iron 
evidence, only to see it reduced to wreckage by ten minutes of well-informed cross-examination or 
convincingly explained away by the other side’s testimony. Some have appeared in cases in which 
everybody was sure of the defendant’s guilt, only for fresh evidence to emerge which makes it clear 
that they were wrong. As Mark Twain said, the difference between reality and fiction is that fiction has 
to be credible. In a system which recruits judges from practitioners, judges need to carry this sobering 
experience to the bench. It reminds them that you cannot be sure of anything until all the evidence 
has been heard, and that even then you may be wrong.’
517
 
The above reasoning by the courts testifies to the fact that it is difficult for the 
adversarial trial truth-finding process to uncover the truth if one party to the dispute 
was not allowed to confront his accusers and without adherence to the values 
protected by the hearsay rule and cross-examination. Moreover, these views, 
expressed by academics and the decisions by the courts, also articulate the 
fundamental features of these values protected by these principles in English law. 
5.4 Canada 
Canada has over centuries not reformed its common law hearsay rule by legislation 
despite the fact that other major common-law jurisdictions have enacted statutory 
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reforms relating to this rule. Canada’s hearsay reforms are “entirely by judicial 
precedent.”518 
The latter observations resulted from the Canadian Supreme Court identifying the 
contemporary hearsay exclusionary rule in Canada to have originated from the 
common law of evidence rather than from any statute or constitutional provision.519 
In 1982, Canada adopted a Constitution which provides the right to a fair trial, 
however, this constitutional right does not indicate whether an accused has a right to 
examine or cross-examine adverse witnesses. In addition, section 7 of the 
Constitution, which is also termed the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
guarantees the “right of life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”520 
In other words, the right to confrontation is not constitutionally guaranteed in 
Canada. 
Madden examined this provisions of the Canadian Constitution and concurs with the 
view that it does not expressly provides an accused’s right to be confronted 
witnesses against him nor does it states whether an accused has a right to cross-
examination and or a right to challenge evidence. On the other hand, Madden 
argues that, this constitutional provision is construed to be providing the right of 
confrontation and cross-examination indirectly.521 These views were expressed by 
the author after he examined the historical link between the hearsay rule and the 
right to cross-examination in Canada’s adversarial trial procedure.522 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Court of Canada held that the common law 
position which states that hearsay evidence is presumed to be inadmissible is still 
applicable and forms part of the Canadian law of evidence.523 Furthermore, when 
interpreting the hearsay rule the Supreme Court of Canada, in R v Khan,524 held that 
a hearsay statement was admissible if it was necessary and reliable. In applying this 
approach the court was creating a whole new test for the admission of hearsay 
evidence and at same time the court was also extended the hearsay rule exceptions. 
The necessity and reliability approach was also applied by this court in R v Smith.525 
This approach taken by the court in applying the hearsay rule seems to endorse the 
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views articulated by Brown that the Canadian Supreme Court and not the legislature 
creates the rules regulating the admission of hearsay evidence.  
Stuesser concurs with the above views when examining the Canadian hearsay rule 
and adds that Canada’s common law hearsay rule is not changed or repealed by 
statutory reforms but rather that the Canadian Supreme Court has, over decades, 
created new exceptions to the hearsay rule by introducing the notion of “necessity 
and reliability”.526 He further states that “necessity” stems from material evidence that 
might be defunct if not admitted through the hearsay rule. In addition, “reliability”, he 
argues, stems from the fact that the trial court has to consider two statements made 
by the same witness, one made out-of-court and the other made during the trial and 
in the presence of the court.527 In Stuesser’s words, the new hearsay exception 
created by the Supreme Court of Canada directs that:  
‘the statement is made under oath or solemn affirmation following a warning as to be the existence of 
sanctions and the significance of the oath or affirmation; the statement is videotaped in its entirety; 
and the opposing party has a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness respecting the statement.’ 
Furthermore, the requirement providing for an opportunity for cross-examination in 
these new hearsay exceptions can be traced back to the historical link which was 
discussed earlier between the common law hearsay rule and the right of 
confrontation. 
On the other hand, Tanovich also examined the necessity and reliability approach 
created by the Canadian Supreme Court and, he argues that the necessity of the 
hearsay statement can be considered in the event that the declarant who made the 
out-of-court statement has died or is not competent to testify. Reliability, on the other 
hand, the author argues, stems from the consideration given to the “declarant’s 
sincerity, memory, and ability to communicate at the time the statement was 
made.”528 In addition, Tanovich also gives as the primary reason for the existence of 
the ‘reliability’ approach in the hearsay rule-, the fact that the adversarial trial system 
requires that an accused be given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses 
against him, and, when assessing the reliability of an out-of-court statement, the 
court is empowered to honour this fundamental principle which forms part of the 
common law and the adversarial system.529 
Moreover, the correctness of Stuesser’s views on the Canadian hearsay rule were 
also evident in Charron J’s reasoning in R v Khelawon.530  When describing the 
Canadian hearsay rule it was stated that: 
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‘Canada’s adversarial system is based on the assumption that sources of untrust-worthiness or 
inaccuracy can best be brought to light under the test of cross-examination. “In addition, the approach 
of admitting hearsay evidence if it is considered to be necessary and reliable has been referred to by 
the Canadian Supreme Court” as the principled approach.’
531
 
In Khelawon, Charron J added that: 
‘Our adversary system puts a premium on the calling of witnesses, who testify under oath or solemn 
affirmation, whose demeanour can be observed by the trier of fact, and whose testimony can be 
tested by cross-examination. We regard this process as the optimal way of testing testimonial 
evidence. Because hearsay evidence comes in a different form, it raises particular concerns.’
532
 
Furthermore, Ewaschuk, when commenting on the Canadian hearsay rule, argued 
that this principle forms a fundamental part of the criminal procedure and cross-
examination is a powerful and primary device to test inaccuracies and discrepancies 
in witness’s testimonies.533 
In addition, these views expressed by Ewaschuk were evident in the court’s 
reasoning in R v Lyttle,534 where it was held that: 
‘Cross-examination may often be futile and sometimes prove fatal, but it remains nonetheless a 
faithful friend in the pursuit of justice and an indispensable ally in the search for truth. At times, there 
will be no other way to expose falsehood, to rectify error, to correct distortion or to elicit vital 
information that would otherwise remain forever concealed. That is why the right of an accused to 
cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution … is an essential component of the right to make all 
answer and defence.’ 
The court in R v Khelawon further described the relationship between cross-
examination and the constitutionally protected rights which was discussed above and 
is understood to imply providing an accused the right to confront witnesses. It stated 
that the Canadian Constitution did not expressly provide the right to confront 
witnesses or the right to cross-examination but the adversarial trial system which 
forms a fundamental part of Canadian law protects these rights.535 These views seem 
to be in accord with those expressed by Madden above. 
Moreover, Choo argues that the necessity requirement for the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence is an important principle because there might be circumstances 
that necessitates that an out-of-court statement be admitted as evidence and that a 
court needed to seek to a find a balance between the admission of such hearsay and 
the accused’s right to confrontation.536 
On the other hand, Tapper criticises the Canadian Supreme Court’s approach in 
reforming the hearsay rule in Canada and argues that the courts involvement in 
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statutory reforms should be kept to the minimum. The legislature, as the elected 
representatives of the people, he reasons, should lead the way and create new 
hearsay exceptions in its legislative capacity.537 
In addition, Botterell concurs with the views expressed by Tapper that the more 
judges have input into the criminal justice system, the less likely it is that the rule of 
law will be upheld because it would be impossible for an accused to predict with 
certainty how individual rules will be applied and what their outcome might be.538 In 
the author’s words, courts should be more concerned with interpreting the law and 
less with creating it, and this would maintain a clear balance in the separation of 
powers and rule of law principles. 
5.5 Australia 
The Canadian approach, where the Canadian Supreme Court has played what has 
been termed “judicial activist role” where the court created new hearsay 
exceptions539 was roundly condemned by the Australian Supreme Court as not being 
sensible in Bannon v R540 where the court held that it was not the court’s 
constitutional role or function to create laws or extend the hearsay exceptions. 
Moreover, Australia has no constitutional provisions protecting an accused’s right to 
examine the witnesses against him.541 The only rights expressly protected by the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 are trial by jury for indictable 
offences,542 freedom of religion,543 and non-discrimination on the grounds of out-of-
state residency.544 
Nevertheless, in Dietrich v The Queen,545the Supreme Court  of Australia held that 
an accused has a right to a fair trial which includes the right to examine the 
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witnesses against him, and it referred to Article 14(3) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights which guaranteed this right.546 
As in Canada, the common law applied in Australian hearsay evidence provides that 
hearsay evidence is not admissible unless it falls under one of the recognised 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule.547 The rationale for the rule against hearsay in 
Australia was discussed by the Australian Supreme Court in R v Lee548-: 
‘The common law of evidence has long focused upon the quality of the evidence that is given at trial 
and has required that the evidence that is given at trial is given orally, not least so that it might be 
subject to cross-examination. That is why the exclusionary rules of common law have been 
concerned with the quality of the evidence tendered – by prohibiting hearsay, by permitting the giving 
of opinions about matters requiring expertise by experts only, by the “best evidence rule” and so on. 
And the concern of the common law is not limited to the quality of evidence; it is a concern about the 
manner of trial. One very important reason why the common law set its face against hearsay evidence 
was because otherwise the party against whom the evidence was led could not cross-examine the 
maker of the statement. Confrontation and the opportunity for cross-examination are of central 
significance to the common law adversarial system of trial.’
549
 
The right of confrontation and cross-examination are essential components in the 
adversarial trial procedure and in the assessing of the quality and reliability of the 
evidence given by the parties. Hence evidence given orally during the trial and 
subjected to cross-examination is deemed to be a fundamental attribute of the 
adversarial trial system. 
Furthermore, Williams argues that the best evidence rule and the hearsay rule have 
distinct origins; the former developed as a general maxim, and, in its application, 
eventually came only to survive in the rule excluding secondary evidence while the 
latter was developed as a consequence of the marking off of the function of 
witnesses from those of jurors.550  
In addition, Williams also identified some dangers encountered when presenting 
hearsay evidence in Australia. These are-: firstly, that hearsay evidence could not be 
considered the principal evidence; secondly, hearsay evidence was given not under 
the sanction provided by an oath; thirdly, the demeanour of the witness who made 
the out-of-court statement cannot be tested; and, fourthly, the accused is denied the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness who made the statement.551 
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It seems that in Australia the hearsay rule and the opportunity of cross-examination 
are considered to be the fundamental tools in in the adversarial process which could                                         
be used to test assertions made against an accused. 
Moreover, the Australian Law Reform Commission which investigated reforms and 
improvements to the law of evidence recommended that “the exclusionary rule for 
hearsay evidence should be continued. Evidence by hearsay should not be 
admissible to prove the truth of what is asserted.”552 Hence the common law hearsay 
rule and its exceptions remain part of Australian law. 
In addition, the Evidence Act 1995 also states that a party may question any witness 
who testifies or gives evidence against him.553  
This Act also makes provisions on how hearsay evidence would be admissible and 
provides that: 
 ‘The hearsay rule – exclusion of hearsay evidence: (1) Evidence of a previous representation made 
by a person is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that the person intended to assert by the 
presentation. (2) Such a fact is in this Part referred to as an asserted fact.’
554
 
The Law Reform Commission further stated its views regarding the future status of 
the hearsay rule in Australia and reported that, “hearsay should be defined to 
encompasses all out of court assertions, express or implied, intended or unintended 
and whether made by words or conduct.”555 
Moreover, the High Court of Australia, in Bannon v The Queen,556 considered the 
hearsay rule and the admissibility of hearsay evidence and held that such evidence 
may be admissible in certain circumstances including where it is considered 
extremely credible and reliable.557 While the Australian Supreme Court disagreed 
with the Canadian Supreme Court’s judicial activist approach in creating new 
hearsay exceptions, as was shown above, it considered it to be sensible to adopt the 
Canadian approach which admits hearsay evidence by making reliance on the 
“reliability approach”. Hence the difference between the Canadian hearsay evidence 
reforms and the Australian law can be seen in that statutory reforms in Australia 
have taken place, and these resulted in the inclusion of the hearsay exception which 
admits hearsay because it is considered to be reliable while in Canada such reforms 
have been introduced by the Canadian Supreme Court.558 
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A close look at the 1995 Evidence Act shows that it provides for this exception in 
section 65(2), and it states as follows: 
‘Exception: Criminal proceedings if maker is not available: 
The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of previous representation that is given by a person who 
saw, heard, or otherwise perceived the representation being made if the representation was: 
(a) made under a duty to make that representation or to make representations of that kind; or 
(b) made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and din circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the representation is a fabrication; or 
(c) made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable; or 
(d) against the interests  of the person who made it at the time it was made.’ 
The reliability of the hearsay evidence test which is applied in Canadian and 
Australian jurisdictions as part of an exception to the hearsay rule, is also applied in 
New Zealand as will be shown below. 
5.6 New Zealand 
Unlike the position in Australia, the New Zealand Bill of Rights does guarantee an 
accused’s right in criminal proceedings to “examine the witnesses for the prosecution 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses for the defence under the 
same conditions as the prosecutions.”559 
In 1999, the New Zealand Law Commission, in its report, expressed the view that the 
hearsay rule “should operate to exclude evidence only if there are sound policy 
reasons for so doing.”560 The Commission further added that the rationale for these 
considerations would be to facilitate the admissibility of material and pertinent and 
also reliable evidence.561  The report clearly recommended that the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence should be based on two considerations: reliability and 
necessity.562 The “reliability approach” takes into account the state of affairs and 
conditions in which the out-of-court statement was taken while, on the other hand, 
the “necessity approach” requires a court to examine the grounds and cause for the 
unavailability of the out-of-court witness.563 In addition, the Law Commission took a 
step further and outlined the function and role of the law of evidence in the New 
Zealand legal system and stated that “under an adversarial system, parties present 
evidence to a judge or jury who make a decision after applying the relevant law to 
the facts. The fact-finder must first decide what the facts are by assessing the 
evidence offered by the parties.”564  
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The fundamental principle articulated by this provision which also forms the core of 
the New Zealand law of evidence can be said to be the fact that evidence is given 
orally in the presence of the accused and the jury. 
Moreover, the above recommendations of the Law Commission resulted in the 
enactment of the Evidence Act 2006 which came into force in 2007, and this 
legislation has implemented the Law Commission’s recommendations. Section 18(1) 
of that Act provides that hearsay statement is admissible if:  
‘(a) the circumstances relating to the statement provide reasonable assurances that the statement is 
reliable and (b) either: (i) the maker of the statement is unavailable as a witness; or (ii) the judge 
considers that undue expense or delay would be caused if the maker of the statement were required 
to be witness.’ 
Furthermore, this statutory provisions attests to the fact that the New Zealand 
legislature had adopted the approach taken by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v 
Smith565 where Chief Justice Lamer said that, “hearsay evidence of statements 
made by persons who are not available to give evidence at trial ought generally to be 
admissible, when the circumstances under which the statements were made satisfy 
the criteria of necessity and reliability.” In other words, New Zealand hearsay 
evidence also contains the hearsay exception which allows the admission of hearsay 
evidence because it is considered reliable. In addition, just as in Australia, in New 
Zealand the reliability approach was introduced through statutory reforms and not by 
the courts as was the case in Canada. Section 16 of the Evidence Act 2006 also 
provides for “circumstances” which includes those relating to “veracity and 
accuracy”. This provision defines the “circumstances relating to the statement” as 
including: 
  “(a) the nature and contents of the statement; and  
   (b) the circumstances in which the statement was made; and 
   (c) any circumstances that relate to the truthfulness of the maker of the statement; and  
   (d) any circumstances that relate to the accuracy of the observations of the maker of the 
statement.’
566
 
These are the factors which a court has to consider when determining whether an 
out-of-court statement is reliable or not in order for such a hearsay statement to be 
admissible as evidence. 
 
 
 
                                                          
565
 [1992] 75 CCC (3d) 257, 273-274. 
566
 Section 16 of the Evidence Act 2006. 
114 | P a g e  
 
Prior to the enactment of the Evidence Act 2006, however, the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal had extended and liberalised the hearsay rule by recognising a common law 
discretion to admit hearsay in R v Manase, where the Court summarised this 
discretionary approach as follows:  
  ‘Whether to admit hearsay evidence under the general residual exception therefore turns to three 
distinct requirements: relevance, inability and reliability. 
(a) Relevance. This is not strictly a requirement directed to this exception to the hearsay rule. Rather 
it is an affirmation and a reminder of the overriding criterion for the admissibility of all and any 
evidence… The evidence in question either has sufficient relevance or it does not… 
(b) Inability. This requirement will be satisfied when the primary witness is unable for some reason to 
be called to give the primary evidence. If the primary witness is personally able to give that 
evidence, it will seldom, if ever, be appropriate to admit hearsay evidence simply because the 
witness would prefer not to face the ordeal of giving evidence or would find it difficult to do so. To 
adopt that approach would be tilt the balance too far against the accused or opposite party who is 
thereby deprived of the ability to cross-examine. 
(c) Reliability. The hearsay evidence must have sufficient apparent reliability, either inherent or 
circumstantial, or both, to justify its admission in spite of the dangers against which the hearsay 
rule is designed to guard. … The inability of a primary witness to give evidence is not good 
reason to admit unreliable hearsay evidence.’
567
 
This decision is thought to have led to the statutory reforms contained in the 2006 
Act because the Law Commission, in its report, cited the rationale and approach of 
this case and recommended that statutory reforms should be handled by the 
legislature and not the courts. These recommendations resulted in the adoption of 
Evidence Act 2006. The legislature seems to have intervened by introducing 
statutory reforms which have halted the path of judicial activism that was started by 
the Manase decision.568 Moreover, in New Zealand, the reliability approach is also 
applied to determine the admissibility of hearsay evidence and is also thought to be 
a safeguard which protects an accused’s right to cross-examination and ensures the 
right to a fair trial.569 
Furthermore, Section 8(1) of the Evidence Act 2006 provides that “judges must 
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the risk that the evidence 
will have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceedings or needlessly prolong the 
proceedings.” This legislation also created a balance between the probative value of 
the hearsay evidence and extent of the prejudice its admission might cause to the 
concerned party, a provision which is similar to the Australian Evidence Act 1995 
above.570 
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5.7 Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong‘s Constitution, in Article 39 of the Basic Law,571 provides that the 
rights guaranteed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] 
remain in force in Hong Kong. Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR guarantees an accused 
person the right to examine the witnesses against him, and it provides that: 
 ‘3(e) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the 
following minimum guarantees, in full equality, to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against 
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him.’
572
 
Under the common law applied in Hong Kong, the hearsay rule is an exception to the 
general principle that all material evidence should be admitted in criminal 
proceedings.573 Sections 70 and 73 of the Evidence Ordinance574 provide for 
circumstances for out-of-court statements made by persons who, owing to certain 
circumstances, are unavailable to give evidence at the trial. 
In its 2005 report, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong also noted that the 
rule against hearsay was still part of the law of Hong Kong and that the basis for 
excluding hearsay evidence was the assumption that indirect evidence might be 
untrustworthy and unreliable because it was not subjected to cross-examination.575  
The Commission further stated that the justification for the exclusion of out-of-court 
statements was that the evidence was not given under oath and not tested by the 
procedural device called cross-examination.576 
In addition, these above recommendations by the Law Commission also identified 
the prejudice caused to an accused if an out-of-court statement is received in lieu of 
evidence tested through cross-examination and the right of confrontation.  
Moreover, in its 2009 report the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong also 
confirmed that the hearsay rule was still part of the law of evidence of Hong Kong.577 
Regarding whether the courts should introduce reforms into the hearsay rule, the 
Commission went further by stating that, “the view is taken that the proper path for 
reform is legislative.”578 In Wong Wai-man v HKSAR the Court of Appeal in Hong 
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Kong cited with approval the United Kingdom and Australian decisions579 where it 
was held that the creation of new exceptions to the hearsay rule would need 
statutory reform. As shown earlier, this approach would be contrary to the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s “judicial activism” approach where the court creates new hearsay 
exceptions to the rule. 
The Law Commission further proposed preserving the hearsay exclusionary rule and 
argued that there should be a clarification of the existing exceptions and that a 
discretion should be introduced “on the basis of a defined test of necessity and 
threshold reliability.”580 The discretion used to determine whether hearsay evidence 
was admissible would be based on necessity and threshold reliability. Hence the 
necessity and reliability approach, which is the same approach used by the 
Canadian Supreme Court and the Australian and New Zealand jurisprudence, also 
forms part of the hearsay statutory reforms in Hong Kong. Furthermore, the Law 
Commission also discussed the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Al-Khawaja581where the admission of hearsay evidence was held to be denying an 
accused’s right of confrontation and found the decision to be correct and 
recommended statutory reforms [which would allow hearsay evidence admissibility 
to be determined on necessity and reliability] which would also protect an accused’s 
right to a fair trial and the right cross-examine witnesses.582  In addition, the Law 
Commission also considered and rejected the UK reforms introduced by the 2003 
Act which provided the “interests of justice” exception where it was said that “its 
categories of automatic admissibility provide insufficient assurances of reliability and 
the terms of the residual discretion to admit hearsay are open-ended and vague.”583 
This same criticism was noted regarding the South African Law of Evidence Act 45 
of 1988 which contained the interests of justice approach.584 This conclusion was 
reached after the Law Commission had cautiously considered the accused’s right to 
examine witnesses against him/her as guaranteed in ICCPR, the hearsay rule and 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law. The Law Commission also concluded that the interest of 
justice test was not a proper and sound safeguard that might ensure a fair trial.585 
Moreover, the Law Commission also found the English reforms contained in the 
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Criminal Justice Act 2003 to be “open-ended and vague” and not capable of 
ensuring the reliability and credibility of evidence.586 
Furthermore, the Law Commission also criticised and rejected the UK approach 
which admits hearsay evidence in the interests of justice on another ground being 
that it deviated from the well-founded common law hearsay tradition, and it “admits 
hearsay regardless of how unfair or how unreliable or how relevant such hearsay 
might be.”587 
5.8 Ireland 
Irish law has not only incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights 
[ECHR] into its legal system but has also created a legal framework in which 
components of the Convention were adopted into its domestic law and, therefore, 
formed part of its law.588 In addition, the relevant Irish legislation provides that:   
‘2 – (1) In interpreting and applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, in so far as 
possible, subject to the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application, do so in a manner 
compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions.’ 
De Londras terms this procedure adopted in Ireland as the “transportation of the 
Convention rather than its incorporation.”589 The rationale for these provisions seems 
to be that Irish Courts have to interpret and apply domestic laws in a manner which 
is compatible with the provisions of the Convention, for example Article 6(3)(d) of the 
Convention which guarantees an accused person a right to examine the witnesses 
against him.  
The Irish Supreme Court has also examined these statutory provisions, and it held 
that Articles 38(1) and 40(3)(1) of the 1937 Irish Constitution590 guarantees a right to 
fair trial procedures, including the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.591 
Moreover, Irish law recognises a general exclusion of hearsay with a number of 
exceptions. This could be seen in the Irish Supreme Court decision in Cullen v 
Clarke,592where Kingsmill-Moore J outlined Irish hearsay rule and held that:  
‘it is necessary to emphasise that there is no general rule of evidence to the effect that a witness may 
not testify as to words spoken by a person who is not produced as a witness. There is a general rule, 
subject to many exceptions, that evidence of the speaking of such words is inadmissible to prove the 
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truth of the facts which they assert; the reasons being that the truth of the words cannot be tested by 
cross-examination and has not the sanctity of an oath.’ 
The Irish common law of evidence recognises that evidence needs to be tested by 
cross-examination and that hearsay evidence might be considered admissible under 
such circumstances. 
In addition, the Law Reform Commission of Ireland published a report on hearsay 
evidence in 2010 after considering the accused’s right to confront witnesses and the 
substance and application of the hearsay rule. This report stated that “the right to 
cross-examine is one of the foundations for the hearsay rule and that the right of 
confrontation forms an important component of the criminal trial under the Irish 
Constitution and at common law.”593 What is also evident from this report is that the 
Law Commission has traced the original historical link between the hearsay rule and 
the right of confrontation and found that it included the right of cross-examination and 
remained an important component of Irish law which included common law.594 
Just as the Hong Kong Law Commission did, the Irish Law Commission criticised 
and rejected the hearsay reforms undertaken by the UK as contained in the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, in particular the interests of justice statutory test. It was also 
concerned that these provisions were too wide and “relaxed the rule in such a 
manner as to potentially render the rule against hearsay redundant.”595 Furthermore, 
the Commission was also distressed in that a wide discretion to admit hearsay in the 
interests of justice failed to appreciate and fully comprehend that at the core of the 
hearsay rule was the recognition of the accused’s right to cross-examination. In 
addition, similarly to the Hong Kong Law Commission’s recommendations, the Irish 
Law Reform Commission also recommended that the traditional common law 
hearsay rule should be maintained, but that an exception be included in which the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence would be determined by making use of the 
reliability approach.596  
The determination of the admissibility of hearsay evidence on reliability seems to be 
one of the primary factors in the reforms that shaped the hearsay rule in Ireland, 
Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, UK, United States and South 
Africa. As has been discussed above, the reliability of hearsay evidence as a 
benchmark for determining the admissibility of evidence has received mixed 
reactions and criticisms from academics, lawyers and courts and this has also raised 
some doubts relating to its credibility.  
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5.9 European Court of Human Rights 
The hearsay rule and the right of confrontation, which are principles guaranteed in 
the European Convention on Human Rights are viewed to be the major 
developments in the protection of human rights which emerged after World War ll, 
after the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
also termed the European Convention on Human Rights was entered into as a treaty 
by numerous countries in Western Europe.597 In addition, the human rights principles 
identified in the Convention were similar to those provided for in the Universal 
Declarations of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948.598 
Furthermore, the European Convention on Human Rights was unparalleled and 
previously unheard of because it established a system in which violations of human 
rights would be enforced, and this mechanism is the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR).599 
Article 6(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that: 
 ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights,(d) to examine witnesses 
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him…’ 
The Convention, however, does not prescribe whether the right to examine 
witnesses includes or means the common law right of confrontation and/ or whether 
it bars the admission of hearsay evidence.  
The first case which was heard by the ECHR involving hearsay evidence was 
Unterpertinger v Austria,600 which was an application made by the accused 
(defendant) who was convicted for assaulting his wife and her daughter. Both these 
witnesses turned down the opportunity to give evidence at the trial. These two 
witnesses were also the only witnesses, and the prosecutor presented as evidence 
their depositions which they have given to the police and their statements where the 
crimes were initially reported. It was on the premise of this evidence that the accused 
had been found guilty. In addition, the ECHR, when construing the accused’s right to 
a fair trial which includes the right to examine witness, concluded that the admission 
of this hearsay evidence had violated these rights. The ECHR also stated the reason 
that these rights had been violated was that the accused was unable to cross-
                                                          
597
 Roger W. Kirst “Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the European Court of Human Rights” 
QLR (2001-2003) at 777. 
598
 Ibid at 777. See also, G.A. Res. 217(iii), U.N.Doc. A/810(1948) at 71. 
599
 See Council of Europe, “The European Convention on Human Rights,” available at 
<http://www.humanrights.coe.int/intro/eng/ GENERAL/ECHR.HTM> (last visited 15 September 2015). 
See also Francis G. Jacobs & Robin C.A. White, The European Convention on Human Rights 3-14 
(2ed.1986). 
600
 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 175 (1986). 
120 | P a g e  
 
examine both witnesses, and that their evidence formed the primary foundation for 
the conviction.601 
Following this case, the ECHR also had to determine the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence in Barbera v Spain.602 The hearsay evidence was contained in a written 
declaration by an erstwhile partner in crime of the accused, in which he informed the 
police that it was the accused who had committed murder and that he, the 
accomplice, had not taken part. This declarant of this statement vanished and could 
not be located when the trial was heard. The ECHR concluded that “above all, the 
fact that very important pieces of evidence were not adequately adduced and 
discussed at the trial in appellants’ presence and under the watchful eye of the 
public” was the ground for stating that the accused did not receive a fair trial. The 
admission of the hearsay statement was found to have violated the accused’s rights 
guaranteed by Article 6(3)(d) of the Convention.603 
Furthermore, in Bricmont v Belgium,604the hearsay evidence against the accused 
was contained in complaints which were not taken under oath from the victims but 
were taken by the court in a private context in the absence of the accused and 
“without the accused ever having had an opportunity, afforded by an examination or 
a confrontation, to have evidence taken from the complainant, in his presence.”605 
The complainant was a Prince and Regent of the Kingdom of Belgium, and this fact 
would necessitate a royal decree being issued before he could be sworn in to testify 
in court proceedings. The ECHR held that the accused’s right to examine witnesses 
and the right to a fair trial had been violated by the admission of this statement. 
Moreover, in Kostovski v Netherlands,606 the accused was found guilty of robbery, 
and the premise for this conviction was a depositions made by unnamed witnesses 
who also refused to testify at the trial. The trial court received as evidence testimony 
from two magistrates and a police officer who had interrogated the witnesses. All 
these parties testified that the witnesses’ fears were material and that they had found 
these witnesses to be reliable.607 The ECHR, after considering the hearsay evidence 
and the accused’s right to examine witness stated that “all the evidence must be 
produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to 
adversarial argument.”608 In addition, the ECHR also stated that, “these rights 
required an accused to be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge 
and question a witness against him, either at the time the witness was making his 
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statement or at some later stage of the proceedings.”609 Hence the hearsay 
statements were found to be inadmissible.610 
It is notable that the decisions taken by the ECHR have drawn the attention of some 
academics to the application of the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation which 
are regulated by the Convention, and they have also prompted some mixed views 
which claim that the Convention and the decisions of the ECHR have “adopted a 
hearsay-confrontation rule for criminal bench trial,”611 “recognised a strong right of 
confrontation,”612 “recognised the right of the defendant to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses,”613 “limited the courts from convicting sorely on 
uncorroborated hearsay,”614 “established a right of confrontation,”615 or “founded that 
the failure to allow confrontation of witnesses can violate the Convention.”616 
There is, therefore, a very strong consensus that the Convention and the ECHR 
have created a right of confrontation or have given powerful support to the hearsay 
rule and its link to the right of confrontation. 
Furthermore, Winter argues that the provisions of the Convention guarantee an 
accused’s right to cross-examine a witness against him but the traditional hearsay 
exceptions are still applicable and recognised in the ECHR proceedings.617 In 
addition, Friedman disapproves of the view that such a fundamental right to 
confrontation should have exceptions, and he argues that “just as the right to jury 
trial and the right to counsel are not subjected to exceptions, the right to confront an 
adverse witness should not be subjected to exceptions - though the accused can 
waive the right or forfeit it by misconduct.”618 
Moreover, Swergold argues that, under the European Convention of Human Rights, 
the right to confrontation is generally satisfied so long as the accused has the 
opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness.619 
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The European Court of Human Rights in Luca v Italy,620 also considered the “proper 
opportunity to question witness” as forming part of the right of confrontation and the 
use of hearsay evidence, and it held at follows: 
‘As the Court stated on a number of occasions, it may prove necessary in certain circumstances to 
refer to depositions made during instigations stage (in particular, where a witness refuses to repeat 
his depositions in public owing to his safety, a not infrequent occurrence in trials concerning Mafia-
type organisations). If the defendant has been given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge 
the depositions, either when made or at a later stage, their admission in evidence will not contravene 
Article 6(3)(d). The corollary of that, however, is that where a conviction is based solely or to a 
decisive degree on depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no 
opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights 
of the defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 
6.’
621
 
The court’s views are that the admission of out-of-court statements should be based 
on clearly defined grounds and the fairness of a conviction emanating largely from 
such statements violates the right to a fair trial. 
In addition, in the case of Van Mechelen and others v The Netherlands,622 the 
defendants were convicted of armed robbery. The trial court held that the reasons for 
the witnesses remaining anonymous were well-founded. As in Kostovski, the court 
remarked that “all evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, in the 
presence of the accused, with a view to adversarial argument.”623  The court also 
found that the accused’s right to examine witnesses and his/her right to a fair trial 
had been violated by the admission of hearsay evidence.624 
Moreover, the court, in A.M.v Italy,625 restated its views in Van Mechelen and others, 
claiming that “all the evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, in the 
presence of the accused, with a view to adversarial argument.” The court also held 
that the accused’s right to examine witnesses, which included his right to a fair trial, 
had been violated by the admission of hearsay statements which were not tested 
through cross-examination.626In addition, in Visser v The Netherlands,627 the court 
also stated that “all the evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, in 
the presence of the accused, with a view to adversarial argument.”628  The court also 
held that the lack of the opportunity to examine witnesses against him resulted in the 
accused not being given a fair trial.629 In the cases of Al-Khawaja and Tahery v The 
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United Kingdom,630which originated from United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, both applicant’s convictions were based solely on hearsay 
evidence. Al-Khawaja, the first applicant complained to the ECHR that in his trial for 
indecent assault his right to examine witnesses under Article 6(3)(d) had been 
violated because the complainant had died before the trial, and her statement to the 
police was read to the jury.631 In addition, the second applicant, Tahery, also 
complained that his trial for assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm had also 
violated his right to examine witnesses because an out-of-court-statement from the 
witness was read to the jury instead of the witness appearing before the jury and 
giving his evidence.632 It is important to note that in the Al-Khawaja’s trial the judge 
directed the jury that: 
 “It is important that you [the jury] bear in mind when considering her [the complainant’s] evidence that 
you have not seen her give evidence; you have not heard her give evidence; and you have not heard 
her evidence cross-examined [by the applicant’s counsel], who would undoubtedly have had a 
number of questions to put to her. Bear in mind that this evidence was read to you. The allegation is 
completely denied, you must take that into account when considering her evidence.”
633
  
The trial judge, when applying English law, remained aware of the dangers inherent 
in the admission of hearsay evidence under common law, and, when highlighting 
these dangers, also stated that the problem with the hearsay statement stemmed 
from the fact the accused had had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness who 
had made the out-of-court statement. Furthermore, the ECHR held that the 
convictions based on these hearsay statements were violating the accused’s right to 
examine witnesses against him which included his right to a fair trial. In addition, the 
court also stated that there was another reason why the admission of hearsay 
evidence was found to have violated the accused’s right to examine witnesses, 
which was that the hearsay evidence was not permitted to be the only evidence on 
which a conviction is based.634 This rule is also called the “sole or decisive rule.”635 
The reasoning of the ECHR in the above cases in finding a link between the right to 
examine witnesses which includes the right to a fair trial under the Convention and 
the admissibility of hearsay evidence are in accord with the views expressed by 
Gasper on the contents of these principles where he argues that the “ECHR 
addresses hearsay evidence and frames the issue in broader terms of whether the 
defendant received a fair trial.”636 These views are also in accord with those shared 
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by Kirst637where he argues that, “if hearsay evidence imposes many handicaps on 
the defence, the EHCR is likely to consider the use of the hearsay evidence unfair”. 
5.10 Conclusion 
The hearsay rule and the common law right of confrontation are said to have 
developed during the same period. Furthermore, these principles are thought to be 
aimed at protecting the values which are safeguarded by the right to cross-
examination. 
The hearsay rule has its origin in England, and it was later incorporated into the legal 
systems of former British colonies. In addition, in most of these jurisdictions the 
hearsay rule has been statutorily reformed, and new hearsay exceptions created, 
amongst others, the interests of justice and the reliability of hearsay evidence. 
Furthermore, this exception is also rejected for failing to honour the common law 
principle that requires evidentiary rules to be predictable. 
Moreover, in the United States the hearsay rule is applied and has also been 
statutorily reformed to include the frameworks termed the interests of justice and the 
guarantees of reliability.  In this jurisdiction the interests of justice exception is also 
criticised for being too wide and not sufficiently protecting an accused’s right to be 
confronted with witnesses against him/her. In addition, the reliability of hearsay 
evidence approach is also criticised for being a non-objective and unstructured 
benchmark that could not protect the Confrontation Clause.  
Furthermore, in Canada there are no statutorily reforms to the hearsay rule, and the 
courts have created new hearsay rule exceptions. This approach is, however, 
criticised as failing to uphold the rule of law and the separation of powers. The 
Supreme Court has through a process termed “judicial activism” created the 
necessity and reliability approach for the determination of the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence. This latter approach, however, finds support in Wigmore’s views, who, 
when commenting on the admissibility of hearsay evidence in common law, argues 
that the necessity and reliability of the evidence was the initial common law 
framework for determining the admissibility of such evidence.638 
In Australia the hearsay rule is also applied. The rule has been statutorily reformed, 
and hearsay evidence is received if considered to be reliable. There is no 
constitutional right to fair trial but the ICCPR right to a fair trial which includes the 
right to examine witnesses is incorporated into the Australian legal system.  
In New Zealand the hearsay rule is also applied. There is a constitutional right to 
examine witnesses which is included in the right to a fair trial. As in Canada, the 
hearsay rule has been reformed to receive hearsay evidence using the reliability and 
necessity approach. While in New Zealand this hearsay reforms have been driven by 
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the legislature, the Canadian Supreme Court and not the legislature has introduced a 
similar hearsay reform framework in Canada. 
In Hong Kong the hearsay rule is applied. The Hong Kong Basic Law, as in the 
Constitution of Australia, incorporates the ICCPR right to a fair trial, including the 
right to examine witnesses, into Hong Kong legal system. In addition, the hearsay 
rule has also been statutorily reformed and hearsay evidence is admissible on the 
basis of the necessity and reliability.  
In Ireland the hearsay rule is also applied. As in Australia and Hong Kong, the Irish 
legal system has incorporated the ICCPR right to a fair trial which includes the right 
to examine witnesses. In addition, the hearsay rule has been statutorily reformed 
and hearsay evidence is admissible if it is considered to be reliable. On the other 
hand, the common law right to cross-examination is also considered to be one of the 
core features of the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation. 
The European Court of Human Rights applies the hearsay rule and the common law 
right of confrontation. In addition, this court also applies the provisions of the 
Convention which guarantees an accused’s right to a fair trial which includes the 
right to examine witnesses. This court, when it considers a denial of the right to 
examine witnesses to have occurred, considers all other circumstances in order to 
determine when the lack of opportunity to examine witnesses resulted in a violation 
of the right to a fair trial. It is equally important to note that this court also considers 
hearsay evidence admissible, but not when it is the sole or decisive evidence against 
an accused.  
What will be examined in the next chapter will be the provisions of section 3 of the 
1988 Law of Evidence Amendment Act in the context of the constitutional right to a 
fair trial. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF SECTION 3 OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE AMENDMENT ACT 45 OF 1988 
6.1 Introduction  
The content of the discussion in this Chapter will form two separate components, 
each of which will examine critically the primary tests used in determining the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence under section 3, viz. the interests of justice and the 
reliability of evidence statutory tests from diverse standpoints with the objective of 
probing the constitutionality of this provision of the 1988 Act:- 
Section A: The constitutionality of section 3 of the 1988 Act, a South African 
perspective.  
Section B: The constitutionality of the interests of justice and the reliability of 
evidence statutory tests – an international perspective or comparative analysis.  
The constitutionality of these benchmarks has vexed courts and academics and has 
resulted in divergent views on whether these benchmarks provide adequate 
countervailing factors which guarantee a fair trial. The study in Section A will, 
therefore, probe the views of South African courts and academics on the 
constitutionality of section 3. This requires an investigation into how this provision of 
this Act is interpreted and applied by South African courts and academics in the light 
of the accused’s right to a fair trial. Section B, on the other hand, requires that the 
constitutionality of these benchmarks, namely, the interests of justice and reliability 
of evidence be investigated with the aim of establishing how the constitutionality of 
these tests has been construed and applied in other jurisdictions, viz. the United 
Kingdom, United States of America and the European Court of Human Rights in the 
light of the accused’s right to a fair trial. As was discussed in Chapter 5, these are 
the international jurisdictions which, like South Africa, also apply these tests when 
determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence. 
6.2 Section A: The constitutionality of section 3 of the 1988 Act – a South 
African overview 
In South Africa, the constitutionality of section 3 has never been subjected to 
constitutional scrutiny before the courts ahead of the enactment of the 1996 
Constitution. In addition, in 1993, prior to the enactment of the 1993 
Constitution,639De Vos and Van der Merwe640 examined the constitutionality of this 
Act, and, in their survey, they considered the United States Sixth Amendment 
(confrontation clause)  which provides the right to be confronted with adverse 
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witnesses, and they seem to have adopted the view expressed by Griswold641 that 
“the confrontation clause had a purpose, clearly, but it was not designed to freeze 
the law of evidence or to exclude all hearsay evidence.” Moreover, De Vos and Van 
der Merwe concluded that the question of the constitutionality of section 3 can be 
“answered with reference to the jurisprudence of the USA in absence of South 
African jurisprudence in this point,” and they found that the provisions of section 3 
were constitutionally sound. 
In 2000, the constitutionality of these provisions was argued in S v Ndlovu and 
others,642 at the Witwatersrand Local Division, before Goldstein J, and it was 
contended that this Act was unconstitutional because it violated an accused’s right to 
challenge evidence as provided by section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. Goldstein J 
rejected this argument and concluded that the provisions of section 3 of the 1988 Act 
are compatible with the right to a fair trial which also included the right to challenge 
evidence as provided by section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. Furthermore, in reaching 
this conclusion, Goldstein J cited with approval the views expressed by Steytler,643 
who also seems to be of the opinion that these provisions of the 1988 Act are 
consistent with the right to a fair trial. Furthermore, Steytler’s views are that the 
provisions of section 3 are consonant with the constitutional right to challenge 
evidence which is included in the right to a fair trial but he also adds that these 
provisions of the Act should be used by courts with alertness and wariness, because, 
in his view: - such an approach would align the admission of hearsay evidence under 
this Act with the constitutional right to a fair trial.644 In expressing this latter view, 
however, the author falls short of elaborating on how such an approach can 
guarantee the constitutional right in question. This case, Ndlovu, later appeared in 
the Supreme Court of Appeal during 2002,645 and the constitutionality of section 3 of 
the 1988 Act was once more argued by the accused, and Cameron JA examined the 
provisions of the Act, and, in particular, the admission of hearsay evidence in the 
interests of justice and the constitutional right to a fair trial which also includes the 
right to challenge evidence, and he concluded that the Act “provides a 
constitutionally sound framework for the admission of hearsay evidence.”646 
Cameron JA, when reaching this conclusion, gave four reasons which were as 
follows:647 
 Firstly, because comprehensive or “wholesale admission” of hearsay was not 
allowed by the provisions of this Act. For centuries common law has identified 
the risk presented by the admission of hearsay evidence and this Act did not 
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alter that common law principle. As part of this common law principle was 
applied by South African courts, he cited Schreiner JA’s remarks in Vulcan 
Rubber Works (Pty) Ltd v South African Railways and Harbours,648 where it was 
stated that “hearsay, unless it is brought within one of the recognised 
exceptions, is not evidence, i.e. legal evidence, at all.” 
 Secondly, Cameron JA stated that because the provisions of this Act are of a 
nature that they provide an exception to the hearsay rule, and have developed a 
flexible criterion for the admission of hearsay in the interests of justice. Thus, 
according to Cameron JA the Act has created sufficient safeguards which were 
absent and not recognised in common law. 
 Thirdly, Cameron JA also noted that, because the Act has created a primary 
criterion which admits hearsay evidence in the interests of justice, this test must 
be construed to be in line with the principle of a fair trial guaranteed by the 
Constitution and is consistent with the provisions of the Constitution because it 
distinguishes between criminal and civil proceedings and recognises the need 
for an accused’s guilt to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, 
Cameron JA also identified three safeguards which in his view would ensure 
that an accused’s right to a fair trial was protected by the provisions of the Act: 
(1) the court has duty to ensure that hearsay evidence was not inadvertently 
introduced against an accused but an accused was informed about the latent 
defect and dangers of hearsay evidence and the risk it carries; (2) that the 
provisions of the Act should not be used against an unrepresented accused 
unless the dangers it contains has been explained to the accused; and (3) that 
the State should signal its intention to introduce hearsay evidence before it 
closes its case, and the court should make a ruling on such evidence’s 
admission before an accused was required to present his case in order to 
enable an accused to know the evidence which was used against him. 
 Fourthly, Cameron JA also examined the kind of powers which the provisions of 
the Act gave to a court when admitting hearsay evidence and he stated that, 
because the Act created a rule and not discretion, this framework was an 
adequate safeguard which guaranteed an accused’s right to a fair trial because, 
in his view, this wide and flexible admission of hearsay evidence was also in line 
with the criterion of the reasonable necessity and reliability approach which was 
created by the Canadian Supreme Court when determining the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence. In addition, Cameron JA also considered and approved the 
residual hearsay exception applied under the United States Federal Rules of 
Evidence which allows for the admission of hearsay evidence when it was 
considered to bear “sufficient guarantees of reliability.”649 He concluded that 
section 3 of the Act can be construed to be containing a similar test, the 
reliability of evidence test. This latter test, Cameron JA concluded, authorised 
the admission of hearsay evidence under the 1988 Act and was, in his view, 
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also deemed to have reassured the accused’s right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him when considering the constitutionality of these provisions 
in the light of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.650 
Moreover, Cameron JA, when applying the interest of justice and the reliability 
of evidence tests and the need to consider the prejudice the admission of 
hearsay might cause to an accused, reasoned that, where hearsay is admissible 
in the interests of justice and such admission results in strengthening the state’s 
case against the accused, this outcome cannot be considered to be 
prejudicial.651 
On the other hand, Du Toit, when commenting on the court’s decision in Ndlovu and 
the constitutionality of section 3, argued that the provisions of section 3, while it 
conflicts with an accused’s right to a fair trial, should be construed as a “reasonable 
and justifiable limitation of the right in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.”652 This 
notion that the admission of hearsay evidence remains prejudicial and does not 
violate an accused‘s right to a fair trial but instead should be deemed an acceptable 
and well-founded limitation in terms of section 36 of the Constitution is also shared 
by Paizes.653    
As was stated in chapter four, in the judgment of S v Molimi and another,654 it was 
argued on behalf of the accused that the admission of hearsay evidence in terms of 
the provisions of section 3 of the Act violated his right to a fair trial, because it 
allowed for the admission of evidence which was not subjected to the constitutional 
right to challenge evidence. In addition, the court was also asked to reverse or 
overrule the approach in Ndlovu where the provisions of this Act were found to be 
consonant with the right to a fair trial. Nkabinde J, however, did not decide on the 
soundness of the approach in Ndlovu because this aspect of that case was, in her 
view, not disputed or questioned when this case, Molimi, was heard by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. Nkabinde J did, nevertheless, find that hearsay evidence of a 
similar nature which was the primary source of the conviction in the Ndlovu decision 
was inadmissible against an accused because she concluded that the admission of 
such evidence would violate a fair trial.655 This reasoning by Nkabinde J seems to 
suggest that there are circumstances, which also existed in Ndlovu, where the 
admission of hearsay evidence might infringe the right to a fair trial.   
The court, in S v Libazi and another,656 also questioned the correctness of the 
approach in Ndlovu on the admission of hearsay evidence in the light of the right to a 
fair trial but did not decide whether section 3 of the 1988 Act was constitutional or 
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not. Nonetheless, the court gave a caveat which should be borne in mind when 
receiving hearsay evidence, and it stated that “failure to respect an accused’s 
person’s fair trial rights has rightly been viewed as having the potential to undermine 
the fundamental adversarial nature of judicial proceedings, which also imperils their 
legitimacy.” On the other hand, Naude657 seems to find no fault with the approach in 
Ndlovu and the constitutionality of the provisions of section 3 of the Act based on 
that reasoning, and, after he had examined the court’s reasons in Ndlovu where it 
was held that section 3 of the Act was consonant with the right to a fair trial, he 
argued that “our current structure provided in section 3 of the Act is well able to 
resolve any confrontation between the right to challenge evidence and the 
admissibility of hearsay.” In other words, Naude’s views are that section 3 of the Act 
provides adequate countervailing factors which guarantee a fair trial. 
Furthermore, the difficulty in assessing the admissibility of hearsay evidence by 
making reliance on the interests of justice test where fundamental values which are 
protected by the Constitution are at issue is also evident in the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, viz. S v Ndlovu and others658 
and S v Mhlongo; S v Nkosi,659where the right to a fair trial and the right to equality 
before the law are concerned.660  
In Ndlovu, the hearsay statement which was held to be admissible through the 
interests of justice test and found to be consonant with the right to a fair trial- was an 
out-of-court admission made by one accused which incriminated his co-accused. On 
the other hand, in Mhlongo, the Constitutional Court has also considered the 
interests of justice test contained in section 3 of the Act, the common law standpoint 
prior to Ndlovu, and the fundamental values guaranteed by the Constitution, and it 
held that “the common-law position before Ndlovu which was that extra-curial 
statements against co-accused were inadmissible, must be restored. Admitting 
extra-curial admissions against a co-accused unjustifiably offends against the right to 
equality before the law.”661 This decision by the court could be understood to mean 
that the interests of justice test if applied to receive certain hearsay statements might 
result in achieving an unintended unconstitutional effect for an accused. In other 
words, the court in Mhlongo held that the same hearsay evidence which was 
considered to be admissible in the interests of justice and not violating the right to a 
fair trial in Ndlovu was not only unconstitutional but also offending against the 
common law hearsay rule. Furthermore, this decision by the Constitutional Court 
also brings into question the efficacy and soundness of the views expressed by 
Paizes that receiving hearsay evidence in the interests of justice in Ndlovu “might 
have been regarded as constituting a limitation of the accused’s right to challenge 
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evidence, a limitation that is both reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution.”662 
We turn now to the discussion on the reliability of evidence factor which is not 
expressly stated to form part of section 3 but is thought to be an implicit component 
of sections 3(1)(c)(ii) and 3(1)(c)(iv)663of the Act and is also regarded as having its 
roots from the common law.664 The reliability factor was also a factor which was 
considered by the court in Hewan v Kourie NO and another665 and found to be an 
important component in assessing the admissibility of hearsay evidence in terms of 
section 3. 
The view that the reliability of evidence factor forms part of section 3 of the Act is 
also shared by Goldstein J in Ndlovu.666 When assessing the probative value of the 
hearsay evidence, he found that the circumstances surrounding the taking of the out-
of-court evidence were reliable, and he concluded that such evidence should be 
admissible in the interests of justice. In addition, Cameron JA also concurred with 
these views and held that the question of the probative value of the evidence in 
Ndlovu was resolved because the “guarantees of reliability are high.”667 
Schwikkard, on the other hand, when commenting on the constitutionality of section 
3, the reliability of evidence approach and its impact on the right to challenge 
evidence, states that if adequate indicia of reliability could lead cross-examination to 
be reprieved and avoided- then the reasonable and pertinent consequence must be 
that hearsay evidence can be admitted even if the person who made the out-of-court 
statement is not available.668  In other words, Schwikkard held the view that the 
reliability of evidence approach is constitutional if there are sufficient grounds for 
suggesting that the hearsay evidence is reliable. Naude has also examined the 
constitutionality of section 3 of the Act and its use of the reliability of evidence 
approach and the right to challenge evidence and seems to agree with the views 
expressed by Schwikkard. He concludes that the reliability of evidence approach is 
capable of guaranteeing a fair trial.669        
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6.3 Section B: The constitutionality of the interests of justice and the reliability 
of evidence tests – a comparative analysis 
(i) United States of America 
The United States Federal Rules of Evidence provides for the admission of hearsay 
evidence in the interests of justice and where such evidence is considered to be 
reliable.670 The “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” test 
provided by the Rules has been construed to include the reliability of the hearsay 
evidence.671 On the other hand, the constitutionality of these statutory tests where 
hearsay evidence and the accused’s constitutional right to be confronted with 
adverse witnesses are to be assessed, has been disputed and doubted by the 
United States Supreme Court and academics. 
Raeder has termed the exceptions of the Federal Rules of Evidence which provides 
for the admission of hearsay evidence-, the “catchall hearsay exceptions” and, when 
commenting on these legislative reforms and their effect on an accused’s right to be 
confronted with witnesses, he argued that the constitutionality of the exceptions and 
their efficacy was absolutely disputed and doubted because they exhibit a wide 
outlook about the admission of hearsay evidence.672 Furthermore, Raeder’s views 
are that the wide outlook which characterises these hearsay exceptions has resulted 
in their consuming and annihilating the accused’s constitutional right to be 
confronted with adverse witnesses.673 Raeder also argues that these hearsay 
exceptions were included in the first draft of the legislative reforms only by way of 
explanation and not restriction. The author adds that these exceptions have not been 
well received by criminal lawyers because they contain a judicial discretion to admit 
hearsay which is considered to be too extreme and that they allow judges 
unrestricted authority to shape and influence what he termed the hearsay debate 
and controversy.674 
Park, seems to concur with Raeder with regard the criticism levelled against the 
effect of these hearsay exceptions on the right to confrontation. He adds that these 
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statutory hearsay exceptions have empowered judges to redefine and create 
hearsay evidence in each case and this has resulted in the weakening of the 
accused’s right cross-examine witnesses which-, he considers to be a fundamental 
part of the constitutional right to be confronted with witnesses.675 
Furthermore, Raeder argues that the drafters of Federal Rules of Evidence had no 
grounds to judge and appraise the significance and effect of the catchalls in criminal 
cases in 1975, especially in cases where the original declarant of the statement was 
not giving oral evidence and being subjected to cross-examination because the 
confrontation clause and hearsay rule had not received increased focus in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and it was at its early development phase.676 In 
addition, a closer look at the debate in the United States House of Representatives’ 
where the Bill, which later became Rule 804(b)(5), was debated also attests to the 
discontent  expressed by the legislature with regard to the effect of these this 
hearsay exceptions on the right to be confronted with witnesses.677  For example, a 
House of Representatives member, Ms Holtzman, made an outcry which illustrates 
this disenchantment and stated that the proposed Rule 804(b)(5), would: 
“Basically abolishes the rules against hearsay and leaves it to the discretion of every judge to let in 
any kind of hearsay that he wants. One of the basic assumptions in our system of jurisprudence is 
that the defendant in criminal trials has the right to confront his accuser. To abolish all prohibitions 
against hearsay really abridges our concept of a fair trial, aside from creating some Sixth Amendment 
problems.”
678
 
 The objection was that these hearsay exceptions violated an accused’s 
constitutional right to be confronted with witnesses against him and so has 
invalidated the hearsay rule. 
In addition, members of the House of Representatives, Messrs Eckhardt and 
Daniels, concurred with Ms Holzman’s view and also raised some concerns that 
these hearsay exceptions would have negative and damaging effect on the right to 
be confronted with witnesses and the right to cross-examination.679 On the other 
hand, the House of Representatives member, Mr Dennis, argued that “I prefer to 
leave this ‘catchall’ provision out, but I do not think it is not really as bad as has been 
made out here, and certainly in a criminal case if there is anything unconstitutional 
about it it cannot be done, of course.”680 To these concerns he added that, “I am 
supporting it as a reasonable compromise which really does not add a whole lot 
because common law courts already could and occasionally did graft new 
exceptions onto the hearsay rule.”681 Furthermore, the House of Representatives 
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member, Ms Holtzman, seemed not to be content with these answers which 
supported the inclusion of the interests of justice and reliability of evidence tests and 
enquired whether these exceptions would allow for the admission of statements 
taken by police even if such statements were excluded under certain legislations.682 
To this question, the House of Representatives member, Mr Dennis, answered that, 
“I cannot see how anybody could suggest that introducing such a report is 
possible.”683 In other words, there was some guarantee that the interests of justice 
and reliability of evidence statutory tests might not be applied to statements taken by 
police from the declarant because of the concern that admitting such statements into 
evidence might violate the constitutional right to be confronted with witnesses. 
Moreover, Raeder, when examining the minutes of the debates in the House of 
Representatives where this Bill was debated, also identified the reasons which led to 
the adoption of these statutory tests and argued that a petition was made that, if 
Congress rejected the draft proposal providing the catchalls, two years of 
congressional reviews and seven years of work surveyed by the Advisory Committee 
would be undermined. Membership of the Judiciary Committee was about to end and 
“this very complicated subject would have to be taken up from scratch by new 
members having no familiarity with it.”684 Therefore, according to Raeder, these 
statutory tests, viz. interests of justice and reliable evidence were included into the 
United States hearsay evidence on two grounds:- firstly, when the accused’s right to 
be confronted with witnesses had not fully developed: and, secondly, it was 
considered as an excusable compromise because the term of office of the Judiciary 
Committee was about to end. In addition, Raeder, when commenting on the 
“circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” framework which also provides the 
reliability of hearsay framework, argued that it is difficult to apply and assess such 
criteria because “even speculative gossip can sound believable, otherwise why 
would someone repeat it?”685 The “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” 
approach was, however, applied by the United States Supreme Court in 1980 in 
Ohio v Roberts,686and evidence received through its application was held to be 
constitutionally sound after the court has considered the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence and the accused’s right to confrontation. It was also held that a hearsay 
statement can be considered to be complying with the reliability test in one of two 
methods, viz. firstly, the hearsay statement may be found to falling within a “firmly 
rooted” hearsay exception, and, secondly, there might be “a showing of 
particularised guarantees of trustworthiness” which strengthen the hearsay 
statement.687 In other words, the court in Roberts held that hearsay evidence, if 
admitted because it is considered by the court to be reliable, does not violate an 
accused’s right to be confronted with witnesses against him. 
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In 2004, the United States Supreme Court, in Crawford v Washington,688 in a 
judgement by Scalia J rejected and reversed the use of the reliability of hearsay 
approach in Roberts and held this approach to be unconstitutional. Scalia J’s 
justification for this finding was that:  
“the confrontation clause commands that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in 
the crucible of cross-examination. Roberts allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary 
process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability, thus replacing the constitutionally 
prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one.”
689
 
In other words, this court’s decision held that cross-examination was the 
constitutionally decreed manner of evaluating the trustworthiness of evidence and 
not the reliability of hearsay mode created in Roberts. 
Scalia J also added that, “the State’s use of Sylvia’s statement made out-of-court 
has violated the confrontation clause because, where testimonial statements are at 
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is 
confrontation.”690 In addition, in concluding that the reliability of hearsay approach 
was unconstitutional, Scalia J had also attempted to clarify his reasoning by stating 
that: 
“Roberts’ framework is unpredictable. Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends on which 
factors a judge considers and how much weight he accords each of them. However, the 
unpardonable vice of Roberts’ tests is its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements 
that the confrontation clause plainly meant to exclude.”
691
 
The confrontation clause was originally intended to exclude evidence deemed 
admissible through the approach adopted by the court in Roberts which allows for 
the admission of hearsay because a judge thinks that such evidence is trustworthy. 
To this reasoning Scalia J also stated that, “dispensing with confrontation because 
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury because a defendant is 
obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”692 
Friedman concurs with these latter views expressed by Scalia J in Crawford and 
questions the court’s reliance on the reliability of hearsay evidence in Roberts. He 
also contends that the reliability of evidence was an unconstitutional framework for 
determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence and adds that: 
“this approach devalues the confrontation clause, treating it as a constitutionalisation of an 
amorphous and mystifying evidentiary doctrine, the continuing value of which is widely questioned. 
We may well wonder whether the Roberts framework, as initially presented by the Court and as 
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subsequently developed by it, fails to capture some enduring values reflected by the clause. I believe 
the answer is affirmative.”
693
 
Friedman also argues that the reliability of the hearsay approach contained some 
latent dangers or deficiencies which make it difficult to justify its use. He points out 
that: 
 “reliability of hearsay evidence is a poor criterion to determine whether admissibility of the evidence 
will advance the truth-determination process. Reliability is notoriously difficult to determine. It puts the 
cart before the horse, essentially asking whether the assertion made by the statement is true as a 
precondition to admission.”
694
 
In summary, according to Scalia J, in the 2004 decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington,695the reliability of evidence approach is 
an unconstitutional procedure for determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence 
when the confrontation clause is at issue. Moreover, the efficacy of the interests of 
justice statutory test as a device that could protect constitutional values, as will be 
shown below, is questioned and disputed. 
           (ii)  United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom’s Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides for the admission of 
hearsay evidence in the interests of justice. Section 114(1) of this Act provides that, 
“In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is 
admissible as evidence of any matter stated if, and only if – (d) the court is satisfied 
that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible.” The court has a discretion 
to receive hearsay evidence and amongst the factors that should be taken into 
account in the application of this discretion, are the probative value of the evidence, 
the reliability of the evidence and whether other oral evidence was available.696 On 
the other hand, there are divergent views on whether this discretion to admit hearsay 
statements in the interests of justice is compatible with the right to a fair trial and or 
the common law right of confrontation. 
In R v Z,697the court considered the admission of hearsay evidence through the 
interests of justice test, the fact that such evidence was untested through the cross-
examination, the right to fair trial principle, and the fact that “section 114(1)(d) is to 
be cautiously applied.” This resulted in the hearsay evidence which was admitted by 
the trial court when convicting the accused to be found not to be admissible because 
this court was concerned that the interests of justice test was too wide and that it 
might have prejudicial effect on an accused.698 However, the court in R v Y,699 
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disputed the views that the interests of justice test should be applied circumspectly 
and held that “section 114(1)(d) does not contain the cautionary reminder.”700 The 
court, however, did note that the Law Commission’s draft bill which preceded this 
legislation did contain cautious language and provided that: 
“9. In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is admissible as 
evidence of any matter stated if the court is satisfied that, despite the difficulties there may be in 
challenging the statement; its probative value is such that the interests of justice require it to be 
admissible.”
701
 
Moreover, the court, in R v Taylor,702 also disputed the views that the interests of 
justice test should be applied cautiously and held that there was nothing in the 
legislation stating such application but only that the court’s decision in exercising this 
discretion must be informed by the factors numerated in section 114(2) of the Act.703 
Recently, in Riat and others v R,704the court was required to determine whether the 
hearsay evidence admitted through the interests of justice had violated the right to a 
fair trial, and it held that “the right of confrontation is a longstanding requirement of 
the common law”705 and in criticising the interests of justice test, it was also held  that 
this common law principle (right of confrontation) was constrained by this approach 
(interests of justice statutory test) and that a conviction reached through such 
hearsay evidence might be correct if the provisions of the Act are applied properly.706 
In other words, the interest of justice test was found to be a statutory limitation which 
could be allowed to curb the common law hearsay rule and not infringe a fair trial 
right.  
On the other hand, Brodin questions and disputes the constitutionality of the UK 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 which provides for the admission of hearsay evidence in 
the interests of justice, and he forewarns other jurisdictions against adopting similar 
hearsay reforms by arguing that “the ideal goals of a criminal trial which are truth-
finding, accuracy, and avoidance of wrongful convictions – are usually best served 
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by presentation of first-hand live testimony.”707 Metcalfe concurs with these views 
expressed by Brodin on the constitutionality of this legislation and argues that the 
primary and indispensable common law principle of confrontation “has long been one 
of the most basic safeguards of the common law right to a fair trial” and that “the 
same dodgy piece of legislation that eroded the right of trial by jury” could never be 
expected to protect an accused’s right to a fair trial.708 In addition, Metcalfe also 
disputes the constitutionality of this UK legislation, viz. in section 114(2)(e) and (f) 
where it admits hearsay evidence because it is considered to be reliable,709 and he 
argues that “it would violate this ancient right of confrontation and the right of cross-
examination for a person to be convicted upon uncross-examined testimony, 
regardless of how reliable it may otherwise appear.”710  
Moreover, Friedman also questions and doubts the constitutionality of the interests 
of justice test applied to admit hearsay evidence contained in section 114 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 and argues that these provisions have weakened and 
sacrificed the right to confrontation.711 Requa, is in accord with these views 
expressed by Friedman and further contends that “the flexibility in the 2003 Act has 
the potential for fair trial violations.”712 As it was shown in chapter 5, the UK reforms 
providing a discretion to admit hearsay in the interests of justice based on reliability 
was recently rejected by the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission and the Irish Law 
Reform Commission on grounds that it violates an accused’s right to a fair trial 
because it is unclear and imprecise.713 Hence there seems to be overwhelming 
views suggesting that the interests of justice and the reliability of hearsay statement 
statutory tests are unconstitutional. 
           (iii) European Court of Human Rights 
Article 6 of the European Convention guarantees the accused’s right to a fair trial 
and specifically protects the right to examine witnesses. On the other hand, the 
Convention does not include any provision paralleling the hearsay rule, and 
Friedman has given a justification for this state of affairs where he argues that it is 
“because most of the judicial systems falling under it do not have hearsay law.”714 
The fundamental duty of the European Court of Human Rights was expressed by the 
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Court in Delta v France715 as being“ to ascertain whether the proceedings 
considered as whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair.” In 
addition, amongst the various factors this Court takes into account in determining 
whether the proceedings were fair when hearsay evidence and the right to a fair trial 
are at issue-, are the reliability of evidence and the interests of justice tests. 
In R v Arnold, the court has added the caveat which points to some latent dangers 
and defects contained in the interests of justice test in the light of the accused’s right 
contained in Article 6 of the Convention where it stated that: 
“very great care must be taken in each case to ensure that attention is paid to the letter and spirit of 
the Convention and judges should not easily be persuaded that it is in the interests of justice to  
permit evidence to be read… Even if it is not the only evidence, care must be taken to ensure that the 
ultimate aim of each and every trial, namely, a fair hearing, is achieved.”
716
 
Furthermore, the court also applied the reliability of evidence approach in Delta v 
France where the accused’s conviction for robbery was based on hearsay 
statements obtained from two witnesses who failed to attend the trial. The court held 
that because the accused “were unable to test the witness’s reliability or cast doubt 
on their credibility…. the rights of the defence were subject to such restrictions that 
Mr Delta did not receive a fair trial.”717 As, in Crawford above, a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court, this court did cast some doubts on the constitutionality 
of the reliability of hearsay framework in the light of the accused’s right to examine 
witnesses who testify against him. On the other hand, in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v 
United Kingdom,718the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
20th January 2009 heard two applications against the United Kingdom government 
where both applicants complained that their convictions had been unfair  because 
hearsay statements made to the police had been received in lieu of oral testimony 
from the prosecution witnesses. It was argued on behalf of the Government of the 
United Kingdom that the trials had been fair because the trial courts had relied on 
several countervailing factors which had included the interests of justice and- that 
this test was sound and complied with the right to fair trial values provided by Article 
6 of the European Convention.719 In Al-Khawaja the reason the victim could not 
attend the trial was that she had committed suicide before the trial had commenced 
and there was other corroborating evidence which the trial court found to be reliable 
and credible when applying the interests of justice test. When considering the 
hearsay evidence and all the countervailing factors, including the interests of justice, 
the European Court of Human Rights found this test not to have safeguarded a fair 
trial and held that “the Court does not find that any of these factors, taken alone or 
together, could counterbalance the prejudice to the defence … The Court finds a 
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violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention in respect of Mr Al-Khawaja.”720 The court 
also considered the hearsay evidence which was admitted in Mr Tahery’s case, and 
was told that the complainant had failed to appear owing to fear of intimidation. The 
countervailing factors which had led to the hearsay statement being considered 
admissible by the trial court were that the accused did have an opportunity to 
question other evidence which the prosecution had presented against him and he 
had also testified in his defence. It was also felt that it was in the interests of justice 
to admit the complainant’s hearsay statement because her fear of intimidation was 
found to be legitimate by the trial court. The European Court of Human Rights held 
that the interests of justice test in the light of the “the right of an accused to give 
evidence in his defence cannot be said to counterbalance the loss of opportunity to 
see and have examined and cross-examined the only prosecution eye-witness 
against him.” Hence, this Court then found that the admission of the hearsay 
statement against Mr Tahery had also infringed the accused’s right to fair trial 
provided by Article 6(1) of the Convention.721  
The government of the United Kingdom approached the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights to reconsider these 2009 judgements of the Fourth 
Section of this Court in the cases of Al-Khawaja and Tahery.722 The Grand Chamber 
of this Court had to determine whether the trial judges’ application of the “interests of 
justice” test when receiving each hearsay statement had safeguarded the accused’s 
right to a fair trial as provided by Article 6(1) of the Convention.723 The third-party 
intervener argued that the common law right of confrontation acknowledged the risk 
inherent in receiving  hearsay statements and that “the essence of the common-law 
right of confrontation lay in the insight that cross-examination was the most effective 
way of establishing reliability of  a witness’s evidence.”724 In other words, the 
submission made was that reliability of evidence at common law was determined 
through cross-examination and that hearsay evidence should not be received even if 
it was deemed to be in the interests of justice where such evidence would violate the 
common law right of confrontation. Furthermore, the constitutionality of the UK’s 
legislation which provides for the admission of hearsay evidence in the interests of 
justice which was applied by the trial court when admitting the hearsay evidence in 
question was also disputed. It was also argued that the interests of justice test has 
not only reformed the hearsay rule but has also ameliorated the “common-law right 
of confrontation,” a process which, it was argued could not have been warranted or 
intended by the legislature.725 In the Al-Khawaja case, however, the Grand Chamber 
held that it was in the interests of justice to receive the hearsay evidence of the 
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deceased witness and that there was no infringement of the right to a fair trial.726 On 
the other hand, in the Tahery case, this Court held that it was not in the interests of 
justice to admit the hearsay statement of witness who refused to testify at the trial 
because of fear of intimidation and that when admitting her hearsay statement in the 
interests of justice the accused’s right to a fair trial had been infringed.727 Metcalfe 
concurs with the Court’s decision in the Al-Khawaja and Tahery’s cases that the 
interests of justice test could not safeguard the right to a fair trial when hearsay 
evidence was received, and argues that this test had been applied by the trial court 
in convicting the accused after it had been introduced by a “dodgy piece of 
legislation.”728 In addition, Mulcahy also argues that the interests of justice test when 
used to determine the admissibility of hearsay evidence in the light of the right to a 
fair trial could lead to “unfair consequences” because the “ECHR has held repeatedly 
that a trial is unfair if the defendant’s conviction was predicated on an 
uncorroborated hearsay statement and the defendant never had the opportunity to 
question the statement’s author.”729 
Furthermore, Maffei examined the application of the right to a fair trial in the 
Convention and the right to examine witnesses which also forms part of the fair trial 
right, and he argues that if a right is “fundamental it cannot be taken away simply by 
showing that a majority of people would be better off if it were not applied in a given 
situation.”730 Maffei also examines the balance that should be made when 
considering fundamental rights and the interests of society and notes that, “a right 
would hardly be worthy of description as fundamental if it could be curtailed by a 
simple reference to the public interest.”731 These views, expressed by Maffei, on the 
primary feature of a fundamental right seem to be in accord with those articulated by 
Dworkin on this principle where he argues that: 
“It cannot be an argument for curtailing a right simply that society would pay a further price for 
extending it. There must be something special about that further cost, or there must be some other 
feature of the case, that makes it sensible to say that although great social cost is warranted to 
protect the original right, this particular cost is not necessary. Otherwise Government failure to extend 
the right will show that its recognition of the right in the original case is a sham.”
732
 
The views shared by these authors seem to suggest that a fundamental right, like 
the right to a fair trial, should not be readily sacrificed in the face of “public interests” 
and that, in the event that such an infringement takes place, that could be an 
indication that the government’s understanding and acknowledgement of the right in 
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question was a pretence and spurious. It is submitted that the notions of a 
fundamental right envisaged by Maffei and Dworkin are in startling contrast to the 
scope, application and nature of the interests of justice test as used by the trial court 
in the Al-Khawaja and Tahery’s cases as well as the provisions of the South African 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 in safeguarding the right to a fair trial, a 
right which is commonly understood to be a fundamental right. 
6.4 Conclusion 
South African courts and academics seem to be in accord in holding the view that 
section 3 of the Act and the tests it uses to determine the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence, namely, the interests of justice and the reliability of evidence are 
constitutional and do not violate an accused’s right to a fair trial. 
The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, considers the reliability of 
evidence approach to be unconstitutional and not capable of protecting an accused’s 
right to a fair trial. In addition, academics also concur with these views expressed by 
the Court in finding the reliability of evidence test to be unconstitutional. While this 
Court seems not to cast doubts on the constitutionality of the interests of justice test 
as model for determining the admission of hearsay, the constitutionality of this test 
was questioned and doubted by the legislature when the draft Bill containing this 
legislation was debated in the House of Representatives. The Bill was later adopted 
as a compromise when the right of confrontation jurisprudence had not been fully 
developed. Moreover, academics seem to agree that the interest of justice 
framework is an unconstitutional mode of determining the admissibility of evidence 
and further that it gives judges unrestrained and unchecked powers to redefine and 
re-establish the hearsay rule. The majority of the United Kingdom courts’ decisions 
view the interests of justice and the reliability of evidence tests to be constitutional 
and not violating an accused’s common law right of confrontation. However, this is 
not the unanimous standpoint of the UK courts. Academics, on the other hand, 
consider these tests and the legislation which contained it to be unconstitutional and 
infringing an accused’s right to a fair trial and the common law right of confrontation. 
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights seems not to be fully persuaded 
that the interests of justice test is capable of protecting a fair trial and the right to 
examine witnesses under the Convention. Academics, on the other hand, are in 
accord in concluding that this framework violates an accused’s right to a fair trial 
provided by the Convention. 
In summary, while the South African perspectives seem to suggest that section 3 
and the tests it uses when receiving hearsay evidence, namely, the interests of 
justice and the reliability of evidence tests, are compatible with the right to a fair trial 
and, therefore constitutionally sound, the international jurisprudence in the 
application, nature and scope of these tests contains divergent views. Hence these 
latter views, assertively cast well-founded doubts and scepticism on the 
constitutionality of the admission of hearsay evidence through section 3 of the Act. 
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
7.1 Conclusion  
The hearsay rule as an English common law principle was developed with the 
objective of excluding hearsay evidence if such evidence was deemed not to be 
falling within the well-known common law exceptions. This principle also formed an 
integral part of the adversarial trial system, a system which requires that both 
adversaries to the dispute should appear in person and give their evidence before 
the trier of fact. In addition, this principle also requires that the accuser and the 
accused’s evidence should be tested through certain procedural devices amongst 
which, cross-examination, was deemed to be the primary procedural test to establish 
reliability of evidence. 
The accused’s right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is an ancient principle 
which is not only an English common law notion but which was also applied under 
Roman law. In addition, English common law developed one of the trials by ordeal 
termed “trial by battle” which required that litigants engage in a physical fight which 
was accompanied by a prayer to God to judge or show the guilty party. This trial 
procedure later developed and required that litigants should verbally confront each 
other through cross-examination. The origin of the accused’s right to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses and the hearsay rule are thought to have been at the roots of this 
medieval era trial by ordeal.  
This fundamental principle of English common law, where both the litigants appear in 
person before the trier of fact, give their evidence in each other’s presence, and 
where the reliability of their evidence is tested through cross-examination was 
commonly known as the principle if orality. Hearsay evidence, on the other hand, 
was admissible, and there were scepticism about its reliability and credibility as 
evidence because it was evidence which was not subjected to cross-examination. 
This was the English common law that was received in South Africa in the form of 
case law and the writing of English academics.  While this English common law 
received through case law and writing of academics included the hearsay rule, it also 
contained divergent views on the nature and scope of the hearsay rule, including the 
definition of hearsay evidence. This state of affairs soon created problems of its own 
in that the South African hearsay jurisprudence which was formed through these 
contrasting standpoints later became difficult to apply and interpret. It was the 
application of this jurisprudence which made the need for legislative reforms of the 
hearsay rule in South Africa inevitable.  
This state of affairs led the South African legislature to investigate and reform the 
hearsay rule and recommendations were made which contained some reforms which 
were adopted and bacame the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. In 
addition, the South African Law Reform Commission, in its recommendations, also 
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identified the need for legislative reforms to the hearsay evidence which would 
provide for a judicial discretion to admit hearsay evidence. When, however, the 
legislature adopted the Act and incorporated the Law Commission’s 
recommendations, it did not state whether the Act had created discretion to admit 
hearsay because the wording of the Act does not state whether it contains such 
discretion. As a result of this aspect of the Act not being comprehensible there have 
also been divergent views from courts and academics regarding the existence of 
such discretion, an issue which still remains unresolved through courts’ interpretation 
of the legislature’s intention in the Act. 
Moreover, the Act also provides that courts should be allowed to use their private 
opinions when determining whether to admit hearsay evidence in the interests of 
justice, a practice which would be contrary to the application of judicial discretion at 
common law, because the use of discretion could not include private opinions at 
common law. 
While the objective of the Act seems to be clear in that it was intended to simplify 
and develop the hearsay rule’s dilemma which was created when interpreting 
English common law, it remains questionable whether the text of the Act has 
accomplished the much-needed reform of South African hearsay evidence. 
The definition of the hearsay evidence, on the other hand, also presents another 
dilemma in that there have been contradictory views on the scope and nature of 
hearsay evidence when courts and academics have construed the provisions of the 
Act through this definition. This definition is also thought to be confusing and 
incomprehensible, and hence it is disputed whether it has intelligibly reformed our 
hearsay evidence. 
The Act also admits hearsay evidence when the admission of such evidence is 
considered to be in the interests of justice. The effect of the application of this test on 
the accused’s right to a fair trial has been that, because it creates an unpredictable 
framework for the admission of evidence, and hence it violates the principle of legal 
certainty which forms part of the notion of the rule of law, it is an unconstitutional tool 
used to establish whether hearsay evidence is admissible or not. In addition, the Act 
also receives hearsay evidence when such evidence is deemed to be reliable. The 
United States Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington733has held that this test, viz. 
the reliability of hearsay evidence, is unconstitutional when applied in the light of the 
accused’s right to be confronted with witnesses against him. 
Furthermore, the meaning and intention of the right to a fair trial, which includes the 
right to challenge evidence, is also an issue which has caused some divergent views 
from the courts and academics. The fundamental defect in the text of the 
Constitution remains the fact that it fails to state whether this right includes the right 
to cross-examine witnesses. While the historical background and majority of the 
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views by courts and academics seem to suggest that this right cannot be separable 
from cross-examination, this aspect remains incoherent in the text of the 
Constitution. 
The hearsay rule and the right of confrontation also form part of the legal system of 
major common law jurisdictions. The United States Constitution also provides for the 
accused’s right to be confronted with witnesses against him. While hearsay evidence 
was held to be admissible when it was deemed to be reliable in the Roberts case, 
this reliability of hearsay approach was also found to be unconstitutional in the 2004 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington.734 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, like South Africa and the United States, also 
recognises the common law right of confrontation and has statutorily reformed the 
hearsay rule and has incorporated a test in which hearsay evidence would be 
admissible if the court would consider the admission of such hearsay to be in the 
interests of justice and based on reliability. The constitutionality of this test and the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) which introduced it remain questionable and 
disputed. In the United Kingdom the interest of justice approach is thought to be 
violating an accused’s right to a fair trial and to be unconstitutional because, it is 
argued, it is too wide and unpredictable. 
Canada has also reformed and introduced reforms to its hearsay rule which allows 
for the admission of hearsay evidence on two tests, viz. necessity and reliability. 
Australia, on the other hand, also recognises the hearsay rule and has reformed it to 
admit hearsay when such evidence is considered to be reliable. In addition, New 
Zealand has also reformed its hearsay rule and receives hearsay by making reliance 
on the necessity and reliability test which is also part of Canadian hearsay law. In 
addition, the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission has approved and adopted the 
Canadian approach which admits hearsay evidence on the two-pronged test, viz. 
necessity and reliability. As in Hong Kong, Ireland has also rejected the UK hearsay 
reform which admits hearsay through the interests of justice test and has also raised 
some concerns about the impact of this approach on a fair trial. Ireland, however, 
has also approved an approach in which hearsay evidence would be admissible 
because it is deemed to be reliable. Hence the reliability of hearsay evidence 
approach forms part of the hearsay jurisprudence of Ireland, Hong Kong, Australia, 
New Zealand, UK, USA and South Africa. As was discussed above, in Crawford v 
Washington the United States Supreme Court recently held that to admit hearsay 
evidence because it was deemed to be reliable to a court was an unconstitutional 
procedure and it infringed upon an accused’s right to be confronted with witnesses 
against him.735  
While the European Court of Human Rights admits hearsay evidence by making 
reliance on the reliability of evidence and the interests of justice test, this Court has 
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recently held that the interests of justice is not an adequate countervailing factor 
which can protect an accused’s right to a fair trial. 
In summary, the constitutionality of section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
45 of 1988 remains questionable because it provides a discretion to admit hearsay 
evidence based on the interests of justice and reliability of evidence framework, 
which has been found to be unconstitutional by both the United States Court 
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. A similar reform provided 
by the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 which also provides this residual discretion, as 
was shown above, was recently rejected by the Hong Kong Law Reform 
Commission and the Irish Law Reform Commission. As it was discussed above, in 
its 2009 report the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission has also examined this 
provisions of the South African Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 which 
provided the interests of justice framework and rejected such reform because it “was 
concerned about the open-endedness of the discretion (i.e. ‘admitted in the interests 
of justice’).”736 In addition, the constitutionality of the reliability of hearsay evidence 
test, which also forms part of the admissibility requirement under this Act, is also 
questioned and disputed. 
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